ON NATUEE AND GRACE. A THEOLOGICAL TREATISE. ^M1 BOOK I. BY WILLIAM GEOEGE WARD, D.Pn. LATE LECTUEER IN DOGMATIC THEOLOGY AT ST. EDMUND'S SEMINARY HERTS. LONDON : BURNS AKD LAMBERT, 17 PORTMAN STREET, PORTMAN SQ. MDCCCLX. {The ngM of Translation is reserved.} ' LONDON: Printed by G. BARCLAY, Castle St. Leicester Sq. To His Eminence, Nicholas, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, My dear Lord Cardinal, IT was you who placed me in my position at St. Edmund's ; and you were kind enough to express much regret, when the failure of health and other circumstances of a private character necessitated my abandoning it. To whom therefore can I so suitably dedicate the first publication which re- sults from that position ? It might seem indeed that some apology is needed, for venturing on this dedication, without having first solicited your Eminence's permission. My only reason for not asking it, has been my iv DEDICATION. anxiety to prevent the possibility of any one supposing, that you are in any way responsible for the contents of this volume. At the same time I need hardly add, what deep gratification it would afford me, so far as I should find you to approve what I have written, and to approve the fact of my writing it. I am most glad of the present opportunity, to give expression, and so relief, to my feelings of gratitude, for the constant kindnesses which I have received from your Eminence : kindnesses, which have continued uninterruptedly to the pre- sent time, from a period preceding by several years my reception into the Church. My personal obligations to you indeed, of which this very volume reminds me, are far greater than you are perhaps at all aware. To your kind confidence I owe, what I have ever regarded as the chief blessing and privilege of my external Catholic life ; my connection with the Seminary. To you I am hidebted for seven years, far happier than any which I ever before spent ; and far happier than any others are at all likely to be, on this side the grave. To you I owe it, that during those years I have been rescued from the dull and wearisome routine of secular life in the world; and allowed to bear a part, however indirect, in DEDICATION. V one of the very noblest works which can possibly occupy the intellect or engage the affections, — the training of ecclesiastical students for the fulfilment of their high vocation. Yet at last the personal obligations to you under which I lie, are as nothing compared with the obligations, resting on public grounds, which I share in common with the whole Catholic Church in England. I feel most deeply, that the prin- ciples of government and administration, which you have introduced and maintained amongst us, are our one hope, under God, for the real and solid promotion of Catholicism, in this our country. That it may be God's pleasure to re- establish you in perfect health, and to preserve for His Church in England the inestimable benefit of your government and counsels, — this is at the present moment the frequent and earnest prayer of many devoted hearts. On these three grounds, I trust that you will not consider me as obtrusive or inoppor- tune, when I ask to place this volume under your Eminence's patronage. I offer it to you, as the first-fruits, if I may so express myself, of that vocation to which you summoned me. I offer it, as an inadequate expression of gratitude, for per- sonal kindnesses which I can never forget. I offer VI DEDICATION. it still more earnestly, as a humble contribution on my part to the general sum of grateful acknow- ledgment, which is due to you from the whole English Church. In entering then on my most anxious theo- logical enterprise, I entreat your Eminence's bless- ing on myself and on my work. And I beg to subscribe myself, With deep respect, Your ever affectionate and grateful Servant, W. G. WARD. PREFACE. I AM hoping, if God enables me, to publish a theological treatise on c Nature and Grace,' founded on part of my course at St. Edmund's. In offering then to the public this first volume of the intended work, I shall reasonably be expected in the first place to explain, what is that portion of Theology, which I mean to express by the above title. I will answer this question as briefly as I can ; for its full consideration belongs to the second volume. In order however to answer it at all, it is necessary to attempt some general chart or map of theological science as a whole. The recognised model for a scientific arrangement of Theology, is St. Thomas's 4 Surnma.' This great work is divided into three parts, of which the contents are as follows : — The 4 Pars Prima ' begins with ' de Deo/ and pro- ceeds to 4 de Trinitate.7 So far it is one connected whole, in the strictest sense; for the doctrine which concerns the latter, absolutely and entirely depends on that which concerns the former. In addition to these fundamental doctrines, the 4 Pars Prima ' contains cer- tain minor matters, on which we need not further Vlli PREFACE. dwell : such as ' de Angelis ; ' and a certain, some- what miscellaneous, assortment of subjects, which stand in later treatises under the general head c de Deo Creatore.' The ' Pars Secunda ' makes a fresh start altogether : and resting its foundation on'the observed facts of human nature, proceeds to consider the various constituents of human action ; the rules of life obligatory on man ; the nature of virtue and vice; and other matters of the same kind : finally crowning the whole with the doctrine of Divine Grace. It is divided into two portions, the la 2ffi, and 2a 2s6 : the former of which proceeds scientifi- cally over the ground which I have just mentioned ; while the latter considers various virtues and vices in particular, with their appertaining circumstances. The 'Pars Tertia' is on the Incarnation and the Sacraments. Any treatment of the Incarnation must include two things. First, it must include a treatment of the Hypostatic Union : and this must necessarily be based on the doctrine c de Trinitate ; ' for it is only by mastering first that doctrine which concerns the Second Person in Himself, that we can possibly study the further doctrine, of His assuming human nature. The other portion, necessarily included in any treatment of the Incarnation, comprises all questions concerning the human soul and body which have been thus assumed. These questions depend on matters treated in the ' Pars Secunda.' We wish to know for instance, what are the endowments of Christ's soul ; what Grace visits it ; what Grace inhabits it : this presupposes the whole doctrine of Grace in general. The doctrine of the Incarnation then is a kind of bridge, uniting the c Pars PREFACE. IX Prima ' with the ' Pars Secunda.' Part of St. Thomas's doctrine in the ' Pars Tertia ' depends on the ' Pars Prima,' and part on the 'Pars Secunda;' but the 'Pars Prima ' and ' Pars Secunda ' themselves are mutually independent. On reviewing then the -whole 'corpus' of Theo- logy, so far as S. Thomas's ' Summa ' may be taken as representing it,* we shall find its organic structure to be of the following kind. Its foundation is composed of two independent portions; and its superstructure rests upon both. There are one or two doctrinal matters indeed, which can hardly be considered as integral parts of this scientific structure at all ; which can be studied as satisfactorily, in one order as in another. But in regard to far the greater number of doctrines, the case is otherwise ; and it is of very considerable importance, if we wish to master them at all thoroughly, that we study them in their due scientific place. * A remark has been made to me by a friend of mine, a priest, which appears true ; though it so unconnected with our immediate subject, that I cannot do more than most briefly allude to it. He considers that St. Thomas's ' Summa' is incomplete, in its theological plan, as containing no sufficient treatment of the ' De Ecclesia.' ' There are three elements,' he observes, ' required to make a good product in concreto from theological teaching : — 1. Scientific teaching of dogma. 2. Its ascetic correlative, i.e. the personal. 3. The life of the citizen of the Kingdom.1 St. Thomas's Theology, he proceeds in effect to say, does not include any sufficient foundation for the latter requisite. ' Our present Theology,' he observes, 'seems to be a stranger to any scientific handling of the two societies, which, as St. Augustine says, dispute possession of the world ; the Civitas Terrena and the Civitas Ccelestis.' I think that these remarks are well founded ; and that a full treatise 'De Ecclesia,' succeeding, and based upon, the treatise 'De Incarnatione,' is indispensable for a complete theological corpus. X PEEFACE. It will be asked, what I mean by this phrase, ' independent ' portions of science ; and a ready illus- tration is at hand. Mathematics is one science, just as Theology is ; yet in its earlier and more rudimental teaching, it is made up of two ( independent' portions, — Algebra and Geometry. Algebra may be studied before Geometry, or Geometry before Algebra ; because (as I have said) they are 'independent' portions of science. On the other hand, in Geometry you cannot study the fourth book of Euclid before the first ; nor in Algebra can you study equations before addition and subtraction. So in Theology. It is impossible to understand the ' de Deo Trino,' till we have studied the 4de Deo Uno ;' and it is impossible to understand the ' de Gratia,' till we have studied the 4 de Actibus Humanis.' But that portion of science on the one hand, which contains the ' de Deo Uno et Trino;' — and that portion, on the other hand, which contains the ' de Actibus Humanis' and ' de Gratia;' — these are mutually independent : it is a matter of indifference, which is studied before the other. Lastly, upon these two independent portions is founded the doctrine of the Incarnation, and all which follows. That portion of Theology then, to which I give the title ' On Nature and Grace,' is the latter of those two independent portions above mentioned. It includes all those revealed truths, which relate directly to each man's moral and spiritual action or condition : all those which concern his individual relations with God His true End ; whether he be tending towards that End, or moving unhappily in the opposite direction. These truths, as will at once be manifest, are PREFACE. XI almost exclusively confined to the contents of S. Thomas's 'Pars Secunda:' yet there are one or two additional matters, which it falls within my plan to introduce. One of these is the state of Original Justice. How can the doctrine of Grace be understood, without considering Original Sin ? Or how can the doctrine of Original Sin be understood, without considering Original Justice? The propriety of this introduction then, is (I hope) most obvious. There is another assemblage of truths, which I hope to introduce from the 'Pars Prima ;' viz. those which appertain to God's Providence and Predestination. A moment's thought will shew, how completely these truths are included within the description which I gave, as to that portion of Theology which I undertake ; for nothing can more closely concern man's individual relations with God his True End. The doctrine of Providence and Predestination, just as the doctrine of Grace itself, considers, on the one hand, the effect of God's Agency on man's free acts ; and considers, on the other hand, the reciprocal bearing of man's free acts on God's Counsels and Agency. The connexion between the two is close and indissoluble. Once more. The doctrine of Justification is most strictly within the compass of this treatise. And yet it is impossible fully to discuss it, unless we carefully consider the qualities of that ' attrition,' which suffices for an adult's justification in the sacraments of Baptism and Penance. Thus we are led to some little encroach- ment on the ' Pars Tertia.' Still on the whole, this treatise, as I have said, will not go beyond the ground covered by the 'Pars Xli PREFACE. Secunda.' And it will naturally divide itself into five Books, of very unequal length; as follows : — Book 1st. Philosophical Introduction. Book 2d. Theological Prolegomena. Book 3d. On Man's Moral Action. Book 4th. On Divine Grace. Book 5th. On God's Providence and Predestination. The titles of the three last Books sufficiently explain their intended contents. In the second Book, I hope to include two different subjects. Firstly, I hope to consider the general nature and character of Theology; with so much, at least, of detail and ex- plicitness, as may give us means of assigning their true relative values, to the various * loci,' or sources, from which our theological arguments will be derived. And further, I hope to include in the same Book a theological treatment (so far as such is necessary) of those various philosophical principles, which we shall have established in this, the first Book. So much then, on the general contents of the Books which are to follow. I must now refer, in somewhat greater detail, to the contents of this first Book, which is now presented to the public. And as it purports to be the 'philosophical introduction' to a * theological treatise,' it will be necessary, by way of preliminary explanation, to say something on the relation between Philosophy and Theology. This also is to be one of the matters handled in the second Book; and it will here therefore be treated with the greatest attainable brevity. PREFACE. Xlll THEOLOGY and Philosophy agree with each other in being sciences : in what do they differ ? The answer which meets us on the surface, is of the following kind. 4 Theology and Philosophy are mutually ex- * elusive. Philosophy is produced, by Reason exercising ' itself on those data, which Reason itself declares ; * Theology, by Reason exercising itself on those data, 4 which are known only by Revelation. If a truth can ' be deduced from Reason and Experience alone, it ' appertains to Philosophy ; if it can only be known ' through Revelation, to Theology/ But one single instance will sufficiently shew, that there is some inaccuracy in this statement. All Catholics agree in holding, as a truth which Reason alone is able to establish, that there exists that Being, Infinite in all Perfections, Whom we call God. From this datum, thus given by Reason, Reason is able readily to deduce all God's principal Attributes : His Aseity, Simplicity, Eternity, Immensity, Immutability, Sanctity, Omniscience, Omnipotence. It would follow then, from the distinction above attempted between Theology and Philosophy, that a consideration of these Attributes is totally external to the province of Theology. Yet it is difficult to imagine a conclusion, more opposed to the Church's universal and continuous practice, and more repugnant to the instinctive feeling of every theologian, than such a statement would be. And the very same reasoning holds, in regard to certain other most important matters of doctrine, which shall pre- sently be mentioned. It is necessary therefore, some- what to revise the above statement : and a very little consideration indeed will enable us to see its fallacy. PREFACE. Theology is produced by the exercise of Reason on those truths, which the Apostles committed to the Church's custody. This is admitted on all hands. Now it is implied, in the distinction just now attempted between Theology and Philosophy, that all these truths are in such sense supernatural, that Reason by itself would be wholly unable to establish them. But there cannot be a greater mistake, than to suppose that all revealed truths are of this kind : and this I now proceed to shew. Certainly no announcement occupied a more promi- nent place in the apostolic teaching, than this ; that a Divine Person, clothed in human nature, had visited this earth ; that He had died an atoning death ; that upon that death He had built an Universal Church. Now it was impossible for the Apostles to teach this doctrine, without teaching in its company the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity ; and it was impossible for them to teach the Trinity, unless there already existed a clear and full apprehension of the Divine Unity. But go where they might externally to Juda3a, the great mass of the people had totally lost their hold of this funda- mental Verity. The revival then, in all their purity, of those doctrines concerning God, which Reason by it- self is able to establish, — this was among the very first enterprises, which it was necessary for the Apostles to set on foot. These doctrines, as all must admit, are to the full as integral and indispensable a part of the Apo- stolic teaching, as are the Trinity and the Incarnation. But again. This Person, as being the Incarnate God, was to be The One Pattern and Exemplar of Sanctity in the Church through every age. Will any PREFACE. XV one say, that the ideal of virtuousness, then prevalent in the heathen world, approached ever so distantly to this Divine Type? Here then was another achievement, which it was absolutely necessary to accomplish. The prevalent ideal of virtuousness was to be radically reformed ; the existing notions of good and evil were to be almost revolutionized ; in one word, the Natural Law was to be republished. It was simply impossible, that our Lord should be accepted as the Model of Life, unless this other task, — republishing the Natural Law, — were also successfully undertaken. I may add also, it was simply impossible that the doctrines of Divine Grace should be preached, unless the faithful were enabled to understand, what is the nature and character of that true and solid virtue, which Grace is to generate in their souls. But in truth there is a reason, even deeper than either of these two, why the republication of true moral prin- ciples was so absolutely indispensable an element of Christian teaching. Why did God the Son clothe Himself in our nature and die on the Cross ? that He might raise men to salvation hereafter, by raising them to sanctity here. Sanctity and salvation, — here is the very end for which Christianity was given. Cer- tainly then it cannot contain any more more vital or more integral doctrine, than its declaration of what sanctity is. There is a considerable body of Truth then, which is in itself capable of being established by Reason ; but which is nevertheless so primary and prominent a part of the Christian Revelation, that no other whatever can possibly be more so. Theology, it is true, is founded exclusively on ' principia revelata :' I only say, that of XVI PREFACE. these 'principia revelata,' there are some most impor- tant and essential, which might have been known by Reason had there been no Revelation.* This body of Dogma belongs as simply and absolutely to Theology, as do the very doctrines of the Trinity or of Habitual Grace : and yet in another very true sense, it belongs to Philosophy also. It is desirable to give it a special name ; and I might be tempted to call it ' Theological Philosophy,' were it not that this term would be so often understood in a totally different sense, as express- ing the philosophy, or rationale, of Theology. I will call this body of Truth, then, the ' Higher Philosophy ;' using this term in a somewhat technical sense. This Higher Philosophy will be found to consist of three principal divisions: (1) the doctrines ' de Deo Uno;' (2) the truths of Morality ; (3) various portions of Ethical Psychology. On the two former divisions we have already spoken. In regard to Ethical Psy- chology, the term is explained in the present volume, p. 193. And in support of my statement, that various parts of this science belong in the strictest sense to Theology, let such questions as the following be duly considered. How far is it possible, without prayer, to resist grave temptation, or keep the sum of God's Commandments? How far is it possible to preserve the remembrance of God throughout the day, amidst the jar and tumult of every-day life ? How far is it true, that, in our fallen state, our will is weaker in the good than in the evil direction? How far are we necessitated to aim at our own felicity ? These and * See St. Thomas, 2* 2ae, q. 2, a. 4. PREFACE. XV 11 many other questions of the same kind, it is manifest, are most strictly theological ; they are such as the Apostles must certainly have answered one way or other, when delivering that body of doctrine, which is to raise us towards sanctity. On the other hand, these same questions are no less strictly psychological ; and are amenable to the tribunal of consciousness and experience. Then consider the great stress, laid by St. Paul- and by the whole Church after him, on Concupiscence. Does not this shew, how strictly theo- logical is the discussion of its phenomena ? Yet what is such discussion, except a psychological analysis ? How large a portion of Theology is constituted by this Higher Philosophy, one single consideration will sufficiently shew. St. Thomas's 4 Summa ' is a ' Summa Theologice : ' yet how large a portion of it is occupied, with matters which are within the region of Philo- sophy ? In the ' Pars Prima,' at least 35 questions out of 119; in the 'Prima Secundse,' at least 82 out of 114; in the ' Secunda Secundse,' not very far from 170 out of 189.* Again, ' Moral Theology,' as its name denotes, is part of ' Theology ; ' yet, in at least two- thirds of its extent, it is occupied with truths, which are in themselves within the province of Reason. See the remarks made in p. 151, 2 of this volume. See however p. 117, 8 and p. 149-151. The whole of my present volume, it will be seen, * Pars la q. 2-22, and 75-88. Prima Secundae, q. 1-66 ; 71-79 ; 90-97. I include q. 3 with its n. 8, because St. Thomas professes (though I venture to think most unsatisfactorily) to prove by Reason, that Beatitude must consist in the Vision of God's Essence. Secunda Secundee, q. 1-170. Since God's Existence is demonstrable by Reason, so also must be the larger part of those main doctrines, which relate to the three theological virtues. b XV111 PREFACE. (with the most insignificant exception of four pages, 424-428) appertains to this part of Philosophy. The first Chapter purports to be 'on the Principles of * Morality ;' and the second, 'on Ethical Psychology :' while of the third Chapter, its first Section belongs to the latter, and its second to the former. It will be desirable then to add a few words, on the spirit of deference to the Church, with which every Catholic philosopher is bound to approach such subjects. Undoubtedly, whatever part of Philosophy be in- vestigated by the Catholic, he owes implicit obedience to the voice of the Church. Whether he be studying the deep mysteries of Space and Time ; or the geological conformation of our planet ; or the planetary universe in general; — on all these subjects the Church possesses indirect authority. In all these investigations, she has the fullest right of peremptorily interfering, wherever she judges that any scientific conclusions lead to consequences, at variance with that doctrinal deposit which is committed to her keeping.* But such inter- * Lord Macaulay indeed attributes to us a different doctrine. He is referring to the case of Galileo, and he makes this remark : ' All intelligent 1 Catholics now hold, with Pascal, that in deciding the point at all, the ' Church exceeded her powers, and was therefore justly left destitute of ' supernatural assistance.' (Review of Ranke.) I hope I am an ' intelligent Catholic' ; but I utterly repudiate any such position. I never indeed heard of any Catholic, ' intelligent ' or otherwise, who had given his atten- tion to the subject, holding any position of the kind. And if Lord Macaulay be right in thinking that Pascal did so, it is only necessary to reply, that where the question concerns due submission to the Church, Pascal is among the very last guides whom a well -instructed Catholic would wish to follow. In regard to the censure of Galileo, if his censured propositions had been most strictly and exclusively theological, it would have none the less been true, that the c?nsure was not of that character, which any theologian regards as claiming the Catholic's interior assent. It so happens, that proof can be adduced of this, which must satisfy the most eager opponent. PREFACE. XIX ferences are of course most rare ; nor are they founded, on any kind of authority which she possesses over secular science as such. They are founded on the obliga- tion under which she lies, of protecting her own science from invasion and detriment ; and on the privileges with which she has been invested by God, for the fulfilment of that obligation. Such are the limits of the Church's authority, within the sphere of purely secular science. But when we are handling such subjects as those with which the present volume is occupied, the case is most different. We are on the Church's special ground. We must look to her at every step for guidance : we must carefully direct our course by those landmarks, which she has so plentifully provided ; or some disastrous misadventure will result. But it is impossible for me to speak in this way, without calling to mind the possibility, that this volume may come under the eye of Protestants. They will read such language as the above with so much indignation and impatience, that it seems de- F. Faure, S. J. was one of the most eminent and learned theologians whom the last century produced. His eminence as an astronomer however was far from equalling his eminence as a theologian ; and he was most intensely opposed to the Copernican theory. Nay, he opposes Copernicanism on theological grounds ; and says that, if we once admit it, we have no defence left against Socinianism. ' Argumentati sumus,' he says, * neces- sariam esse illationem a Copernicanismo affirmato, ad amrmandum Socini- anismum' ; with very much more to the same purpose. (Notes on St. Augus- tine's Enchiridion, Passaglia's Edition, p. 49, col. 2.) Now F. Faure is writing to Catholics ; and he holds that, even on theo- logical grounds, Copernicanism is a most pernicious and destructive error : it is quite certain therefore, that he will make every use in his power of any condemnation of Copernicanism, which the Church has ever pronounced. I would beg the reader then most carefully to observe the following language. * Quee omnia cum scribimus, scimus Socinianorum errorem . . . fuisse et esse ab Ecclesia damnatum ; quam damnationem adhuc non pasta est hypothesis XX PREFACE. sirable to say something on its manifest reasonableness. It is difficult, indeed, at all times to apprehend the precise ground of Protestant dissent from our doctrines. The deep and contemptuous prejudice with which (alas for themselves!) they regard our Creed, so possesses them, that they will not ordinarily take the trouble to analyse their objections, or put them into any definite shape. And so, in the matter before us, they deal in vague generalities; they say, e.g. that our maxims fetter the intellect, and enslave the soul : and they leave us to guess at the meaning of these gene- ralities as best we may. Our own view of the case certainly seems on the surface simple and intelligible. All Truth is ordinarily a blessing ; but Truth, on those matters which directly concern virtue and piety, is among the very greatest blessings which we can receive. If then the Church is divinely commissioned to teach us such Truth, we are most grateful to God accordingly. We should no more imagine that this precious gift fetters the intellect and enslaves the soul, — than we should so think, if Copernicana, sive ull& pontificia bulla sive ullo concilii cecumenici decreto. Ceeterum nos, non auctoritate (quae nulla nobis est) definientes, sed theo- logice ratiocinantes, argumentamur ab absurdo : quod argumentationis genus Catholic! ipsi Scholastic! contra Scholasticos alios usurpant, sine alterius injurid.' (p. 52, col. 1). F. Faure is evidently desirous that Copernicanism should be condemned, and thinks that it fully deserves condemnation ; yet he is obliged to confess that, at the moment of his writing, it is a perfectly open question. Nor does this arise, from his forgetting the censures which had been put forth on Galileo ; for he distinctly mentions them immediately afterwards. He cites the ' decreta Congregationis Cardinalium sub Paulo V. die 5 Martii, 1616 ;' and also the 'censuratheologorum de mandato pontificis selectorum.' He cites these, at the head of his list of quotations ; quotations which are adduced to shew, how many and how strong Catholic authorities he PREFACE. XXI God mercifully revealed the efficacy of some medicine, which experience had not yet discovered; or than Adam so thought, when God instructed him how to till the earth and reap its fruits. Such language then as the above seems most strangely chosen, if all which Protestants mean to ex- press is, that they are not themselves convinced, by those proofs which satisfy us of the Church's infallible authority. Such a difference is one of fact, not of principle ; and it seems quite unmeaning to express it in such phraseology as we have been considering. If however this be their whole meaning, of course it is impossible here to reply : because such a reply would simply be a discussion on the grounds on which the Church's claims repose ; and such a discussion would occupy a volume. Here it is only necessary to say, that a Protestant's authority on such a matter is, in general, worth extremely little ; for a Protestant, who knows with any kind of accuracy what we believe and why, is among the rarest of human beings. But I cannot help thinking, that Protestants do often mean something more definite, when they use such has on his side. But the idea never occurs to him of pressing them further ; of even starting the supposition, that they bind the Catholic's opinion to one side of the question. I should add, that he speaks of ' Copernicani Catholici, si qui sunt qui systema illud, non tantuin ut hypothesin, defendunt ; in quo nulla esset difficultas.' This shews, I suppose, that not many Catholics in F. Faure's time held Copernican opinions ; so far at least as he was himself aware : but it shews much more clearly, that (in Faure's judgment) they might hold them, without ceasing to be Catholics ; or in other words (which indeed he had already expressly stated) that Copernicanism had never been condemned. See, On the relations between Christianity and Scientific Investigation, an able essay of Father Newman's : ' On University Subjects,' p. 262. XXli PREFACE. language. Some such statement as the following may perhaps correctly express their objection. ' Of course, ' where truth is to be received, which is above the 4 sphere of the intellect, an unquestioning acceptance of 4 God's Word is our only mode of arriving at it. But * within the region of Philosophy, the intellect should 4 reign supreme and uncontrolled. Wherever any 4 matter is concerned, which the intellect can reach at « all, — its one way of reaching it is the way of free, * unrestrained, unbiassed enquiry. To place any check ' upon such enquiry, is to fetter the intellect and enslave 4 the soul. Here is one strong reason, in addition to the 4 many others which will ever keep me back from 4 Catholicism ; viz. that it sanctions such tyrannical ' interference. I can never believe, that a revelation 4 from God goes counter to those intellectual laws, 4 which God Himself established in creating man/ This is undoubtedly a most intelligible objection ; and one which we can briefly notice in this place. I reply then most confidently, by denying the whole assumed principle. I deny altogether, that the intel- lect's appointed way of arriving at Truth, is that of unbiassed and uncontrolled inquiry. I assert the very contrary. I maintain, that so soon as the intellect quits the region of pure mathematics, it absolutely requires, for its healthy action, the being compelled constantly to compare its conclusions with some external standard. The vast majority even of speculative men, — or (to speak more truly) the whole body of them without exception, — have so constant a tendency to take up premisses, with no due regard to their truth and their sufficiency ; and to adopt reasoning with no due regard PREFACE. XX111 to its validity ; that the human intellect will inevitably plunge more deeply into error at every step, unless some powerful corrective be applied to its spontaneous operations. My first illustration of this statement shall be one, to which my opponents, least of all men, are likely to demur : the case of mediaeval physics. I am wholly ignorant myself, I regret to say, of the very rudiments of physical science : but there seems a consensus of all who have examined the subject, that the aberrations of physical science in the middle age were incredibly great ; and that those aberrations were all due to one cause. Enquirers of that age, we are told, had not learnt to check their conclusions at every step by ap- peal to experiment. Each speculator was consequently enabled, without restraint or hindrance, to follow his own preconceived ideas. The whole mass of physical error then, prevalent at that time, was owing to the one fact, that the intellect was left to its own intrinsic and spontaneous operations, without the necessity of con- forming its conclusions to some external standard. Since the days of Bacon, it would seem, all this has been reformed. The great body of physical sciences seem to unite those two characteristics, which (when found together) constitute the surest proof, that a science has been duly constituted: I mean, stability and progressiveness. Each new generation of enquirers find fresh ground, for holding the great mass of Truth which they have received ; and at the same time have the means of importantly adding to that mass. Such are the advantages which flow, from the intellect being compelled to adjust its conclusions by an external standard. XXIV PKEFACE. But there is one science, if science it can indeed be called, which still reminds us of mediaeval physics. It is the Protestant attempt at constituting Morality and Theology. What is the popular account of ante- Baconian physics? Such as the following. We are told, that the treatment of physical matters, then pre- valent, was a disputatious, never-ending, still-beginning, strife of words. We are reminded, that the most in- genious series of deductions is useless, or worse than useless, where no pains is taken, to confront them with the external standard of actual experiment. We are informed, that after ten centuries so employed, — after the production of as many different theories as there have been speculators, each professing to exhaust the whole domain of physical science, and each irre- concileably at variance with all others, — the world will end just as wise as it began. Such is the description popularly given of physical science, as it stood before the era of experiment. I earnestly wish my readers will peruse it again, and see in what respect it can be said to differ from Protestant Theology. In this also, each speculator has his own especial theory: each speculator professes to exhaust the whole domain of revealed science ; to give us his views, thought out by himself from the intimations of Scripture, on the Trinity, on Original Sin, on Eternal Punishment, on Justification by Faith. And what has been the result? The great test, as I just now observed, of a science being truly constituted, is the union of stability and progressiveness. As to the stability of Protestant Theology, it is but insulting Protestants to name the very notion : it is on its pro- gressiveness that they love to insist. Now what has PREFACE. XXV been its progressiveness ? Its progressiveness has consisted in its declension. Its course has been the gradual' subtraction of one doctrine after another ; until at length it seems culminating in the denial of all dogma whatever : I mean, of course, as dogma ; as being certainly revealed by God. The number of Protestants surely is becoming daily fewer, who will say of any doctrine, of any moral precept, ' this is a certain part of Christ's Revelation?' Things are more and more coming to this, that in no Protestant society is there any body of truths, accepted and recognised among its members as the truths of Revelation. And how are we to account for this state of things ? It arises from the fact, that the intellect has been left to work upon certain data, without being required to con- form its conclusions with some external standard, un- mistakeable in utterance and peremptory in authority. It has thus become a prey to its own waywardness and wilfulness. Reverting however to physical science, — I will ask this question. Suppose some eminent philosopher is led by deduction to a certain result : he compares that result with phenomena, and finds it erroneous. Does it ever occur to him, that by this process his intellect is enslaved and his soul fettered ? On the contrary, he is most grateful for this opportunity of experimental disproof; he feels confident at once, that either his pre- misses have been unsound or insufficient, or his in- ferences too hasty. He reviews his past course of reasoning, fully assured that he will make one or other of these discoveries ; and his assurance is invariably justified by the event. Such is precisely the course XXVI PREFACE. adopted by a Catholic philosopher, in treating on such subjects as those of the present volume, if he find his conclusions at variance with the Church's voice. If such a procedure be the mark of intellectual slavery, then the votary of modern physical science is of all thinkers the most enslaved. But in fact every sober- minded man must regard it as an inappreciable advan- tage, that some guarantee should be afforded, against that one-sidedness, eccentricity, partiality, to which the unchecked intellect is ever exposed. I need hardly add of course, that if our external standard were not infallibly correct, there would be intolerable bondage in being required to adjust by it our intellectual conclusions : and indeed unless we firmly believed it thus infallible, such a task would be simply impossible. I am not here at all professing to argue against those, who merely deny our allegation, that there is sufficient proof of the Church's infallibility. I have only been arguing against those who maintain, that there is some special objection to the very principle on which the Church proceeds ; the principle of re- quiring intellectual submission to an external standard, on matters which are within the province of Reason. One final question will be asked. In regard to those philosophical truths which are within the domain of Theology, what is the distinction between their philo- sophical and their theological treatment? I think the two following particulars constitute the main distinction. (1.) The philosopher, as such, has no concern with any truth, except as demonstrable by Reason : wherever he has no proof from Reason to produce, the truths are out of his province. (2.) Although the Catholic philo- PREFACE. XXV11 sopher is bound to take care, that his conclusions are fully in accordance with the pronouncements of sound Theology, — yet it is no part of his business to exhibit that accordance. The theologian, on the contrary, has no task more peculiarly his own, than to shew in every instance the accordance of those doctrines which he de- livers, with the decrees of the Church ; with Scripture ; with Tradition ; and with the other ' loci theologici.' IT is now sufficiently apparent, what is meant by the * philosophical introduction ' to a c theological treatise.* It is the exhibition of those truths, as demonstrable by Reason, the mastery of which will enable us more fully to grasp the meaning or the evidence of the theological doctrines appertaining to that treatise. How far the propositions handled in the present Book have been well chosen for that end, it will be impossible of course for the reader to determine, till he has seen the subsequent volumes. But how far the said propositions are true, — and how far the argumentative support here given to them is adequate, — this is at once a most legitimate matter for criticism. Of these propositions, by far the most important and fundamental, are those contained in the three first Sections. The second and third of these treat on the nature of Moral Truth ; and the first lays down a necessary foundation for such treatment. The idea 4 morally good,' — with its cognates ' morally preferable/ 4 morally evil,' — occurs at every step, through the whole science on * Nature and Grace/ So far as we apprehend these ideas obscurely, such obscurity will vitiate our apprehension of almost every single doctrine in the XXV111 PREFACE. science. The Church has not determined the precise character of this idea ; though of course it is most fully within her province to do so : but among the various theories which may be maintained by Catholics, I am most strongly convinced that the theory which I ad- vocate is, in all essential particulars, the theory which Reason declares. No candid student indeed of Theology or Philo- sophy will deny, that in both these sciences there are many questions, even very important ones, of a more or less doubtful character. There are many questions, on which much may be urged with reason and soundness on both sides ; on which the investigation of Truth is a most anxious and delicate task ; and on which, even when we have decided that the balance inclines in one direction, we are obliged in fairness to admit, that various objec- tions and difficulties remained unsolved. We shall meet with many such questions in the succeeding volumes, and there are one or two of the same kind in the present. But I maintain confidently, that no such thing can truly be said on the matters handled in those two Sections. I maintain confidently, that while the reasons for that theory which I follow are cogent and irresistible, — there is neither difficulty nor objection, which possesses the slightest force on the opposite side. It will be for my reader of course to decide, — after having carefully studied the reasoning adduced, — how far that reason- ing warrants so confident a judgment. But I may refer them to the passage from p. 95 to p. 98, as con- taining an argument, which in itself (if it stood alone) seems to me quite decisive. And I may refer them to the passage from p. 102 to p. 107, as noticing that ob- PREFACE. XXIX • jection, which, more than all others put together, deters some most pious and admirable Catholics from the con- clusion which I advocate. • On this most important matter, as will be seen, I am utterly opposed to the opinion, that all moral obliga- tion is founded on the Creator's Command. Now I have found some Catholics under the impression, that this opinion rests on a degree of theological authority, which would make it at least temerarious in any Catholic to question it. There cannot be a greater miscon- ception than this ; I am confident indeed, that the great preponderance of authority is on my side. I have added therefore a Supplementary Section to shew this. This Section in no way professes a theological treatment of the question ; it is purely defensive, and directed against such adverse impressions as those to which I have just referred. A considerable number of moral truths, in my humble opinion, are known to us intuitively. It was necessary therefore to prefix a preliminary Section, on the authority and self-evidence of various intuitive judgments. Moreover, some of the most current objec- tions, to that view of morality which I follow, are of such a nature, that if they were once admitted as of force, nothing could reasonably ensue, except the most absolute and hopeless scepticism. It was therefore essential, to enter in sufficient detail on this question of scepticism. My immediate reason then for introducing a philoso- phical treatment of these two subjects, — viz. (1) the self-evidence of certain intuitions, and (2) the character of Moral Truth, — has been simply the indispensable ne- XXX PREFACE. * cessity of such treatment for the purposes of our science. But if I had been specially thinking of contemporaneous non-Catholic philosophy, I could not have made a more pertinent selection. Thus (1) the main drift and cur- rent of such philosophy, as Dr. Brownson most justly remarks,* is towards a denial of Objective Truth. There is no refutation of this error, I think, so available, as that which shews the desolating extent to which such principles must consistently be carried, if they are worth any thing at all. This I have attempted to shew in my first Section. It will also be found (I think) that the philosophical principles advocated in that Sec- tion, if accepted as sound, add most importantly to the philosophical argument for God's existence. So much on the first Section. Then (2) the Objective Reality of moral distinctions, — the subject considered in the two following, — is perhaps equally important, in its bearing on the controversies of the time. If once admitted, it sweeps clean away that vague and misty Pantheism, which is at present so miserable a snare to the non- Catholic world. No human being has ever yet been found, who thoroughly holds the Objective Reality of moral distinctions, without going on further, to recognise a Personal God, the Moral Governor of mankind. f * " Protestantism is not a religion ; is not a credo or a worship ; but is a suspense of faith ; a transition from the old superannuated Catholic form to some newer and nobler form yet to be developed In former times religion was regarded as having an Objective Truth, a subsistence independent of man ; and the question was, which and what is the true religion, if any ? But now it is not so. This order of thought denies all Absolute, and there- fore all Objective Truth, and makes both religion and truth purely relative and subjective. To refute it, we must establish the objectivity of thought itself; i.e. the Objective Truthfulness of Reason:'— Jan. 1860, pp. 22, 23. t This has been most ably stated by Mr. Martineau ; a writer who PREFACE. XXXI A remonstrance of the following kind has reached me from one or two Catholics. 4 Surely,' they say, c all 1 Catholics are united in essentials, as regards the real * character of Moral Truth. No Catholic e.g. really 4 fancies, that God could command pride or malevo- 1 lence ; nor does any Catholic on the other hand hold, 4 that there is some abstract Moral Rule, distinct from ' and independent of Himself. Catholics differ on such ' points, rather in their expressions than in their thoughts ; 4 and it is undesirable to dwell on such points of differ- ' ence, when we should rather aim at presenting an 4 united front.' There are many replies, which I could make to this: I will content myself with two. The question here to be considered, it will be seen, is not whether those views be correct which I myself maintain on Moral Truth, but whether it be of any great importance to have correct views. And I most gladly concur with the objector in thinking, that on such matters expresses himself, not only with so much depth and clearness of thought, but in many respects with such deep recognition of piety and religion, that it is most painful to think, how many of his opinions must be regarded by every Catholic, as not erroneous merely, but deeply pernicious. These are his words on the matter in hand : — " No ethical conceptions are possible at all, except as floating shreds of unattached thought, without a religious background ; and the sense of responsibility, the agony of shame, the inner reverence for justice, first find their meaning and vindication in a Supreme Holiness that rules the world. Nor can any one be penetrated with the distinction between right and wrong, without recognising it as valid for all free beings, and incapable of local or arbitrary change. His feeling insists on its permanent recognition and omnipresent sway ; and this unity in the Moral Law carries him to the Unity of the Divine Legislator. Theism is thus the indispensable postulate of conscience ; its objective counterpart and justification, without which its inspirations would be illusions and its veracities themselves a lie." Studies of Christianity, p. 9. See also p. 75 of this volume, and the passage of F. Newman there referred to. XXX11 PREFACE. Catholics differ, not so much in principle, as in their respective mode of analysing those principles which they hold in common. Yet it is of very great moment, in regard to a most extensive part of theological science, that the student should have clear views on the terms ' right ' and ' wrong ; ' and the same thing is extremely important on other grounds also. But where prin- ciples are the same, to hold clear views, is to hold correct views : if an incorrect view be consistent with sound principle on the subject, it must be precisely because such view is obscure. This is my first re- ply; and I proceed to a second. It is of extreme moment, that the Objective Eeality of moral distinctions should be urged on various non-Catholic philosophers. Now we can only urge this truth on them, by means of argument; and argument is not available for an incor- rect statement of the truth, but only for a correct one. On both these grounds therefore it is in the highest degree desirable, that we Catholics shall come to agree> what that correct statement really is. There are some peculiarities of arrangement in the present volume, which make it necessary to offer some further explanation, in regard to the three first Sections. No one can be surprised, that I feel most deeply the anxious and momentous character of the work which I have undertaken, and. the great danger of falling into serious mistakes in its accomplishment. I felt it very desirable therefore, before publishing this volume, that I should obtain the judgment of theological friends on its contents. Accordingly, I circulated it privately so long ago as last October ; and I have been so fortunate as to receive numerous PREFACE. XXxili and valuable comments on its many defects. The course of reflection into which these comments led me, determined me wholly to re-write the three first Sections. It did not appear to me that in other portions any alteration was absolutely indispensable. But there is no part of the volume, in which it is so important to convey my meaning clearly and con- vincingly, as in these first Sections ; and there was no part in which I had made less approach towards attain- ing that desirable object. This failure arose in part, from my having attempted to combine two incompatible ends. It is not difficult, and I never found it so, in dealing with students who have received no special philosophical instruction,* to place before them (what I consider) the true principles on Certitude and on Morality, with amply sufficient clearness ; with so much clearness, as should enable them, both to understand those principles, and to appreciate their argumentative foundation. Nor, on the other hand, can I admit that it is at all difficult to place the same principles, with the same clearness, before those who have given considerable attention to Philosophy : for the unquestionable truth of these principles (according to my view of the case) makes the task a comparatively easy one. But to combine these two ends, (is I believe) not difficult, but impossible. Yet in this volume, as it first issued from the press, I did attempt to combine them. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that the three Sections were too lengthy and obscure to be apprehended by * At St. Edmund's I was allowed to give some instructions to those who were just beginning their philosophical studies. XXXI V PREFACE. Beginners ; while they were too brief and hurried, to give time for meeting fairly the difficulties and ob- jections which occur to those versed in Philosophy. Indeed, in the very construction of the volume there was ample proof, how little my plan had been matured. For when first I began writing, I had intended to omit all direct treatment of that most important question, the relation between God and Necessary Truth. As I proceeded, I found more and more the impractic- ableness of such omission ; and at last I had to add an Appendix, for the purpose of explaining what I ought to have stated at first. This was, in part, the reason why these Sections, in their original state, were obscure without being profound, and lengthy without being full. Another reason was my culpable inattention (here and there) to strict accuracy of statement. The strongest instance of this is referred to in p. 30 with the appended note. The theory there mentioned, and which many attributed to me, had never so much as occurred to my imagi- nation; yet I could not deny, when my attention was called to it, that there were various passages which, considered apart from the general context, gave much support to this interpretation of my meaning. I have consequently re-written the three first Sec- tions ; keeping no other end in view, except to present my arguments in the clearest possible shape, before those who are conversant with philosophical inquiries. It should be distinctly understood however, that I have not made any change whatever in the philosophical principles which I have advocated, or even in the slightest detail or particular of philosophical opinion : PREFACE. XXXV as any one may readily see, who will read the Sections as they originally stood. It is necessary to make this explanation, quite apart from any vindication of personal consistency, for the interests of what I regard as truth. I could not expect the view, which I advocate, to be considered with any care or attention, if it were supposed to be a theory newly adopted; at variance with one formerly held ; and merely taken up, under pressure of adverse argument. But nothing could be more contrary to the fact than any such supposition. Indeed the various comments, which I have received on the three Sections, would have greatly increased and intensified my conviction of their substantial truth, if that conviction had not already been so strong, as to be incapable of increase from any further argumentative confirmation. I have greatly increased then the length of the first Sections, and have incorporated into them what stood as the Appendix. In order to make room for these additions, I have moved — to the end of the volume — that Section which stood fourth in order, giving it the title ' Supplementary Section/ Even after doing this, two or three pages, and two or three numbers, will be found twice over : I have therefore marked them with an asterisk, where they occur in the third Section. Finally I have added a brief paper of ' Cor- rigenda ;' chiefly for the purpose of correcting refer- ences, made in the later Sections, to the first three Sections as they originally stood. ON the rest of the volume, considered in detail, very few preliminary remarks seem required. In the re- XXX VI PREFACE. maining Sections of the first Chapter, I have pursued on grounds of Reason, these three enquiries. (1) What is the appropriate means, whereby Reason, were it left to work by itself, might arrive at Moral Truth? (2) How far does Moral Truth extend over the various acts of us men, in the nature and circumstances which God has appointed to us ? (3) What is the full power pos- sessed by God of working a change in Moral Truth ? The precise relation between God and Moral Truth cannot possibly be understood, till this last point has been carefully considered ; and the seventh Section is consequently devoted to its investigation. The various matters, treated in the second Chapter under the head of c Ethical Psychology,' are such, that the reader will at once see their importance, in the way of preparation for that portion of Theology which we undertake. I may however beg him specially to notice the distinction between 'implicit' or 'virtual' and merely 4 habitual ' intention, because of the extremely important practical consequences which result from that distinction. See p. 233-238 and p. 246-248.* * One of these consequences is so incalculably important, in its bearing on the spiritual life of every single day, that I will here state it. It will have no natural place in the body of this treatise till we come to the third Book ; but what here follows will be readily intelligible, to any one who has read carefully the above- cited pages. It is taken almost word for word, from one of the lectures which I gave at St. Edmund's. Men unversed in Theology, I remarked to my pupils, sometimes speak, as though a merely habitual intention could make a present action good, which would otherwise not be so. They will tell you, e. g. that if in the morning I refer all my acts of the day to God, this makes every act of the day, which would be otherwise indifferent, individually good. Yet it is hardly credible that men, not absolutely bereft of reason, should gravely put forth such an absurdity as is here stated. Of course, if the morning reference have left a trace of itself behind ; — if, as a consequence of that reference, I am in fact at this moment really (though unconsciously) refer- PREFACE. XXX Vll Again, it may be worth while to mention here, that the discussions of the third Section in this second Chapter lands us at the very threshold of the whole theological doctrine of concupiscence. There could follow immediately afterwards (1) an explanation and definition of the term 'concupiscence;' (2) a detailed consideration of the phenomena which that term ex- presses ; and (3) a treatment of those very important passages, wherein St. Paul refers to these phenomena. I would also direct particular attention to the long fifth Section, ' On the Adaptation of our Nature to Virtue.' This Section is almost entirely independent of what precedes and follows, and its reasoning is far more easy of apprehension, than are the various arguments of the first Chapter. It is possible therefore, that various readers, who may not care to take the pains of mastering that earlier Chapter, may yet be not unwilling to study this particular part of the volume. The proposition on which I lay far the greatest stress is this ; that there is no one propension, implanted by God in our nature, which is not capable of legitimate gratification in the ring my acts to a good end ; — then our very statement is, that my acts (if otherwise faultless) are truly good. Here is a real case of * implicit * or ' virtual ' intention. But we are now speaking of the case, when the morn- ing reference has not left behind it any trace, which at this moment exists. And to say that, in such a case, that past reference makes the present act good, is among the most extravagantly absurd of all imaginable proposi- tions. We shall in due time have to consider one of Luther's strangest heresies ; it is this, that so only we have what he calls faith, (i.e. unbounded confidence in the certainty of our own salvation), our acts, though remaining bad, are counted by God as if they were good, and are requited accordingly. A monstrous statement, indeed ! but yet one which is immeasurably less absurd, than that which I am now assailing. For my present opponent does not say that, in consequence of my morning's reference, my present act is counted by God as though it were good ; but that it actually is good~ XXXV111 PKEFACE. cause of virtue, see p. 259-359. It is evident at once, how vitally momentous is this proposition, (if once it be admitted as true,) on the whole theory of spiritual guidance and direction. It is also evident at once how important a corroboration it will furnish, to the argu- ment for that all-important truth, the Creator's Sanctity, Were it only on these grounds, I hope that my readers will carefully examine the course of reasoning on which it is supported. But my chief reason for laying so much stress on it has been the following. There is one miserable habit, against which it seems to me that we have especially to be on our guard, in the present age : — the habit of worldliness. By this I mean, the not practically regarding it as any part of our ordinary Christian duty, to labour He absolutely says, incredible as tke fact must appear, that an act is consti- tuted good, from a circumstance which in no way affects it ; from a circum- stance which is done and over, leaving no trace behind. 'Yesterday afternoon,' e.g. ' I elicited a certain act ; this present afternoon I elicit another, which ' is precisely similar to yesterday's in every single circumstance without ' exception. Yet the act of yesterday afternoon is good and the act of this ' present afternoon is bad, — because yesterday morning I made a reference of my day's acts to God, and this morning I did not.' Intellectual drivel- ling can hardly sink below this ; it is like saying that my evening cup of tea is sweet, because I put a lump of sugar into the cup which I drank at breakfast. Lugo gives expression to this common-sense principle, by taking the particular case of temperance at meals. You and I are both at dinner : our will is affected (we will suppose) in precisely the same way towards the delicacies before us ; and our external acts also are precisely similar. Yet it shall be judged forsooth that I am acting at this moment rightly and you wrongly, — or (in other words) that I am eating temperately and you zratemperately, — because in the morning I referred my dinner to God, and you did not. Of course, that shews that in the morning I acted (so far) better than you ; that I at least elicited one good act which you did not. But how upon earth can this circumstance affect the present act, unless it does affect the present act ? I mean, if the action of my will at this moment is not intrinsecally affected by my morning's reference, how can the moral quality of that action be affected by such reference 1 ( Certum PREFACE. XXXIX directly and systematically at the task, of raising our affections from earthly to heavenly objects.* In the third and fourth Books I shall have again and again to revert upon this. I shall have to shew my grounds for believing that this danger now very specially exists ; the causes which (in my humble judgment) lead to it ; deplorable and degraded state of mind which worldliness engenders, and which is the more deplorable, because its true character is so commonly unsuspected ; lastly, our appropriate safeguards against it. I need hardly say that, among those safeguards, theological study itself has a very prominent place, for those who have the means of pursuing such study ; because the great end to be aimed at for the purpose of protection, is the obtaining an intimate and familiar acquaintance with the great Objects of Faith. But, not here to dwell upon mihi est,' says Lugo, 'hanc voluntatem merd habitualem non sufficere ad meritum . . . operis sequentis. . . Quare qui mane refert omnes suas actiones ad Deum, si postea pransurus itd se hdbet ac si earn voluntatem non habuisset, nee comestio oritur ex ed voluntate nee ab alia bona et honesta, non magis meretur per comestionem, qudm si earn voluntatem non habuisset.'' (De Pceni- tentia, d. 7, n. 39.) In a word, then, I cannot now be eliciting a good act of any kind, unless my will be now influenced by a good motive : unconsciously perhaps, but really and truly ; I may not see it, but God sees it. I am not now eliciting an act of justice, because I elicited one in the morning ; my will must now be fixed on the virtuousness of justice. I am not eliciting an act of tem- perance now, when my meal is over and I am engaged very freely in talking and laughing, — because I ate my meal temperately when I was eating it. And in like manner, if I wish at this moment to have the advantage of referring my acts to God, I must be referring them to Him at this moment ; not perhaps consciously, but really, practically, influentially. It does not. make my present act good, that I elicited a very good act in the morning. Among innumerable testimonies to this principle, I drew their particular attention to F. Rigolieuc's beautiful treatise ' De la Garde du Cceur.' * See Father Faber's most powerful chapter on 'the World,' in the 'Creator and the Creature.' That chapter is, I think, among the most masterly things he has ever done. X.1 PKEFACE. tliis, it is plain that one most powerful help will be ob- tained for deliverance from worldliness, in proportion as men are practically impressed with the conclusion, to which this fifth Section is mainly directed. It is plain, I say, that men will be immeasurably more en- couraged to labour at fixing their hearts on the Invisible World, in proportion as they come to the conviction, that all their deepest emotions, all their keenest af- fections, may thus receive satisfaction, both far more intense and far more permanent, than the wretched objects of this perishable world can possibly afford. In regard to the third Chapter, it must be manifest to any one reading it, how completely the two questions, there discussed, constitute an integral part of our science. And in regard to the short fourth Chapter, its- indispensable necessity, for our subsequent theological reasoning, will be thoroughly recognised by all who may read the following volumes. The doctrine of Liberty e.g., and again the unavoidableness of venial sin, are perfectly unintelligible without such a pre- paration. HAVING now said all that seems necessary on the general contents of the volume, I will close this Preface with a few miscellaneous remarks. It will be observed, that I have introduced a large number of quotations from Father Newman ; and chiefly, though not exclusively, from his Protestant works. I have had two reasons for doing this. In the first place, I was desirous that Catholic readers should know, how large a fund of deep Christian Philosophy PREFACE. xll is contained in F. Newman's Protestant works. And those who may be struck by the specimens which I bring before them, will not improbably be led to consult the originals. But there was another much stronger reason. I hope it may not be considered egotistical, if I speak on the intellectual relation in which I stood for many years to F. Newman. Certainly it ought, not so to be considered ; for such relation was in no way peculiar to myself: on the contrary, very great numbers of us converts would have substantially the same testimony to give, though with accidental differences, according to the circumstances of each individual case. What I have to state, then, is this, I was enmeshed in the toils of a false philosophy, which could have had no other legitimate issue, except a further and further descent towards the gulf of utter infidelity. From this thraldom, the one human agency which effected my deliverance was F. Newman's teaching. My deliverance was wrought, not merely through the truth and depth (as I consider) of those philosophical principles which he inculcated ; but also through the singular large- mindedness, whereby he was able to make those principles both intelligible and attractive to every variety of character. In regard, then, to those citations which I make from his Protestant works, I wish to ex- plain the meaning of my adducing them. I do not quote them, as external testimonies for this or that truth, to which my own reflection had brought me ; every one of them had its place, in opening that truth itself on my apprehension. Take any one of F. Newman's utterances in his Protestant works on the one hand; Xlii PREFACE. and take any one of my own convictions on moral and religious matters on the other hand ; it is often im- possible for me even to guess, how far the former may have been simply the one exciting cause of the latter. I am saying this, simply to explain the meaning of my references to so great a benefactor : not in any way, as though I claimed his authority, in approval of what I have now written. I might, in my present circum- stances, venture to differ from him, even on very important matters of thought on which Catholics are allowed to differ ; and yet I must not, on that account, appear to forget, that to him, as to the one human cause, I owe the inestimable blessing of having become a Catholic at all. The mention of one individual leads me not un- naturally to speak of other individuals. I have criti- cised, in my first Section, Mr. Mansel and Mr. Mill, as representing in different ways what I have called the semi-sceptical position in Philosophy. To each of these gentlemen accordingly I forwarded, half a year ago, the volume as it then stood. I have to thank Mr. Mansel sincerely, for his kind reception of it, and for the frank explanation which he was so good as to send me on the matter between us. My own statement of the point at issue, in the volume as it then stood, was far from clear ; and it is probable enough that, had the case been otherwise, a greater amount of agreement would have resulted, from our mutual communication. However that may be, I am still (quite as strongly as before) under the impression, that Mr. Mansel and I are at direct issue on the matter referred to ; nor can I honestly speak, as though I con- PREFACE. Xliii sidered this matter to be one of subordinate importance. See p. 20-25. But in expressing very earnest dissent from what I understand to be Mr. Hansel's proposition, I trust that neither my words nor my tone are in any way inconsistent with most sincere respect. Such respect is certainly Mr. MansePs due, for the great services which he has rendered in many ways to the cause of sound Philosophy. In regard to Mr. Stuart Mill, I can only say that he could not have treated me with greater kindness or courtesy, had he concurred with the main substance of my volume, instead of differing (as I fear is the case) on almost every premiss, and almost every conclusion. His comments have enabled me, I hope, to bring out my side of the controversy with greater distinctness and precision ; and they have confirmed me in the impression which I have long entertained, of his intellectual character. Of Mr. Mill certainly, if of any man living, it may truly be said, that he aims at doing the fullest justice to every school of thought, however remote from his own ; and that the one aim, which consciously influences his intellectual exertions, is the pursuit of truth. May the Merciful God grant him, before he dies, the unspeakable blessing of its pos- session ! Reverting to the general contents of the volume, I should observe that I have retained the form of Lectures throughout, and have addressed my various remarks to an imaginary audience of pupils. One chief reason for this, has been my desire of thereby rendering my style less dull and heavy than it naturally is. The same desire has led me, in various places, to be much more PREFACE. frequent in the use of Italics, than is (I fear) really conducive to the very purpose at which I aimed. I have already spoken of my anxiety, in regard to the work which I have undertaken. I should have felt this, in undertaking any theological treatise. But surely there is no part of Theology, in which it is so easy to fall into serious mistakes, — in which it is so difficult to preserve faithfully the true mean, — as in that, with which my succeeding volumes are to be occupied. Let one important instance of this be con- sidered, as a sample of several. On the one hand there is the danger, lest theological doctrine should be so represented, as unduly to alarm those, who sincerely desire and pray for their own sanctification ; but who are conscious of indefinite weakness and inconsistency. On the other hand there is the danger, lest any thing should be even accidentally stated, which might con- firm in their blind and presumptuous confidence those most misguided men, who have no practical fear in regard to their eternal lot, while yet they are making no efforts at all to discover their latent faults ; to remove their affections from objects of this earth ; to measure worldly events by the Divine standard ; to grow in personal love of their God and Saviour. One hardly knows, which of these two extremes is the more mischievous and dangerous ; and it is most difficult, consistently to avoid giving some countenance to one or to the other. Such being my dread of the task before me, I might well have shrunk from attempting it. And certainly indeed I should have so shrunk, had not circumstances of various kinds led me strongly to think, that it is a PREFACE. xlv work which God desires at my hands. In this opinion I have been confirmed, by more than one clerical friend, thoroughly conversant with the state of the case, and on whose judgment I have the greatest reliance. I have only therefore earnestly to pray for God's Merciful Guidance ; and to submit most unreservedly each volume, as it appears, to the Church's judgment. In this very Preface I have strongly urged, that nearly all the subjects, treated in this volume, fall most directly and absolutely under the Church's jurisdiction. If then there be any proposition in them which the Church may think fit to censure, — God forbid there should be any such ! — I am certain beforehand, that such state- ment is no less contrary to Reason than to Theology ; and at this moment I implicitly (implicite) revoke and renounce it. It is abundantly possible again, that there may be various views, here contained, which, though not incurring the Church's censure, may be mistaken in themselves and injurious in their tendency. May God grant that any such views may be speedily and efficaciously refuted ! If on the other hand (as I earnestly hope is the case) there are other propositions which are true and sound, may He bless them to the one ultimate end which every theologian must propose for his labours, — the sanctification and salvation of souls ! Northwood Park, Cowes, Feast of St. Joseph's Patronage, April 29, 1860. TABLE OF CONTENTS TO BOOK I. CHAPTER I. ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. SECTION I. On Intuitions and on the Principle of Certitude. PAOB 1. Judgments of Consciousness and Judgments of Intuition. . 5 2. Judgments of unconscious Inference. .... 7 3. The principle of Philosophical Scepticism stated. . . 9 4. The Sceptic's answer to a Semi-sceptic 10 5. Consistently to hold Sceptical opinions, is physically im- possible. 14 6. Semi-scepticism is an utterly unreasonable and inconsistent position. .... ^>^ .... 15 7. Scepticism need not in consistency extend to Judgments of Consciousness. . . . . . . .16 8. Scepticism a worse extreme even than Rationalism. . ib. 9. The Principle of Certitude stated and defended. . . 18 10. The Principle of Certitude has been denied by Mr. Man- sel, though partially and inconsistently. . . .19 11. Also by Mr. Stuart Mill and his school. ... 25 12. Intuitional light the reasonable ground, for our confidently holding certain intuitive judgments. ... 29 13. Fundamental importance of laying down some test of legi- timate intuitions. ....... 33 14. Two explanatory and qualifying statements on this. . 34 15. F. Burner's tests of legitimate intuitions. ... 37 16. A thesis may be most fully founded on reason, yet not on reasoning. ......... 38 17. Remarks on the sense in which we throughout used the word * intuition,' and other kindred terms. . . 39 18. On necessary intuems 42 19. On the relation between God and Necessary Truth. . ib. 20. Concluding remark on the Section. . " . . .47 Xlviii CONTENTS. SECTION II. On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth. PAGE 21. Various judgments stated, which include in different shapes the idea * morally good.' ...... 48 22. What is meant by simple and complex ideas ? 50 23. What is meant by analytical and synthetical judgments ? Various subdivisions of the former. .... 52 24. The idea ' morally evil ' is maintained to be a l simple idea.' 55 25. Reply to that attempted analysis, which would explain it as meaning ' worthy of disapprobation ; ' or ' worthy of blame ; ' or ' worthy of punishment.' ... 56 26. Reply to that attempted analysis, which would explain it as meaning ' prohibited by the Creator.' ... 57 27. The same reasoning equally efficacious, against any other attempted analysis. . . . . . . .61 28. That particular moral judgment, which we originally cited, is intuitive and not inferential. .... 63 29. It is a legitimate intuition. ...... 64 30. The truth intued is a necessary truth. .... 67 31. Explanation of the term < Moral Truth.' ... 68 32. Remarks on the two classes of philosophers, who are op- posed to our doctrine. ...... 69 SECTION III. On the Relation between God and Moral Truth. 33. Subject of the ensuing Section. ..... 71 34. Relation between God and Moral Truth, according to our doctrine. 72 35. Two positions, on which all Catholic philosophers, who differ from our doctrine, would agree with each other. 76 36. First adverse theory considered. 'Morally evil means freely prohibited by the Creator.' .... 77 37. Second adverse theory. ' Morally evil means necessarily prohibited by the Creator.' ..... 78 38. Third adverse theory. 'Morally evil means necessarily detested by the Creator.' 90 39. Fourth adverse theory. ' Morally evil means necessarily detested by the One Necessary Being.' ... 93 40. Fifth adverse theory. * Morally evil means that which separates us from our True End.' .... ib. 41. General argument against all these adverse theories. . 95 42. Can we say that Veracity and Benevolence are Perfections, because God is what He is ? . ... 98 CONTENTS. xlix PAGE 43. First objection considered. * You exalt an abstraction above the Living God/ . . , . . .100 44. Second objection considered. * A creator who should love mendacity and cruelty, would give us faculties which regard those qualities as virtuous.' . . '•' . . 101 45. Third objection considered. ' Every obligation is con- sidered by holy men as coming from God, and as part of His free Providence.' ...... 102 46. Various modes in which our doctrine holds up God as the One Object of undivided reverence. . . . 107 47. Distinction between « Dei Potentia Absoluta' and ' Ordinata.' 1 09 48*The Natural Rule and the Natural Law. . . .111 49*' Mala quia Prohibita,' and * Prohibita quia mala.' . . 107* 50*The truths of these Sections in their ontological order. . 108* 51*Conclusion of the Section. . 110* SECTION V. On the Idea of Moral Worthiness. 48. Instances in which men always say, that this act is more worthy than that. . . . . . . .113 49. The idea 'moral worthiness' a simple idea. . . .114 50. Its connection with the idea of moral obligation. . .115 51. Extreme frequency of moral judgments. . . . .116 52. Enlarged sense of the phrase * Natural Rule.' . . .117 53. Different senses in which it may be asked, how far the Natural Rule extends. . :=i*fc*-: .... ib. SECTION VI. On the Extent of the Natural Rule. 54. Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence, are intrinsecally good ends of action. . . . . . .119 55. No good end of action may ever be contravened, except for the sake of some other good end, which at the moment conflicts with it. . . . . .122 56. No act is virtuous, unless done for the virtuousness of some good end. .. . . .. . . . ib. 57. Distinction between objective and subjective virtuousness. 124 58. An act is subjectively better, caeteris paribus, in propor- tion as the will adheres more firmly and efficaciously to the virtuousness of a good end 125 59. What is meant by an Infinitely Holy Being ? . . ib. 60. Objection made against the proposition, that a Holy Creator cannot deceive us ; and reply to that objec- tion. ... . . * . . ,• . * . 126 d 1 CONTENTS. PAGF 61. Virtuousness of those good acts which relate to God. . 127 62. How far will Reason shew, that Humility, Forgivingness, and Purity, are virtuous ends of action ? . . .128 63. ' Production of the arc' principle. . . . ib. 64. The Moral Faculty 129 65. Process whereby our moral judgments increase in ac- curacy. . . . . . . . .132 66. Position occupied respectively, by the Moral Faculty and by the other intellectual faculties, in arriving at moral truth. ... 135 67. The question, 'What are virtuous ends of action? 'is immeasurably more important than any other moral question. . . . . . . . .138 68. Reason shews that pride is sinful. . . . . .139 69. Reason shews that vindictiveness is sinful. . . .144 70. What are the various grounds, which justify infliction of pain on our fellow-men? . . . . . .146 71. Is Forgivingness simply identical with Benevolence? . 147 72. Reason shews the virtuousness of Purity. . . . 148 73. Catalogue of virtuous ends recognised by Reason. . .149 74. Probable inference, from all that has been said, on the Extent of the Natural Rule ; and harmony of this inference with the dicta of theologians. . . .150 75. Objection to our whole doctrine answered. . . .152 76. Our principles add to the motives of credibility for Catho- licism. ......... 153 77. Reasons for holding our doctrine, on the Moral Faculty and its growth. . . . . . . .154 78. Substantial agreement of the principles put forth in this Section, with those usually recognised by Catholics. 161 SECTION VII. On God's Power of Interference with the Natural Rule. 79. Interference is of two kinds. . . . . . .165 80. God's Power of addition to the Natural Rule. . . ib. 81. God's Power of subtraction from the Natural Rule. . 166 82. Mutable part of the Natural Law 170 83. Immutable part of the Natural Law. . . . .171 84. Theologians cited in behalf of our doctrine. . . .175 85. How far can God, by His interference, affect the relative moral worthiness of acts ? . . . . 187 86. Distinction between * intrinsic' and 'independent' obliga- tion or moral worthiness. . . . . .188 87. Concluding remarks, on the matters treated in this whole Chapter. % . . 190 CONTENTS. li PACK CHAPTER II. ON ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 88. Explanation of the term. ... .192 SECTION I. On the Threefold Classification of Mental Phenomena. 89. The soul is a simple substance. ... .195 90. We have no direct knowledge of that substance itself. . ib. 91. Its phenomena fall irresistibly under three classes. . . 196 92. Emotions in general .197 93. Propensions, and an important division of them. . . ib. SECTION II. On tjie Passions. 94. Explanation of the term 200 95. First six Passions enumerated by the scholastics. . .201 96. Supplementary remarks on these. ..... 202 97. Remaining five Passions enumerated by the scholastics. . 205 98. Criticism on this latter enumeration. .... 207 99. Proposed enumeration of the Passions. .... 209 SECTION III. On the Relation between Will and Sensitive Appetite. 100. Act of Will, corresponding respectively to each Passion. 211 101. Name given to each act of Will 212 102. * Spes,' 'audacia,' 'delectatio voluntatis,' considered and analyzed. Also 'envy' and ' ill-humour' of the Will, and 'murmuring against God's Providence.' . . 213 103. 'Gaudium Voluntatis' and 'Delectatio Morosa.' . . 217 104. Acts of the Will are often elicited, without any correspond- ing emotions. Caution with which this statement is to be received. , . . . , . 220 105. ' Motus primo-primi' and ' secundb-primi.' . , . 222 106. 'Actus primo-primi' and ' secundo-primi.' . . 224 107. Power of the Will in resisting emotion. .... ib. Hi CONTENTS. SECTION IY. On Certain other Phenomena of the Will. PAGE 108. Subject of the Section 231 109. < In tentio finis.' ib. 110. 'Absolute end ;' 'Relative or intermediate ends.' . . 232 111. ' Unconscious intention,' either ' implicit ' or ' virtual.' . 233 112. A considerable number of actual ends are often simul- taneously influential. ...... 235 113. ' In tentio finis ' is applied to a relative end, no less than to an absolute. ........ 236 114. ' Habitual Intention.' Subdivision of this. , . . ib. 115. 'Intentio,' distinguished from 'Amor' and ' Desiderium.' 238 116. Acts of the Will are what they are, and not what we reflect on them as being. ...... 239 117. < Bonum' defined 242 118. ' Bonum delectabile.' 243 119. ' Bonum honestum.' ....... 244 120. Unconscious intention of bonum honestum. . . . 246 121. No other 'bonum,' except 'honestum,' 'delectabile,' and ' utile.' • 248 SECTION V. On the Adaptation of our Nature to Virtue. 123. Subject of the Section 250 124. First argument for our thesis. Virtue is pursued for its own sake, but vice cannot possibly be so pursued. . ib. 125. Second argument for our thesis. ' Bonum honestum ' and 'delectabile,' as they are the only legitimate, so are the only possible, ends of action. .... 251 126. Third argument. Moral judgments are so extremely frequent with all men. . . . . . .251 127. Fourth argument. The pleasures of reflection are all on the side of virtue. ....... ib. 128. Fifth argument stated. Our Propensions are the sole occasion of sin; and yet there is not one of them, which has not a real and legitimate place in leading us to virtue. ........ 252 129. Most important place held by pleasure, in helping us to- wards virtue. ........ 254 130. Immense benefits of sensible devotion. .... 257 131. Individual propensions examined. Propension of Duty . 259 CONTENTS. liii PAGE 132. Propension of Self- Charity. . . . 260 133. Propension of Personal Love 261 134. The passion 'Amor,' distinguished both from 'Amor Benevolentiae,' and ' Amor Concupiscentiae.' . . 265 135. Singular assistance given by this Propension, to growth in love of God. . 266 136. Propension of General Love for mankind. . . . 274 137. Propension of Compassion. ...... 276 138. Propension of Gratitude. . ... 278 139. State of the argument considered. . . . . ib. 140. Love of Honour considered. ...... 279 141. Love of Power 283 142. Love of Money 284 143. Love of Intellectual Exertion 289 144. Resentment 297 145. Love of the Marvellous. . . .... 311 146. Objection to the statements ofn. 144, answered by help of this latter Propension. . ..... 312 147. Emulation perverted into Envy. . . . . .314 148. Love of Self-assertion perverted into Pride. . . .315 149. List of the Propensions already enumerated. . . . 324 150. What are those Propensions respectively useful for our duties, (1) towards the Invisible World ; (2) towards our own interior; and (3) towards our fellow-men ? . 325 151. Protestants, in proportion as they are 'formally' such, practically deny, that God can be a satisfying Object to our higher Propensions. This view stated and examined. ........ 329 149.* As men grow in perfection, it is not that new Propensions spring up within them, but that the Propensions, implanted by God in their nature, are fixed on new Objects 347 150.* On the Bodily Propensions 350 151.* On the Love of Beauty 355 152. Sixth argument for our Thesis. The ex-regarding Pro- pensions are fully as powerful as the self-regarding. . 359 153. Seventh argument. Peace obtained, by the rest of our most powerful and pervasive Propensions, in the thought of God 361 154. How far are virtue and earthly happiness ordinarily co- incident? 363 155. How far does our earthly happiness consist, in our prospect of Future Bliss ? 373 156. Eighth argument for our Thesis. None of our most power- ful and pervasive Propensions can possibly come into closer contact with earthly objects, than they may with heavenly ........ 376 By some mistake nn. 149-151 have been repeated. Hv CONTENTS. SECTION VI. On the Marks of Moral Degradation in our Nature as it now exists. PAGE 157. Existence of evil an utterly insoluble difficulty. • 381 158. Testified by experience. ...... ib. 159. The difficulty has not been lessened by Revelation. . . 383 160. Our nature, as it now exists, is far more powerful in the wrong, than in the right, direction. .... 384 161. Our Will is far weaker in its aim at virtue, than at pleasure. 385 162. Our Will is most wayward and capricious, in its aim at virtue 387 163. The Propension of the Flesh seems to have received a most morbid intensity. ...... 389 164. Connection of this with the dogma of Original Sin. . 390 SECTION VII. On Certain Philosophical Terms. 165. On the term c Nature,' as applied to an individual. . . 392 166. On the term * Nature,' as applied to a species. . . 397 167. On the terms 'species sensibilis,' ' species intelligibilis,' ' phantasia,' &c. &c. 399 CHAPTER III. ON SELF-CHARITY. 168. General account of the question at issue on this subject between Bossuet and Fenelon. 402 CONTENTS. Iv SECTION I. On Mans Desire of Felicity. 1 69. Statement of the felicity-thesis, as advocated by Bossuet. . 404 170. This thesis opposed to Theology, Reason, and Expe- rience 406 171. There is no one absolute end of human action. The argument, brought from authority against this state- ment, carefully considered. ..... 409 SECTION II. On the Claims of Self- Chanty. 172. How far are we under the moral obligation of aiming at felicity? . . . . . . . .419 173. First Principle. It is metaphysically impossible, that what is morally obligatory shall be otherwise than conducive to our permanent happiness. . . . ib. 174. Second Principle. It is metaphysically impossible, that one course of conduct shall be more morally worthy than another, without being also more conducive to our permanent happiness. ..... 420 175. Third Principle. Self-Charity is a virtuous end of action. ib. 1 76. Fourth Principle. If I aim at my own permanent hap- piness, yet not for the virtuousness of so doing, still the movement of my will on the whole is good. . 422 CHAPTER IV. ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF CERTAINTY AND IMPOSSIBILITY. 177. Things may be certain objectively or subjectively. First of subjective certainty. ...... 424 178. Experimental certainty. ...... ib. 179. Fundamental certainty 425 Ivi CONTENTS. PAGE 180. Metaphysical certainty. ....... ib. 181. Physical certainty. ....... ib. 182. Moral certainty. . 426 183. Objective a priori certainty 427 184. Impossibility ; metaphysical, physical, and moral. . . 428 SUPPLEMENTARY SECTION. BEING SECTION 4TH OF CHAPTER FIRST. Catholic Authority on Independent Morality. 185. No Catholic can hold that Moral Obligation flows from God's free Command 429 186. The condemnation of two certain propositions, cited in opposition to the theory, that obligation flows entirely from His Necessary Command. . . . .431 187. Spiritual Exercises of S. Ignatius cited. . . . ib. 188. Suarez. 432 189. Vasquez 440 190. Lessius 441 191. Lugo. . 442 192. 'Plures ex antiquioribus et recentioribus,' adduced by Lugo. ......... 444 193. Salas, adduced by. Lugo . . . . . ib. 194. Gregory and Gabriel, adduced by Lugo. . . . ib. 195. General views of theologians, as adduced by Lugo. . 445 196. Coninck, quoted textually by Lugo. .... ib. 197. Bellarmine cited. ........ ib. 198. Compton Carleton. ....... ib. 199. Berti 448 200. Frassen 449 201. Consideration of the condemned proposition on Philo- sophical Sin. ........ 450 202. Viva's doctrine stated and opposed. . . . . 457 203. Gerdil cited in our favour. ...... 462 204. < Praelectiones Philosophic^.' 473 205. Solimani 474 206. Dmowski . . 477 207. ' Philosophia Lugdunensis.' ...... 479 208. Noget-Lacoudre. . . . . . . ib. 209. Chastel 481 210. Theologians cited, who hold that the idea 'morally good' does not contain that of any relation to God. . . 483 211. Philosophers cited to the same effect 488 212. Conclusion of the Section. 489 BOOK FIRST. PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. BOOK FIRST. PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. I AM not professing, as you are well aware, to carry you through a regular course of Philosophy. I only wish to give you a full and complete grasp of certain great philosophical principles, which are essential to our subsequent theological course. We are not there- fore to be considered here as occupied with Philosophy for its own sake, but simply as an introduction to Dogmatic Theology. We are met at starting by a great disadvantage, under which many other scientific courses also lie. It would be greatly desirable if the earlier part of our work could be rendered comparatively clear and easy; for by such means an interest might be excited in the study, and an ardour be stimulated for its prosecution, which would greatly animate and encourage you, in encountering any unavoidable difficulty which meets us in our path. It happens however most unfortun- ately, that the chief difficulties occur at the very outset ; they occur before you have had any opportunity of tasting the sweets (as I may say) of theological science, and of appreciating, even in a moderate degree, those most beautiful and attractive Objects, which it opens to our contemplation. For we must begin by the establish- ment of abstract principles ; and to master abstract 4 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. principles, is necessarily among the most laborious and ungrateful tasks in the world. I can only earnestly exhort you, to take that on faith, which you have as yet had no means of knowing by experience. I can only exhort you to believe, on the word of others, that whatever amount of discouraging and repulsive labour may meet you at the outset, the prize for which that labour is to be encountered, — I mean the mastery of dogmatical truth, — is so great and precious a treasure, as most abundantly and superabundantly to recompense you for all preliminary toil. It will cost you then, I think, much more trouble to master the first Chapter of the first Book, than to apprehend any subsequent part of the entire study ; and it will give you much more trouble to master the first Section of that Chapter, than any subsequent por- tion. In regard indeed to the first Section, I beg you to pass and repass carefully in your mind the various statements therein contained, so as fully and familiarly to grasp them, before you attempt any study of the subsequent sections. On my part, I will do all in my power to save you unnecessary trouble ; and I will state what I have to say, in the clearest and most intelligible language I can command. I heartily wish I had more power than (I know) belongs to me, of putting abstruse and recondite matter into an easy and familiar shape. CHAPTER I. ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. SECTION I. On Intuitions and on the Principle of Certitude. 1. I MUST begin by begging your particular attention to a distinction, which seems to me very important, between two different classes of intellectual acts. I will call them respectively Judgments of Consciousness and Judgments of Intuition. And now to explain the meaning of this distinction. I form tbe judgment, that I am this moment suffer- ing the sensation which we call cold. This is simply a judgment of consciousness: I reflect on the fact, that I am at this moment affected in a certain way ; the judgment begins there and ends there. Again, I form the judgment, that I am suffering under that which we call low spirits ; or that I am out of humour ; or the like. These are all judgments of consciousness ; the mind's reflection on its own actually present experience. But now suppose I remember, that half an hour ago I endured the sensation of cold. Here first there is, or may be, a judgment of consciousness ; I may reflect on the impression which is now in my mind, that the past fact was so. But there is another judgment of far greater importance, which I also confidently form, and which we may call a judgment of intuition or an intui- tive judgment. I may judge confidently indeed, that I have the present impression of having undergone that 6 PHILOSOPHICAL INTKODUCTIOtf. sensation ; but this is not all. I confidently form an- other judgment also : viz. that the sensation was under- gone ; that I actually did feel cold, at the time to which my thoughts refer. Moreover I regard this truth, not as known to me hy way of consequence or deduction from other truths ; but as known to me immediately and in itself. Such a judgment we may call a judg- ment of intuition : a judgment, which on the one hand is quite distinct from the mind's reflection on its own present consciousness ; and which on the other hand is quite distinct also, from a judgment arising in my mind in the way of consequence from other judgments. As our second illustration of an intuitive judgment, let us take our various acts of belief in the validity of reasoning. A well-instructed thinker follows some chain of demonstrative reasoning, and forms the fol- lowing judgment without the faintest shadow of doubt: c if the various premisses are true, the various conclu- sions, here deduced from those premisses, are most cer- tainly true also.' He does not elicit merely a judgment of consciousness: i I am impressed with the idea that these conclusions are true, if the premisses are true ; I am so constituted that I cannot help thinking this to be so.' No ; he forms also an intuitive judgment. It is not merely ' I cannot help feeling as if the conclusions followed from the premisses,' but ' I see for certain that they do so follow.' As a third instance, let us take mathematical axioms. ' A rectilineal figure of three sides has neither more nor less than three angles.' So soon as I under- stand the meaning of this proposition; — so soon as I can produce in my mind the representation of a three- sided figure, and have a moment's leisure for reflection ; — I judge at once that this proposition is quite cer- tainly true. I never think of confining myself to a subjective judgment ; ' I am so constituted that I cannot help thinking the proposition is true :' no ; the judgment which I form is objective; 'the propo- sition is true.' As a fourth instance, let us take our belief in an ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF CERTITUDE. 7 external world. The great mass of men never think of confining themselves to a mere judgment of con- sciousness on this matter ; ' I am impressed as if there were external objects :' they always form an intuitive judgment, ' there are external objects.' It is well known that certain philosophers have existed, who deny that there are grounds for any such judgment. But it is no part of our business here to consider the arguments of these philosophers ; for we are not here considering how far these intuitive judgments are true, but explaining what is meant by an intuitive judgment. I say then, the great mass of men (rightly or wrongly) do, as a matter of fact, elicit the intuitive judgment, * external objects exist/ • Such then are intuitive judgments, in the sense which we shall consistently assign to that word. They are judgments, which I do not hold as being inferred in any way from other judgments, but as immediately evident. Yet on the other hand they are totally distinct from what we call judgments of con- sciousness ; or, in other words, from the various reflec- tions made by my mind upon its actually present ex- perience. Many of the judgments, which we thus form, are true ; many are false : but, whether true or false, I will equally call them judgments of intuition, if they are immediate judgments, and yet not judgments of consciousness. 2. We must carefully distinguish however these intuitive judgments, from another numerous class which on the surface resemble them. There are very many judgments, which appear to be formed imme- diately ; in forming which, the mind does not reflect on any premisses from which they result ; but which nevertheless are in fact formed as conclusions from premisses. For instance. An experienced farmer goes into a corn-field, and says to himself, on looking around, 4 in what excellent condition and how abundant is this corn!' Yet this judgment, though so spontaneously formed, is in fact not elicited as immediately evident; it is elicited as a conclusion, resulting in part from various 8 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. judgments which already existed in his mind. These judgments will be such as the following. (1.) c I remember a number of fields, in which the corn was in very good condition.' (2.) ' These fields all agreed in certain charac- teristic marks.' (3.) 'If certain marks prove one corn-field to be in a good state, marks precisely similar must prove another to be so.' To these judgments, with which he was already familiar, one intuitive judgment is added, which he now elicits for the first time. ' There are in this field the same marks, which everywhere characterise a good con- dition of corn.' All these various judgments go to make up the grounds, for his opinion on the corn-field before him. Most of them indeed are so familiar to him, and they are all formed so readily and inevitably, that he does not reflect upon them at all, and is inclined to fancy his judgment to be immediate. Yet it is manifest on a moment's consideration, that unless every one of the preceding judgments had passed through his mind, he could not by possibility have formed the original opinion which he did form. That opinion was in fact the conclusion resulting from a certain logical process ; and that process was built upon these respec- tive judgments, as among the premisses on which it rested. Let his belief be shaken in any one of these judgments, his opinion on the healthy state of the corn-field before him must at once fall to the ground.* * One or two readers, I find, have doubted whether such opinions as the above are really inferential. There cannot, I think, be any kind of reasonable doubt that they are so, and philosophers (I believe) universally hold this. But it is no part of my province to contend for this statement ; for my arguments in the next Section would be but strengthened if it were denied. It is a very important proposition, advocated by me in the next Section, that 'moral judgments,' are 'intuitive.' I am obliged however to admit, that the mere fact of their appearing immediate is no sufficient proof of this ; because (as I here state) many inferential judgments appear intuitive. If this were denied, my arguments in the next Section would but proceed moreseasily and flowingly. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 9 On the other hand take a really intuitive judgment : — for instance, 4I recently experienced the sensation of cold/ It is plain that I hold this, not as the conclusion of any logical process whatever ; — not as depending on any judgment, whether reflected on or not; — but in the strictest sense as an immediate conviction. If our direct theme were Philosophy, it might be desirable to proceed at greater length, in illustrating this distinction ; but under our present circumstances, thus to have indicated it will suffice. 3. When we have sufficiently mastered the distinc- tion between the two kinds of immediate judgments, — Judgments of Consciousness and Judgments of Intui- tion,— we shall be able to understand wherein philoso- phical scepticism precisely consists. The only thesis, which expresses this theory with perfect consistency, is the following : — c We are unable to know with certainty anything whatever, beyond the facts of our actually present consciousness ; because no intuitive judgment can possibly carry with it its own evidence of truth.' A thinker of this class may be imagined, with a cer- tain superficial consistency, to argue as follows : — ' There 4 can be no possible ground for holding any intuitive ' judgments ; and the mass of men, in confidently holding 4 them, are simply unreasonable. Take for instance the 4 case of memory ; — what imaginable reason canlhavefor 4 supposing, that those various impressions, which I call 4 acts of remembrance, correspond to real facts of my 4 past history ? How can I know, for instance, that I 4 have not been formed by some malignant being, who 4 has given me mendacious faculties for the very pur- 6 pose of deceiving me ? How can I know but that 4 this being makes me fancy I w^as cold e.g. a short 4 time ago, when I was really experiencing some totally 4 different sensation ? But this supposition indeed, — 4 the supposition of a malignant creator, — is only one, 4 out of a hundred which might be made; each one at * variance with the belief, that my memory can be 6 trusted. Surely I can have no more real ground for ' believing, that I have actually gone through those 10 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. 4 various experiences, of which my memory presents 6 the impression, than a madman has for imagining 4 himself to be Csesar or Alexander the Great. * In c like manner, what possible ground have I for believing 4 that the conclusion of a syllogism really follows from 4 its premisses ? or again, that a rectilineal figure of 4 three sides has three angles? No doubt, I feel as if 4 these propositions were true ; I cannot help thinking 6 that they are true ; but what possible warrant have I 4 for inferring, from my own intellectual impotence,f 4 the truth of an objective and external fact ? I must ' remain then for ever, in a state of utter and hopeless 4 ignorance of everything, beyond the actually present 4 phenomena of self. I must remain, shut up (as it 4 were) within the region of present consciousness.' 4. Now in order to the true refutation of scepticism, we must beyond question deny its premiss : we must assert most confidently, in opposition to its theory, that certain intuitive judgments do carry with them their own evidence. Various thinkers however have, at various periods, taken a different course. These philosophers have admitted the sceptic's premiss, but joined issue with his conclusion. They have admitted * " Une autre consequence egalement juste" (from that doctrine of scep- ticism which the author is opposing), " est que nous n'avons aucune certitude Gvidente de ce qu'hier il nous arriva ou ne nous arriva pas ; et meme si nous existions ou si nous n'existions pas. Je crois bien etre evidemment certain qu'hier j'6tais au monde ; mais c'est un jugement qui pent se trouver sujet d erreur, selon les philosophes dont nous parlous. Car, selon eux, je ne puis avoir d'evidence que par une perception intime qui est toujours actuelle ; or, actuellement, j'ai bien la perception du souvenir de ce qui m' arriva hier ; mais ce souvenir n'est qu'une perception intime de ce que je pense presentement, c'est-a-dire d'une pensee actuelle, laquelle n'est pas la meme chose que ce qui se passa hier et qui n'est plus aujourd'hui. Par la m6me raison, je serai encore moins certain si je ue suis par en ce monde depuis deux ou troismille ans, et si je n'ai point anim6 le corps d'un crocodile ou d'un moineau. II est tres-evident que je n'en ai aucune memoire ; mais tout cela s'est pu faire, sans que je m'en souvienne actuelle- ment ; comme il arrive effectivement que chacun de nous est demeure plusieurs mois dans le sein de sa mere, sans en avoir conserve le moindre souvenir. Ce manque de memoire n'est done pas une certitude evidente, centre ce qu'on voudrait supposer de I'anciennet6 de mon existence, et des situations differentes ou je me serais trouve" dans le systeme de la metempsy chose." — Burner, (Euvres Philosophiques, chap. iii. s. 20. t This excellent phrase, ' intellectual impotence,' was used by an able writer signing himself M. in the ' Rambler' of September 1859. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 11 that no intuitive judgment can carry with it its own evidence ; but to avoid the sceptic's inference on man's dense and utter ignorance, they have looked in other directions for proof of the trustworthiness of certain intuitions. They have maintained accordingly, that various intuitive judgments may be proved legitimate, by means of some prior self-evident truth. As these philosophers admit the sceptic's premiss, I may be per- mitted to call them semi-sceptics ; and I maintain that nothing can be more complete in itself,* than the reply, put forth by the more consistent sceptic, against any such attempt at compromise. The semi-sceptic then professes to prove the trust- worthiness of certain intuitive judgments, by this or that course of argument. But this very fact, — viz. that he does appeal to argument, — furnishes his opponent with a triumphant retort. How do we believe that reasoning, in its most rigorous form, is really valid ? Evidently by an intuitive judgment. ' What can be 4 more illogical,' then the more consistent sceptic may proceed, * than your whole procedure ? You profess to prove that there are some intuitive judgments which may be trusted ; and in every step of your proof you assume that there are some which may be trusted : for the very profession of argument implies that pre- cise assumption.' So much then on the mere fact that arguments are used against him at all. Let us next see the answers which are ready to his hand, in reply to the particular arguments which have been chiefly attempted. Thus Des Cartes puts the very hypothesis, which we have supposed the sceptic to make ; viz. that we may have been formed by some malignant being, who has implanted mendacious faculties for the very purpose of deceiving us. Des Cartes meets this difficulty, by setting himself to prove the existence of a Holy God ; and from this, as from a fundamental truth, he deduces the proposition, * I say ' in itself :' because of course in a sceptic, the use of any reason- ing implies self-contradiction. 12 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. that we may most reasonably trust those faculties which He has implanted.* But how obvious is the sceptic's reply. 4 Either you believe in God's Existence by an ' immediate judgment of intuition, or you believe in it c as in a truth deduced from a chain of reasoning. In ' the former case, you take For granted the legitimacy 4 of that intuitive judgment ; in the latter case you take ' for granted the validity of reasoning. In either case ' you assume the precise proposition, which you under- * take to prove ; viz. that there are trustworthy judg- ' ments of intuition/ Here again the argument is in itself irresistible. Another mode of reasoning against the sceptic was devised by the unhappy La Mennais. He says : c We * may derive confidence in various intuitive judgments, ' from the fact that all mankind agree, arid cannot but ' agree, in forming them.' * My authority for this statement is Reid. His whole passage is worth considering. ' Des Cartes certainly made a false step in this matter ; for having suggested this doubt among others — that, whatever evidence he might have for his consciousness, his senses, his memory, or his reason, yet possibly some malignant being had given him those faculties on 'purpose to impose upon him ; and, therefore, that they are not to be trusted without a proper voucher ; — to remove this doubt, he endeavours to prove the being of a Deity who is no deceiver ; whence he concludes, that the faculties He had given him are true and worthy to be trusted. 'It is strange that so acute a reasoner did not perceive that in this reasoning there is evidently a begging of the question. ' For, if our faculties be fallacious, why may they not deceive us in this reasoning as well as in others ? and, if they are to be trusted in this instance without a voucher, why not in others ? 1 Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties, amounts to no more than taking their own testimony for their veracity ; and this we must do implicitly, until God gives us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old. And the reason why Des Cartes satisfied himself with so weak an argument for the truth of his faculties, most probably was, that he never seriously doubted of it. ' If any truth can be said to be prior to all others in the order of nature, this seems to have the best claim; because, in every instance of assent, whether upon intuitive, demonstrative, or probable evidence, the truth of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of the premisses on which our assent is grounded. How then come we to be assured of this fundamental truth, on which all others rest ? Perhaps evidence, as in many other respects it resembles light, so in this also — that, as light, which is the discoverer of all visible objects, discovers itself at the same time, so evidence, which is the voucher of all truth, vouches for itself at the same time. ' This however is certain, that such is the constitution of the human ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 13 But the sceptic's answer here is in itself no less triumphant than in the former cases. 4 Unless you as- 4 sume that certain intuitive judgments may be trusted, 6 you can have no knowledge whatever of the fact that ' men do agree in trusting them : you cannot under- ' stand the very meaning of a single sentence which is 4 uttered by your fellow-men ; nay, you cannot so much 4 as apprehend its external bodily sound. I say, you ' cannot so much as apprehend the very sound, of which c a spoken sentence is composed, unless you assume 4 that certain intuitive judgments may be trusted. You * are hearing at this moment the last word of the sen- 4 tence ; but how do you know the other words of which 4 it consists ? Simply by remembering them : either 4 then you must trust that kind of intuitive judgment 4 which we call an act of memory, or else you cannot ' apprehend the very sound of which a spoken sentence 4 is composed. And as for the meaning of such sentence, 4 it is still more manifest that various exercises of me- mind, that evidence, discerned by us, forces a corresponding degree of assent. And a man who perfectly understood a just syllogism, without believing that the conclusion follows from the premisses, would be a greater monster than a man born without hands or feet. ' We are born under a necessity of trusting to our reasoning and judging powers ; and a real belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained for any considerable time by the greatest sceptic, because it is doing violence to our constitution. It is like a man's walking upon his hands : a feat which some men, upon occasion, can exhibit ; but no man ever made a long journey in this manner. Cease to admire his dexterity, and he will, like other men, betake himself to his legs.' — Reid's Inquiry, Essay vi. Chap. v. Gioberti quotes the following passage from Jouffroy, which may also be cited in illustration : 1 Quand une faculte vient a s'appliquer et a nous donner la notion qui lui est propre, il est evident que nous ne croyons et ne pouvons croire a la verite de cette notion, qu'a une premiere condition ; c'est que nous avons foi a la veracite native de cette faculte car pour peu que nous en doutions, il ii'y a plus de verite, plus de croyance, possible pour nous. Et cependant rien ne prouve, rien ne peut prouver, cette veracite native de DOS facultes Done, messieurs, le principe de tout certitude et de toute croyance est d'abord un acte de foi aveugle en la veracite naturelle de nos facultes.' — Cours de Droit Naturel. I find this passage quoted in M. Alary' s French translation of Gioberti's " Introduction to Philosophy, vol. ii. note 33, p. 362." I suppose I need hardly add, that I am very far from agreeing with it. I maintain, as will be seen, that the ' natural veracity of our faculties' is a truth, in no way resting upon ' blind faith,' but brought home to us with perfect evidence by a most clear light. 14 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. 4 mory are requisite, in order that you may ever so ' distantly guess it.' 5. It is very curious to see how completely a sceptic overreaches himself, if he set himself thus frankly and energetically to carry out his principles. For the sceptic's argument, above stated, lands us in this con- clusion:— that we cannot begin listening to his objec- tions, we cannot so much as know that there is such a doctrine as scepticism in the world, until we have first committed ourselves to its denial; until we have taken for granted that precise thesis, which scepticism rejects. Unless I can trust my various acts of memory, I don't even know what the sceptic says, much less what he means. But if I can trust these acts of memory, then certain intuitive judgments may with reason be con- fidently formed ; which is the very point at issue between him and myself. Here then we fully see the truth of what sound philosophers continually say ; viz. that to attempt argu- ment against scepticism is a simple absurdity. I cannot know what the sceptic says, until I have elicited con- fidently various acts of memory ; i.e. have trusted one class of intuitive judgments : and I cannot argue against what he says, until I have trusted another. For to argue implies a belief in the validity of those processes of reasoning which I adduce ; and what can such a belief possibly be, except one or more intuitive judgments ? Yet let this be most carefully observed. While on the one hand it is a simple absurdity to argue against scepticism, on the other hand to hold sceptical opinions in their full consistency, is not less than physically impossible. As a first proof of this take the following. I have just said, that until we have committed ourselves to anti- sceptical opinions, we cannot even listen to the arguments brought against them. The converse is equally true. The sceptic complains that men in general most unreasonably trust their intuitive judg- ments. Now consider this most noteworthy circum- stance : he cannot know, or have the most distant idea, that the fact is so, until he has himself followed their ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 15 example; until he has trusted at least one class of intuitive judgments, viz. various acts of memory. Unless he first trust those acts, he cannot so much as guess at the opinion of his fellow-men on any single particular (see n. 4). Now I ask, has he really the physical power of doubting in many cases what their opinion is? For another instance, the story told of Pyrrho is well known. He was lecturing to his disciples, it is said, on the inability of our faculties to apprehend truth ; when a waggon suddenly came rushing down the hill, and the sceptical philosopher was the first who took to flight. We may ask, — had he so much as the physical power at that moment, really to distrust that faculty of memory, through which alone he had the means of so much as guessing, that he was in any danger at all ? evidently not. So in like manner, let any one of us try to regard it as really doubtful, whether he was experiencing a minute ago what his memory declared him to have been experiencing ; — let any one try to do this, and he will see readily the truth of my remark, that the task is physically impossible. He can no more compel himself really to doubt that he was ex- periencing those sensations or those thoughts which he distinctly remembers, — in other words, he can no more prevent himself from holding a certain intuitive judg- ment with the most undoubting confidence, — than he can raise himself into the air and fly to the top of a tree. 6. We have arrived, then, at two vitally important results. (1.) If we once admit the sceptic's premiss, — viz. that no intuitive judgment can carry with it its own evidence, — we are most irresistibly brought to his conclusion, that no such judgments are trustworthy at all. (2.) This conclusion is such, that no human being has so much as the physical power really to believe it. I would say this to the professing sceptic : — take the dearest and oldest friend you have in the world ; either maintain that you have not the means even of guessing that you ever saw him before in your life, or else admit that your whole scheme is a delusion and a mockery. 16 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. 7. At the same time I fully admit, that the sceptic's doubts need not, in consistency, extend to what I have called (n. 1) Judgments of Consciousness. Such judg- ments, in fact, amount to no more than this; "my present feeling is what I now feel it to be:'' and the truth of such judgments as these would not certainly be questioned, by the most consistent advocate (if such a person could be found) of philosophical scepticism. Put even the impossible case supposed by Des Cartes ; put the case, that I had been created by some malignant being, who has given me mendacious faculties for the very purpose of deceiving me. Well : even such a being as this could not make me imagine, that my present feeling is not what I now feel it to be. We need not, however, enlarge on this proposition : there are two reasons why we need not do so. Firstly, it is one of those propositions, which are in themselves so clear, that their luminousness is obscured, not intensified, by amplification and expansion. Secondly, so far is this proposition from being essential to my argument, that, on the contrary, my argument would be even (if possible) increased in strength, were I able to deny it. My argument, I say, would be even increased in strength, were I able to affirm, that the sceptic is called upon by his principles to deny the facts of actually present consciousness. He is not, however, so called upon ; and it may suffice, once for all, thus to have fairly stated what is certainly undeniable. 8. I have been led thus to enlarge on the sceptical position, for this reason among others. There are two false principles, in extreme antagonism to each other, against which the Catholic philosopher has specially to guard ; because they are far more prominent and pervasive, than any other philosophical errors which can be named. They are the Scylla and Charybdis, between which the bark of true Philosophy must direct its course. The one of these is Scepticism, the other Rationalism. But there is this most remarkable difference between the two errors. Rationalism can be most abundantly re- futed on its own chosen ground, — the ground of Reason. ON INTUITIONS AND THE P1UNCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 17 If the orthodox combatant be at all equally matched with the rationalist, the latter's signal overthrow is quite certain. But the case is very different, where scepticism is our opponent ; for when we have to assail it, our very weapons of offence fall from our paralyzed hands. We set out to refute it on grounds of Reason : but we are at once reminded, that we are simply begging the question at issue ; and that the very point to be determined is, c Can Reason be legitimately trusted?' Scepticism, then, is a far more destructive and desolating error, even than its extreme opposite. It represents all knowledge of Truth, great or little, as simply impossible ; it corrupts Philosophy at its very source. Our very first philosophical enterprise must be the overthrow of that error, which (once admitted) would render all thought and all knowledge impossible. Yet, against such a doctrine, or rather such a negation of all possible doctrine, what is to be done ? Reason against it we can not; for to reason (as the more consistent sceptic urges) is to assume the whole question at issue. It will be found however that we can accomplish, what will be amply sufficient in practice to overthrow the error. Firstly, we, who are not sceptics in any sense, — we, who deny the sceptic's premiss as well as his conclusion, — may communicate with each other, and make our combined observation on the enemy. We remark to each other, that it is physically impossible for any human being to carry out consistently the sceptical principle ; and that every professing sceptic is (by consequence) in a simply self-contradictory position. Secondly, there are great numbers of thinking men, who are more or less deeply infected with the sceptical poison, — some indeed to a very considerable extent. — who yet by no means carry their principles to the length of distrusting their reasoning faculty. Indeed, total distrust of the reasoning faculty, is one of those sceptical demonstrations which are not less than phy- sically impossible. Those men therefore, who will 18 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. admit reasoning at all, may be addressed by means of reasoning. We can bring them face to face with the full meaning of their position. We can labour at oringing home to their reason, and again to their imagination, the extent of that pitiable and debasing ignorance, which is the only consistent result attainable in that position. We can deter them from unwarily acquiescing in some among the less monstrous exhibitions of the sceptical principle, by showing them what that principle is, in its only full and consistent development. Thirdly, we can trace back this whole principle to the primary argumentative source from which it results. This I consider that wre have already done in the present Section. We have taken one particular pre- miss; viz. ' it is impossible that any intuitive judgment 4 can carry with it its own evidence of truth : ' and we have shown, that this premiss leads by legitimate con- sequence to the full-length sceptical whole. The sceptical premiss, I say, leads to the sceptical conclusion, by logic so absolutely clear and irresistible, that no one, who admits the validity of reasoning at all, can possibly deny the necessary connexion of the two. 9. We may very suitably, therefore, designate the con- tradictory of this premiss, as the Principle of Certitude. In other words, the Principle of Certitude will be this proposition : c it is fully possible that intuitive judgments ' may carry with them their own evidence of truth.' And this proposition may well be called the Principle of Certitude ; because, unless we confidently maintain it, it will be impossible consistently to recognise the certainty (or even approximation to certainty) of any one thing, beyond our actually present experience. If this principle were untrue, our knowledge would be less than that of the brutes ; it would be strictly con- fined to the mind's reflection at each instant on its own existing consciousness. We could not compare e.g. our present consciousness with our past ; for unless the Principle of Certitude were true, we could not even ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 19 guess what our past consciousness lias been. Much less, as is evident, could we even contemplate comparing our own consciousness with that of others. To ask for proof of this principle, is manifestly illogical. If certain intuitions carry with them their own evidence of truth, that evidence is our reasonable ground for accepting them as true. We may then proceed to reflect on the fact, that we do thus legiti- mately hold various intuitive judgments on their own evidence ; and this reflection is in itself an assertion of the principle before us. The only further question, which you can reasonably ask, is 4 what is the nature of * that evidence on which these intuitions rest?' and of that we will expressly speak before we close the Section. This then is our direct and appropriate proof: yet we are able (as has been seen) to give, over and above, an indirect demonstration of our principle, founded on the manifestly false consequences which would result from its denial. We can give such a demonstration, I say, to all who admit that there can be such a thing in rerum naturd as a demonstration. I would reply as follows to the sceptic. If you deny the legitimacy of reasoning, you commit a simple absurdity in asking for a proof at all. But if you admit the validity of proof at all, I offer you the strongest possible proof of our principle, in the shape of a ' reductio ad absurdum.' If our principle be not true, you have no ground for trusting e.g. the simplest and most obvious act of memory ; you have no ground for knowing, that you ever saw in your life that person, who is your dearest and most intimate friend. But this is a conclusion so undeniajbly false, that no human being has so much as the physical power of believing it. Hence the premiss, from which the con- clusion resulted, is also false ; and our principle, being the contradictory of that premiss, is undeniably true. 10. It may plausibly be objected then : ' if no one * has the physical power of consistently questioning the 4 Principle of Certitude, where is the importance of thus 1 laboriously presenting and illustrating it?' I reply, it is true indeed that no human being can consistently 20 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. question it ; i. e. can really believe those propositions, which inevitably result from its denial. Still, though this be so, many philosophers have denied it partially and inconsistently: i.e. they have denied it in itself, though they have refrained from carrying that denial to its legitimate consequences. And as the first instance of my statement, strangely enough, I can cite one among the most eminent and most sober English philosophers of the present day — Mr. Mansel. Take for instance the following passage from his "Prolegomena Logica:" — " It may be indeed, that the condition of possible thought cor- respond to conditions of possible being ; that what is to us incon- ceivable is in itself non-existent. But of this, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to have any evidence. If man as a thinker is subject to necessary laws, he cannot examine the absolute validity of the laws themselves, except by assuming the whole question at issue ; for such examination must itself be conducted in subordination to the same conditions. Whatever weakness, therefore, there may be in the object of criticism, the same must necessarily affect the critical process itself. " We may indeed believe, and ought to believe, that the powers which our Creator has bestowed upon us are not given as the instru- ments of deception. We may believe, and ought to believe, that, intellectually no less than morally, the present life is a state of discipline and preparation for another ; and that the portion of knowledge which our limited faculties are permitted to attain to here may, indeed, in the eyes of a higher Intelligence, be but partial truth, but cannot be absolute falsehood. But in believing thus, we desert the evidence of Reason to rest on that of Faith ; and of the principles on which Reason itself depends, it is obviously impos- sible to have any other guarantee. "But such a faith, however well founded, has but a regulative and practical, not a speculative, application. It bids us rest content within the limits which have been assigned to us: it cannot enable us to overleap them, or to exalt to a more absolute character the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers concerning finite objects of thought. For the same condition, which dis- qualifies us from criticising the laws of thought, must also deprive us of the power of ascertaining, how much of the results of those laws is true in itself, and how much is relative and dependent upon the particular bodily or mental constitution of man during the present v'lfis* * The italics are not Mr. MansePs. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 21 Considerable question has been raised as to Mr. Hansel's meaning here : but the more I consider the passage, the clearer it appears to me that Mr. Mansel, in each separate paragraph, states or implies a denial of what we have called the ' Principle of Certitude.' In the first paragraph he takes for granted, what all of course admit ; the existence of certain ' necessary laws ' to which ' man as a thinker is subject.' There cannot be a more undoubted instance of such laws, than our firm conviction, that the conclusion of a syllogism really follows from its premisses. Now every one, who reads the first paragraph above quoted, will recognise in it the proposition, that ' it is impossible to have any evidence ' as to ' the absolute validity ' of those laws. 'It is impossible to examine such validity, except by assuming the whole question;' — this is expressly stated. ' It is impossible to have any evidence of such validity without examination,' — this is manifestly implied : for, if it were admitted as possible that there could be such evidence, the whole paragraph would become totally unmeaning. 'We are so constituted,' Mr. Mansel im- plies, ' that we cannot help regarding the conclusion of a syllogism as resulting from the premisses ; but whether it really do so result, — of this "from the nature of the case it is impossible to have any evi- dence.'" But certainly no other intuitive judgment carries with it stronger evidence of truth, than does this judgment, that syllogistic reasoning is cogent. Hence, ' from the nature of the case it is impossible,' according to our author, c that any intuitive judgment can carry with it its own evidence of truth.' The second paragraph maintains that " the portion of knowledge, which our faculties are permitted to attain, cannot be absolute falsehood :" yet ' even this moderate degree of certainty,' he adds, 'is not attainable by Reason ; we can have no " other guarantee" for it than " faith." Now it would carry us much too far, to consider the philosophical value of this most extraordinary state- ment, that Faith is our guarantee for the legitimacy of 22 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Reason : * and our immediate question is not the value but the meaning of Mr. Hansel's theory. And of its meaning there can surely be no doubt. If it be possi- ble that intuitive judgments may carry with them their own evidence of truth, it is possible to have some other guarantee, besides Faith, of 'the principles on which Eeason depends/ But Mr. Manscl considers it "ob- viously impossible to have any other guarantee." Mr. Mansel therefore considers it obviously impossible, that intuitive judgments can carry with them their own evidence of truth. And this is the precise opinion, which I ascribe to him. I should add here, however, that when Mr. Mansel speaks of c Faith,' he does not contemplate exclusively a special and authenticated Revelation : he includes under the phrase (as I have good reason to believe) Faith in that primitive Revelation, on God's Existence and Attributes, which was made to man at his creation, and which is still continued throughout the world. This does not in the least affect my argument ; but it is necessary to the appreciation of the author's meaning. Lastly, the third paragraph above quoted refers again to the ' laws of thought ; ' including of course our belief, that the conclusion of a syllogism really follows from the premisses. " We have no power of ascertain- ing," he says, "how much of the result of those laws is true in itself, and how much is dependent " on our natural " constitution " of body or mind. Mr. Mansel holds then, that we have no power of ascertaining whether the conclusion of a syllogism do really follow from its premisses : or whether our belief that it does so, is simply " dependent on our particular bodily or mental constitution." I really cannot see any opening for doubt, as to Mr. Mansel's meaning ; and in the earlier part of this Section * I may briefly however ask, what is an act of Divine Faith, except a certain exercise of Reason ; viz. the believing of this or that truth on God's Word ? If we have no independent ground for trusting our Reason, what sufficient ground can there possibly be for our act of Faith ? ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 23 I have said (I trust) what is abundantly sufficient to refute his doctrine. Here, however, I may be allowed briefly to state what that doctrine really comes to, and submit it to his own maturer judgment. Mr. Hansel's doctrine then is in fact this. ' Unless we lived under a ' Divine Revelation, we could not even guess, whether 'the conclusion of a syllogism really results from its ' premisses ; or whether on the other hand our necessary ' belief tlisit it does so, is a mere delusion, resulting from 'our particular mental constitution. Since, however, 'we do enjoy the light of Divine Revelation, we know ' not indeed that this belief is precisely true, but that c it cannot be absolutely and totally false/ Again surely, as I just now incidentally urged, those intuitive judgments which we call acts of memory, cannot possibly be alleged to have greater means of carrying with them their own evidence of truth, than have those intuitive judgments, whereby we recognise the validity of reasoning. Indeed they apparently fall under Mr. Mansel's very words : for if I was cold some short time ago, then my present impression of /laving then been cold, is a c necessary law,' to which ' as a thinker I am subject.' According to Mr. Mansel then, were it not for Revelation, my memory would give me no ground for so much as guessing that I was cold a short time ago : ' nay even with the light of Reve- ' lation,' according to him, ' I cannot know for certain ' that I was cold a short time ago ; but only that this 4 belief of mine is not absolutely and totally false.' I would ask Mr. Mansel — with most sincere re- spect, and with great admiration of his many high philo- sophical gifts, — whether in this shape he could himself accept his own theory?* *• The greater part of Mr. Hansel's passage, above quoted, occurs agaiu in the author's Bampton Lectures (p. 145, 6.) It will be of some value then, towards ascertaining his meaning, if we say a few words on the argument of those lectures. Their main object is to recommend the conclusion, that we cannot possess any direct knowledge on the Infinite and the Absolute. Now my present purpose leads me to consider, not how far this proposition is true, but what is the argument by which the author supports it. Let us enter on this question. There are two totally distinct syllogisms, either of which 24 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. A further reason for thinking that I have correctly seized Mr. Hansel's meaning, will be the effect produced by his writings on his most unreserved admirers. I may refer, in illustration of this, to an essay, which un- doubtedly displays considerable earnestness and ability. It is a most eulogistic review of Mr. Mansel's Bampton Lectures, which appeared in the c Guardian ' newspaper of Dec. 7, 1859. No words can possibly be more ex- plicit than the following, which I take from that Essay. " We look for the foundation and for the limit of our belief in our own faculties) to the deep-seated instinct which tells us that God cannot deceive. Reason cannot guarantee itself. . . . Surely the religious instinct, which bids us trust in God, is the one primary premiss of all truths. Neither sense nor reason can warrant them- selves : we believe them, because we believe that God gave them and that in giving them He must needs have given us Truth/' Strange indeed that this writer never asked himself the question, — how can we know that we have a Creator, or that that Creator is Veracious, except through the highest and choicest acts of Reason ? If the writer considers that we know these great truths immediately, he considers, in other words, that we know them through certain intuitive judgments : i.e. through certain momentous acts of Reason, appertaining to the class which we call 'intuitions.' If he holds that we know these truths by inference, he holds that we know them by means (1) of certain intuitive judgments, and (2) of a certain process of inference, based upon those judgments. In either case then, we know these would land us in the desired conclusion : and it is of great importance that we shall precisely understand, which of these two syllogisms is the one which Mr. Mansel adopts. SYLLOGISM I. ' Major Premiss. Whatever Reason really declares is really certain. 'Minor Premiss. But Reason really declares, that we have no direct ' knowledge of the Infinite and the Absolute. ' Conclusion. Hence it is certain, that we have no direct knowledge of * the Infinite and the Absolute.' SYLLOGISM II. ' Major Premiss. No declaration of Reason suffices to give us certain 1 knowledge ; (because no such declaration can carry with it its own ' evidence of truth.) ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 25 truths through the highest and choicest acts of Reason ; and cannot possibly know them in any other way. But if Reason cannot 'guarantee itself,' what 'guarantee* exists, or can possibly exist, for those acts of Reason, which give us our knowledge of God's Existence and Veracity ? From such principles as these, the necessary consequence is nothing less than scepticism, the most bewildering and the most desolating, 'Reason cannot guarantee itself;' hence there is no possible guarantee for the truth of Reason's declaration, that there exists a Veracious Creator. But this particular declaration of Reason is c the one primary premiss of all truths ;' hence, according to our reviewer, ' there is no possible guaran- tee ' for ' the one primary premiss of all truths.' If all truths be derived from one primary premiss, — and if, for the truth of that premiss, there can be no possible gua- rantee,— the only inference is, that we have no reason- able ground whatever for believing any thing at all. 11. I will take my second instance, from a school of philosophy the most opposed to Mr. Mansel, — the so- called philosophy of experience: a school, of which perhaps Mr. Stuart Mill may be cited as the worthiest English representative. These philosophers claim as their special characteristic, that they build wholly upon experience ; ' and this,' they proceed to say, ' is the only ' sure basis of philosophy : for once abandon the solid 'ground of experience, each man will at every turn ' mistake his own personal fancies and prepossessions 'for absolute truth.' 1 Minor Premiss. But whatever direct knowledge is professed of the ' Infinite and the Absolute, is merely the declaration of Reason. ' Conclusion. Hence we do not really possess any certain knowledge of 1 the Infinite and the Absolute.' These two syllogisms, I have said, are totally distinct ; but indeed, as regards the question before us, they are absolutely contradictory. The Major Premiss of the second expressly denies, that which the Major Premiss of the first as expressly affirms ; viz. that a real declaration of Reason is certainly true. Now plainly, in regard to the passage quoted in the text, there can be no doubt which of the above syllogisms it is intended to sup- port. It is absolutely impossible, by any stretch of ingenuity, to adduce it in confirmation of the first syllogism : for it has not the remotest tendency to support the Minor, and it has a very obvious tendency to overthrow the Major. On the other hand, the tendency of the whole passage (if its argument were admitted) towards establishing the Major of the second 26 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. I would ask of these philosophers, do they mean by ' experience ' the experience of the present moment, or do they include past experience also ? If they say the former, I reply it is obviously false that they do in any sense build their philosophy wholly, or chiefly, on experience. But if they answer (as they most certainty will) that they do include past experience as well as present, then again I deny their allegation, that they build their philosophy wholly on experience ; and I proceed thus to argue against them, on behalf of my denial. You make use of your own past experience, — you make use of other men's experience, — as part of the foundation on which you build. How can you even guess what your past experience has been ? By trusting memory. But how do you prove that those various intuitive judgments, which we call acts of memory, can rightly be trusted ? So far from this being provable by past experience, it must be in each case assumed and taken for granted, before you can have any cognizance whatever of your past experience. Moreover, from these facts of past and present ex- perience, you deduce argumentative conclusions. In so doing, you assume in each single instance the validity of the reasoning process. It cannot be even superficially or plausibly maintained, that these various judgments, — ' the conclusion here truly results from the premisses,7 — that these various judgments (I say) are derivable from experience. syllogism, is so irresistibly obvious, that further words are superfluous on so plain a fact. It seems beyond question then, that in this passage, at all events, a denial of what we have called the ' Principle of Certitude ' is the very basis on which the author's argument has been built. Still I am far from meaning to imply, that Mr. Mansel never uses the first syllogism to prove his conclusion : for in one or two places he undoubtedly does so. Thus (p. 36) he expresses distinctly the very im- portant truth, that ' Reason itself, rightly interpreted, teaches the existence of truths above Reason.' And the following passage again, is so justly and admirably expressed, that nothing can possibly be more so. " Reason does not deceive us, if we will only read her witness aright ; " and Reason herself gives us warning, when we are in danger of reading it " wrong. The light that is within us is not darkness ;' only it cannot " illuminate that which is beyond the sphere of its rays." (p. 198.) ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 27 At all events then you are compelled to assume two large classes of judgments, — and those of most vital importance, — on no ground of experience whatever : viz. that (1) your various acts of memory, and (2) also your various acts of reasoning, correspond with Objective Truth. In making these tremendous assump- tions, why are you not also exposed to that danger, which you would fain represent as exclusively besetting your opponents ; — the danger of mistaking your own personal fancies and ideas for absolute Truth ? You will reply perhaps, that you assume no more than all mankind necessarily assume. I will give one only, of the many replies which might be made to that state- ment; — and I answer thus. You assume proposi- tions of these two classes, before you know, or can so much as guess, that any other man living assumes them ; for it is only by means of their assumption, that it is possible to know, or even so much as to guess, what other men's opinions are. As it is most desirable to bring this point quite clearly home, I will cite and apply a passage, in which Mr. Stuart Mill states his own philosophical doctrine. ' There is no knowledge a priori ; no truths cognisable by the ' mind's inward light, and grounded on intuitive evidence. Sensa- ' tion, and the mind's consciousness of its own acts, are not only * the exclusive sources, but the sole materials, of our knowledge.'* Let us test then, by these principles, an act of memory. I am at this moment comfortably warm ; but I call to mind with great clearness the fact, that a short time ago I was very cold. What datum does ' sensation ' give me? simply that I am now warm. What datum With this sentiment (I need hardly say) I most cordially agree, and am very grateful to the author for such valuable and important enunciations. But the direct philosophical charge which I would venture to bring, is the following. Two different syllogisms are separately available, in behalf of Mr. Mansel's conclusion ; syllogisms, however, which it is impossible logically to combine, because the Major Premiss of the one directly con- tradicts the Major Premiss of the other. But Mr. Mansel, it appears to me, has most illogically united these antagonistic syllogisms. He passes from one to the other with apparent unconsciousness, and without in any way recognising their mutual inconsistency. * This passage is the one cited from Mr. Mill by an able writer in the 'National Review,' to whom I shall again have occasion to refer. 28 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. does i consciousness ' give? that I have the present im- pression of having been cold a short time ago. But both these data are altogether wide of the mark. The question which I would earnestly beg Mr. Mill to ask himself, is this ; — what is my ground for believing, that I was cold a short time ago? ' I have the present impres- ' sion of having been cold a short time ago ;' — this is one judgment. ' I was cold a short time ago ;' — this is a totally distinct and separate judgment. There is no necessary, nor any even probable, connexion between these two judgments, — no ground whatever for thinking that the truth of one follows from the truth of the other, — except upon the hypothesis, that my mind is so constituted as accurately to represent past facts. But how will either 4 sensation ' or ; consciousness,' 01* the two combined, in any way suffice for the establishment of any such pro- position ? Those who have maintained the 4 experience ' theory, differ widely from each other, as to the degree of religious belief which they have professed : I will therefore so state my argument, as to cover every pos- sible case of belief and unbelief. Either my soul ( 1 ) was created by some Superior Being; or (2) was caused by some non-creative agency ; or (3) started into existence without any cause at all. These three alternatives are logically exhaustive. If the first alternative be taken by the ' experience ' philosopher, I ask him this question : how can c sensation and con- sciousness' suffice to shew that the Creator is Veracious? that he has so formed my soul, that my own present im- pression of a certain past sensation corresponds (even in any degree whatever) to a certain past fact? to the fact, namely, that I really experienced that sensation, at the time to which my memory refers? If the second al- ternative be taken, I ask a similar question : How can 'sensation and consciousness' suffice to shew, that this non-creative cause has issued in the production of a soul, possessing this singular and admirable endowment, that my present impression of a certain past sensation cor- responds (even in any degree whatever) to a certain ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 29 past fact? the fact, namely, that I really experienced that sensation, at the time to which my memory refers ? If the third alternative be taken, I ask again a similar question : How can 'sensation and consciousness' suffice to shew, that the soul, which has thus without any cause started into existence, is so singularly and ex- quisitely constituted, that my present impression of a certain past sensation corresponds (even though it were in ever so faint a degree) to a certain past fact? the fact, namely, that I really experienced that sensation, at the time to which my memory refers? For the sake of fixing our ideas, I have confined my remarks to the case of memory. But it is plain, that every thing which I have said equally applies to the case of reasoning; and to the assumption, universally made by the experience school, that the syllogistic process is objectively valid. It is undeniable then, that these philosophers cannot possibly maintain their ground. 'Sensation and consciousness' are not suffi- cient foundations for any knowledge, which shall exceed, or even equal, that of the brutes (see n. 9). These thinkers, no less than others, must admit various in- tuitive judgments, as carrying with them their own evidence of truth. They may join issue no doubt, as to the number of legitimate intuitions, or on the test of their legitimacy. But all this is in no wise a question of principle ; it is wholely and solely a question of degree. As soon as they have admitted one, they have abandoned the characteristic tenet of their school.* * The citation made in the text of Mr. Mansel and Mr. Mill, as types of sceptical philosophy, was also made in this volume as it was printed last October. After that period, I read with great interest an article in the 'National Review' (Oct. 1859), on Mr. Stuart Mill, which contains a remarkable agreement of opinion. I am well aware, how very serious are the differences between a Christian writer like Mr. Mansel, and such an un- believing philosopher as Kant ; still Mr. Mansel would himself admit, that those philosophical utterances of his, which I venture to regard as semi- sceptical, have their origin in the Kantian school. It must be considered then an instance of agreement, that the * National Review ' unites the schools of Kant and of Mill in one category. He says that, amidst the striking contrasts which exist between these two schools of thought, they agree in depriving us (if they could establish their respective principles) of all means for knowing certainly Objective Truth. I have net the article at hand this moment, and therefore quote from memory. 30 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. 12. We have sufficiently shewn then, that the pos- sibility of our possessing any knowledge worthy of the name, rests (1), upon the circumstance, that it is possible for intuitive judgments to carry with them their own evidence of truth ; and (2), on the circumstance, that certain intuitive judgments do carry with them such evidence. Your next question will be, Of what nature is that evidence ? And this question it is the more impor- tant to answer distinctly, because some of you have most seriously misunderstood what I intended to convey.* To simplify the matter as much as possible, let us take for illustration (as hitherto we have chiefly done) two classes of intuitions, which are really and undeniably legitimate. Let us take (1), those intuitions, wherein I judge that I really experienced sensations which I dis- tinctly remember ; and that I experienced them moreover at the time, to which my memory refers back. Let us take (2), those intuitions wherein I judge, — a syllogism having been drawn out in its logical shape, — that its conclusion really follows from its premisses. Some of you then have understood me to maintain, that my belief in the truth of these judgments is the conclusion of a syllogism. Thus : — 4 Major Premiss. My memory may be trusted. 4 Minor Premiss. My memory testifies this past * sensation. ' Conclusion, Hence I may know that I really did experience that sensation.' Or again, 4 Major Premiss. My reasoning faculty may be 4 trusted. ' Minor Premiss. My reasoning faculty testifies 4 that this conclusion really results from those premisses. 4 Conclusion, Hence I know that it does so result.' But nothing would be more preposterous than such a notion as this ; and I never imagined anything at all like it. In the first place, it is contrary to the clearest facts. Children e.g. distinctly remember past sensa- * It was not some of my pupils who thus misunderstood me, but some of those who read the present volume as it was printed in October. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 31 tions, — as their having seen their mother's or their nurse's face, — long before they think of the universal judgment, that memory may be trusted. Indeed, multitudes of men (I suppose) pass through life, having remembered in their time a vast variety of past events, without having once formally elicited any such uni- versal judgment. But there is a second objection to this absurd theory, even more peremptory than the adverse testimony of facts. Such a theory is logically self-contradictory. It is impossible that I can avail myself of a syllogism, without holding confidently two intuitive judgments. The first of these judgments is an act of memory; for I cannot draw the conclusion, without remembering the premisses. The second is an act, whereby I recognise that the conclusion does really follow from the pre- misses. You see, then, how impossible it is that our ground for confidently forming intuitive judgments can be any syllogistic process. You see that the very opposite to this is undeniable. So far from a syllogistic process being our ground for trusting intuitive judg- ments, we must, by absolute necessity, trust certain in- tuitive judgments, before we can have reasonable grounds for trusting any syllogistic process whatever. It is very manifest, indeed, since the number of judgments which we form is not infinite, that there must be certain judgments, which are not derived by reasoning from any previous judgments whatever. These judgments, if legitimate, and if they are not the mind's mere reflection on its actually present con- sciousness, are precisely what we call intuitive judg- ments, carrying with them their own evidence of truth. In other words, my soul is so constituted, that I not only elicit certain intuitive judgments, but elicit them with full grounds of knowing their truth. My soul possesses a certain intrinsic quality, which gives me full evidence of their truth at the very moment when I elicit them. When I return (after a few hours' absence) to my children, I know, and have the fullest intrinsic ground for knowing, that I have seen their faces before. 32 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. When I put together the premisses, ' All men are mortal/ and 'I am a man;' — and when from those premisses I draw the conclusion that CI am mortal;' — I have full ground for my confidence, that this inference is legiti- mate. This ground of confidence in either case is, and can be, nothing else, except the operation of a certain intrinsic mental quality. In regard, then, to various judgments of intuition which might be named, I cannot admit for one moment that they are either less certain, or less immediate, than judgments of consciousness. All which can be said is, that judgments of intuition, however certain, require for their evidence the operation of a certain intrinsic mental quality ; whereas judgments of con- sciousness do not require this. Again, every judgment of intuition may be accompanied by a corresponding judgment of consciousness; see n. 1: and yet it is remarkable, how seldom it is so accompanied. The judgment of intuition is so absolutely certain, that we do not trouble ourselves to elicit the parallel judgment of consciousness. When I see my children again, spontaneously, and without reflection, I elicit the judg- ment, c These are the faces which I saw a few hours 4 back.' But, unless I am in an unusually philosophical mood, I never think of eliciting formally the parallel judgment of consciousness. I never think of saying to myself, c I am so affected at this moment, that I cannot c help thinking I saw these faces a short time ago.' This intrinsic quality of the mind then it is, which renders any knowledge possible, beyond the knowledge of my own actually present consciousness. This quality it is, of which a consistent sceptic, if such a thinker were physically possible, would question the existence. This quality it is, which no one, except that impossible mon- ster, can question with any consistency at all. It is through the operation of this quality, that our various thoughts are raised from mere 'intellectual impotencies,' to direct and trustworthy perceptions of Truth. It is through the operation of this quality, and in no other way, that we are enabled to apprehend Objective Keality. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 33 And by a very natural and obvious figure, this quality is commonly called a * light' to the soul. When actual light is away, we are shut up, each in his own company, and debarred from all direct vision of the external world. And so, were it not for this '-intuitional light,' we should be shut up, without the possibility of escape, in the dreary region of actually present consciousness. Thanks be to God, we possess this light : and in its bright efful- gence, we know our own past history ; we know our fellow-creatures ; we know our Almighty Creator. And now observe this further inference. There can be no doubt, that acts of memory at least, in one shape or other, proceed throughout our whole waking life. At every instant, we at least call to mind our consciousness of the few preceding instants. Consequently, — even though there were no other legitimate classes of in- tuition except those two which we have been of late specially considering, — an important result would follow, in regard to this c intuitional light/ It is not a quality, like many others, which is generally dormant, and only from time to time called into activity : on the contrary, it puts forth its appropriate operation during every instant of our waking lives. Philosophers have been occupied from time to time, with greater or less of diligence and success, in investi- gating the nature of this * intuitional light:' and the same question is destined hereafter (I expect) to play a far more important part in such inquiries than it has hitherto done. But it is not requisite for our present theological purposes, to pursue this matter further. 13. Here then we may draw our breath ; having at length brought to an end our protracted train of argu- ment. It will be desirable, before we advance further, that you should again proceed over the ground which we have already traversed ; that you should examine carefully the course of argument, which we have gone through ; and that you should consider how far your reason freely and fully recognises its cogency. If you have followed me up to this point, you will readily proceed with me one further step. D 34 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. The Principle of Certitude is, as we have seen, the one key to any knowledge worthy of the name. But so soon as the philosophical edifice has been unlocked and entered, then the question which first meets us on the threshold, will be the test of legitimate intuitions. All reasoning of course must be built upon premisses ; and there must therefore of necessity be a certain number of primary, premisses which are known to us not by reasoning but by intuition. The whole of our knowledge is obtained, and can be obtained, by no other process, than combining and building upon such primary premisses. If then this be so, how vitally important is the task of distinguishing true intuitions from false ! For once suppose our foundation to be erroneous, then in proportion as we reason the more consistently, the more accurately, the more frankly and energetically, so much the more widely mistaken, and in all probability so much the more mischievous, will our conclusions become. This all-important preliminary inquiry, — the mode of distinguishing true intuitions from false, — has met (I cannot but think) with very far less attention from philosophers than was its due. The intellect, as Father Tapparelli incidentally remarks, has two main functions; the intuitive and ratiocinative :* but the former has surely been very far less methodically and systematically treated than the latter. 14. Here however, in order to prevent very pro- bable misconception, I must make two explanatory and qualifying statements. (1.) I am very far indeed from meaning to imply, that no one can form a legitimate intuition, unless he be himself prepared with .some philosophical test to establish its legitimacy. Far indeed otherwise. The parallel case of inferential judgments will here pre- cisely illustrate what I mean to convey. There is no more common phenomenon in the world than the following. A man of great natural shrewdness but uncultivated intellect, displays the * "La faculta intellettiva, nelle due funzioni d'intuito e raziocinio" &c. — Natural Diritto, n. 32. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 35 greatest acuteness in deciding, what means will or will not be conducive to some end which he has greatly at heart. His reasoning will be most sound from first to last ; yet not only he will be quite unable to give any philosophical test of its validity, but even so much as to state the various premisses on which he proceeds. Now who will be so wild as to maintain, that this man has really no valid ground for his conclusions ? that he is taking them up accidentally and at random, and is as likely to be wrong as to be right ? No : we shall all recognise, that he is using that power of reasoning, which is one of the highest faculties implanted in his nature; and using it most healthily and legitimately: nor shall we under ordinary circumstances have any wish at all, that he should draw out with any greater accuracy the process through which his mind has travelled. Yet on the other hand, if we had to do with a man of totally inaccurate mind, who is leading himself or others into serious mischief by his bad reasoning, we should act otherwise ; we should aim at persuading him to state methodically his various premisses, in order that he may see how ludicrously inadequate they are to his conclusions. And lastly, in the case of philosophical and systematic writers, of them we do most reasonably expect, not merely that they argue correctly, but that they put before us their premisses in sufficient detail ; and not only so, but be prepared also to vindicate the validity of those reasonings which they have built thereon. The case of intuitions is in every respect similar to this. There are multitudes of men who elicit legi- timate intuitions, who would be wholly unable to state any philosophical test which shall establish that legiti- macy : yet it would be monstrous to say that such intuitions may not most reasonably be trusted. Again there are multitudes of men (other men or the same) who mistake this or that prejudice of their own for a legitimate intuition : and in such instances it is most suitable to urge upon their notice, on philosophical grounds, the spuriousness of such a conviction ; th@ 36 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. fact of its being utterly destitute of all pretension to be accounted true and genuine. Lastly, we may most fairly call upon those who profess to write scientifically and to instruct us in philosophy, that they lay down some plain and intelligible method, whereby we may distinguish these true primary premisses from spurious counterfeits ; and that they establish moreover to our satisfaction the reasonableness and sufficiency of that method. (2.) Now for my second explanatory statement. There are certain intuitions, so intermingled (if I may so express myself) with the very first springs of thought, — such indispensable prerequisites to every intellectual act worthy the name, — that it is simply impossible to apply directly and methodically any test of their legitimacy. Impossible for this reason, that in order to apply any test imaginable, some intellectual act must be elicited ; which act implies, in the very process of eliciting it, ttyat those particular intuitions are genuine. Instances of such intuitions will be those which we have already so often mentioned ; our various intuitions of memory and of reasoning. But then it is these very intuitions, in regard to which each one of us has the strongest possible guarantee for their truth; viz. the fact, that it is not less than physically impossible (see n. 12) to doubt them for one moment. Again, even as to these most fundamental intuitions, a certain subsequent and negative test of their genuine- ness may be directly and methodically applied. It is imaginable, that my to-day's memory of the events which passed last Sunday, may be contradictory to my yesterday's memory of those same events ; so that by the fact of trusting my memory, I am led into endless contradiction and confusion. It is imaginable again, that the same premisses, if combined in one order, would lead to one conclusion ; if in another, to another and a contradictory conclusion : so that by the fact of trusting my reasoning faculty, I am brought into end- less contradiction and confusion. I need not say that ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 37 nothing of the sort takes place ; but that on the con- trary, the deepest harmony exists between those various propositions, which my memory and my reasoning faculty combine to establish. Here then is a subse- quent and a negative test, yet one of a very cogent description, that those two fundamental classes of in- tuition are genuine. 15. Having so far explained my meaning, I return to my former remark. Philosophers in general have laboured far less, it seems to me, than they ought to have laboured, at the all-important task of providing us with tests, whereby genuine intuitions may be dis- tinguished from spurious. F. Buffier indeed, the well- known Jesuit metaphysician, has applied himself to this work, and deserves no slight praise for seeing its importance and fundamentally ; yet no one, I think, can regard his treatment of the question as very subtle or profound. The tests which he suggests are these three : — (1.) That the judgments, alleged to be first truths, be so clear, that when one undertakes either to prove or to oppose them, one can only do so by the help of propositions, which are manifestly neither clearer nor more certain. (2.) That they be so universally received among men in every time and place, and by every sort of character, that those who oppose them find themselves, in comparison to the rest of mankind, not more than one in a hundred or even in a thousand. (3.) That they be so strongly impressed on our minds, that we conform our conduct to them, notwith- standing the refinements of those who imagine contrary opinions ; which latter class indeed act, not in con- formity with their opinions thus imagined, but with those first truths which are universally received.* * " Le premier de ces caracteres est qu'elles soient si claires, que quand on entrepreud de les prouver on de les attaquer, on ne le puisse faire, que par des propositions qui rnauifestement ne sont ni plus claires ni plus certaines ; " D'etre si universellement re9ues parmi les hoinmes en tout temps, en tous lieux, et par toutes sortes d'esprits, que ceux qui les attaquent se 88 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. While admitting that I cannot be satisfied with these three criteria as at all adequate to the occasion, it must not be supposed that I profess in any way to improve upon them.* But I would venture to solicit the serious attention of philosophers to the question ; as I must think that no edifice of metaphysical science can be considered stable and trustworthy, where the security of its very foundation has been so greatly neglected. Until the question of intuitions has been systematically and fully considered, I must think it truer to affirm that most copious and valuable materials for metaphysical science have been brought together, than to affirm that that science itself has been defini- tively called into existence. For my own part I can only say that, without attempting any general solution of the question, at all events I will not allege any one intuition as legitimate, until I have brought together so many grounds for my statement, as will (I think) satisfy every reflecting man. 16. We have already seen quite enough, to guard us against falling into a fallacy, which need only be stated to be exposed. It happens sometimes, that when we claim intuition in behalf of some important pro- position, certain unphilosophical men, who claim to be specially philosophical, regard that claim itself as a confession of argumentative weakness. When we say plainly that we can advance no chain of syllogisms in behalf of our thesis, they regard this as tantamount with a confession, that we do not allege Reason in its trouvent, dans le genre humain, 6tre manifestement moins d'un centre cent, ou meme centre mille ; " D'etre si fortement imprime'es dans nous, que nous y conformions notre conduit, malgre les raffinements de ceux qui imaginent des opinions contraires, et qui eux-memes agissent conforniement, non a leurs opinions imaginees, mais aux premieres verites universellement recues." — Burner, chap. vii. p. 22. * I have not attempted any methodical consideration of this most im- portant matter, because such consideration would have carried us much too far on purely philosophical ground. Yet I may refer the reader to some remarks in p. 130-133 with the note ; p. 159-161 ; p. 419. If these remarks be admitted as true, they have undoubtedly a bearing on the general ques- tion mentioned in the text. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 39 behalf at all ; that we cling to it, and admit ourselves to do so, on grounds of fancy, feeling and prepossession, in defiance of Reason. But after the various consider- ations which have occupied us in this Section, it is not necessary to do more than state very briefly the fol- lowing most obvious truth. We are guiding ourselves fully as much by Reason when we hold confidently legitimate intuitions, as when we proceed further to draw inferences from those intuitions. Nay it may be said in one sense, that we go more by Reason in the former case than in the latter ; so far as in every case premisses may be said to possess higher certainty, than the conclusions which they tend to establish. When men thus thoughtlessly call for argument in each particular case, they forget that all argument must depend on certain primary premisses which are not based on argument. If then nothing is reasonable except that for which argument is produceable, those primary premisses are not reasonable ; hence neither are the conclusions based on them reasonable ; and hence again, no knowledge of any kind is possible at all. If indeed no more is meant by such statements, than that we should be very careful what intuitions we claim as legitimate; — that this must not be left to each man's private fancy, but must proceed on certain fixed and cognizable principles ; — then no more is meant, than what I not merely admit, but have most earnestly maintained. But many men really seem to think (most extravagant as the proposition must appear when for* mally stated) that all intuitions, from the very nature of the case, are and must be the mere offspring of fancy, prejudice, or caprice. 17. This will be a suitable place for such remarks as seem desirable, on the sense which we affix, through- out this Section, to the word 'intuition,' and other kindred terms. What the sense is indeed, in which we have used the word itself, 'intuition' or 'intuitive 4 judgment,' this will be now quite familiar to you. If I merely reflect on my actually present consciousness, I elicit a 'judgment of consciousness.' On the other 40 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. hand, if I regard a certain judgment as resulting from certain others, this act of the mind is an ' act of in- ' ference/ or an ' inferential judgment.' But if I elicit a certain judgment as true self-e violently and not by way of inference, — and if this judgment is not a mere judgment of consciousness, — we call it an ' intuitive act,7 or an ' intuition.' We call it so, without any regard to the question of its truth or falsehood ; and accordingly we subdivide 'intuitions' into 'true' and 'false,' or ' legitimate ' and 4 illegitimate.' We will further use the verb ' intue,' as corre- sponding in every respect with the substantive ' intui- ' tion,' and the adjective ' intuitive.' But it is of the utmost importance, to distinguish quite clearly, between the intuing act of the mind on the one hand, and the thing itself intued on the other hand. As no English word is here ready for our use, let us coin the word 'intuern.' I am well aware, of course, how contrary is this word to philological pro- priety; since the word 'intuition' is derived from the Latin and not from the Greek. Still, I am sure you will admit, that, in philosophical discussion, philological propriety should at once give way, where any increase of clearness and accuracy can be obtained. I will define an'intuem,' then, 'a truth legitimately intued.' My present memory of having seen my children yester- day is the 'intuing,' or ' intuitive' act, or the ' intuition ;' the fact itself, now called to mind, that I did then see them, is the ' intuem.' Various criticisms may probably enough be made on this use of words. It is not worth while, certainly, to speak at any length, on a mere question of verbal propriety. The less so indeed, because at last the one adequate defence of any verbal usage is its proved utility: and this defence it is impossible for you to appreciate, except by proving its utility ; that is, by proceeding with our scientific course. Yet a few words may be in place, to explain why I prefer our sense of the word 'intuitive,' to others which different writers have affixed to it. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 41 Many philosophers confine the term to our immediate perception of necessary truths. On the meaning of this term ' necessary ' we are to speak very soon ; but you have now probably a sufficient general notion of its sense, to understand what is here intended. My reason for preferring our own use of the term to that employed by these philosophers, is the following. I think it very important, that we should be trained to contemplate, as a class, all those judgments, which, without being mere judgments of consciousness, carry with them their own evidence of truth. These judg- ments agree with each other in this, that a special quality of mind is called into action, to make their truth self-evident. They also agree with each other, in being by necessity the primary premisses, whereon our whole fabric of knowledge is built. If you recognise, with me, the importance of habitually viewing them as a class, you will, of course, at once see, that no way so efficacious can be suggested of securing this, as to call them by a common name. It may be thought a more questionable usage, that I include false judgments as well as true under the head 4 intuitions.7 To this it will be a sufficient reply, if I point to the parallel use of the word ' reasoning/ Whenever I regard a certain judgment as resulting from certain others, I am said to 'reason;' to arrive at my result by means of ' reasoning : ' and then we distin- guish 'sound' reasoning from 'unsound.' Our usage of the word 'intuition' follows precisely the same analogy. A final objection may come from an opposite quarter. If the word 'intuition' extends both to 'true' and 6 false' judgments, why is not the word ' intuem' made similarly extensive ? Here again we may point to the common usage of speech, in regard to that other principal operation of the intellect, reasoning. If I reason unsoundly, it is always said that the result at which I arrive is not a real conclusion from the pre- misses. And so, if I ' intue' unsoundly, the thing intued is not a real * intuem.' 42 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. So much then, on the comparatively unimportant question of verbal propriety. 18. Of intuems, some are c necessary,' others not so.* By 'necessary intuem' is meant a verity legiti- mately intued as 'necessarily' true. When, e.g. I intue by memory that five minutes ago I was seated at this table, this truth is no necessary intuem. But when I intue that a rectilineal figure of three sides has three angles, the truth is necessary, and is legi- timately intued as such. As no Catholic philosopher (I believe ) has doubted the existence of necessary truths, and as my direct purpose is not philosophical disquisition, we need not say much in mere explanation of this term 'necessary.' Anything, I suppose, is 'necessarily' true, when its truth arises from nothing whatever external to itself; when its truth arises simply from what is expressed in the subject and in the predicate of that proposition which declares it. Thus the intuern, that I was seated five minutes ago at this table, resulted from the external circumstance that my will then gave my body the requisite command. But the intuem, that every three-sided rectilineal figure has three angles, arises simply from the intrinsic connexion which exists, between a three-sided and a three-angled rectilineal figure. The truth of this latter intuem, I say, does not result, nor is intued by me as resulting, from any external circumstance, as for instance from a Creator commanding that such figures should have such a property ; but is intued as wholly intrinsic to the objects themselves whereof we are judging. 19. This leads the way to a very important philoso- phical discussion. We believe of course most firmly, and believe as a truth which Reason by itself can establish, that there exists an All-holy, Almighty God, Infinite in every Perfection, The One Necessary Self- existent Being. Here then a difficulty presents itself, * It can hardly be requisite to remark, that, throughout this Chapter, where I speak of ' necessity,' I invariably mean what is called ' metaphy- sical necessity,' as distinct from ' physical ' or ' moral.' These three distinctions correspond to the three distinctions of objective certainty : see p. 427, 8. ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 43 which will more and more make itself felt, in proportion as we more carefully ponder on the relations which must exist between God and Necessary Truth. Let us enquire then, as a preliminary step, what is the relation in which Necessary Truth stands, to the Intellect and the Will of this Adorable Being. We assume His existence ; and we proceed upon that assumption. Nor can we take a better instance of Necessary Truth, than the axioms and theorems of Geometry. Let us consider then two propositions, which are im- plied by this word 'necessary,' in regard to Mathematical Truth, and its relation to God's Intellect and Will. (1.) Necessary truths do not derive their verity, from the fact that God necessarily intues them. Rather the very opposite is the fact : God necessarily intues them, because they are necessary truths. Who would say e. g. that God is necessarily Self-Existent, because He intues Himself to be so ? On the contrary of course : He intues Himself to be so, because He is so. In like manner He necessarily intues the base angles of an isosceles triangle to be necessarily equal, because they are necessarily equal : He necessarily intues that the three angles of every triangle together necessarily equal two right angles, or that the square of the hypo- thenuse necessarily equals the sum of the squares of the sides, because in each instance the truth is so. It is indeed (as is manifest) the very excellence of God's Intellect, that it is necessarily determined by Truth ; or (in other words) His Intellectual Perception depends on Truth, not Truth upon His Intellectual Perception. What Vasquez says of Moral Truth, is applicable to all Necessary Truth of whatsoever kind, 'Ante omnem ' Dei Voluntatem et Imperium, immo etiam ante omne 4 JudiciumJ this truth must be conceived as existing ; ' praecedens, secundum rationem, omne Judicium Divini « Intellects.' (In lm 2" d. 150, n. 23.) It follows therefore, that through all Eternity God is constantly and necessarily gazing on the vast mass of Necessary Mathematical Truth. 44 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. (2.) It is not only certain that necessary truths are not derived from God's intuition of them, but that in some sense they seem to limit His Power. God cannot create a rectilineal figure of three sides, which has more or less than three angles ; or again, whose angles taken together amount to either more or less than two right angles. Here then we are brought face to face with the difficulties which I mentioned as existing. Is the assertion endurable, that God is gazing through all Eternity on some mass of Necessary Truth, external to and independent of Himself? on Truth, co-eternal with Himself, and yet distinct from Himself? on Truth, equally necessary with Himself, and yet not Himself? Again, is the assertion endurable, that God's Power is limited by something external to Himself? not by His Own Intrinsic Perfections (as e. g. He is unable to destroy Himself because of His Necessary Self-exist- ence) but by some body of external Truth ? I ask again, is either of these assertions endurable ? It is plain that neither could be tolerated by any reflecting Theist. And yet, if we wish to avoid this, there is but one possible resource ; in other words, we are led by com- pulsion to one very definite conclusion. We are led to infer, that Necessary Truth is not distinct from God Himself; that (in some way wholly incom- prehensible to us) it is identified with Him; that, in gazing on it, He is not gazing on something external to Himself, but merely penetrating and comprehending the depths of His Own Nature; that when His Power is limited by it, it is limited by no external shackle, but by His Own Intrinsic Essence. That this fact is totally mysterious, I of course fully admit; though really not more so, than is every proposition which concerns the Incomprehensible Creator. It is totally mysterious : but there is no difficulty whatever (so far as I am aware) in the way of our receiving it. Nor does it seem to me possible to avoid this precise conclusion. It seems to me that we are brought, by the very exigency of the case, to that one hypothesis, which avoids all difficulties, ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 45 and harmonizes all data ; that hypothesis, which admits all that Reason testifies, on the absolute independence possessed by Necessary Truth; while it even deepens and intensifies our apprehension of God's Greatness and Incommunicable Necessity. This then is our conclusion. All Necessary Truth is identical with God ; in intuing it, I really intue the One Necessary Ens; though in this, as in so many other cases, I may be very far from recognising the full extent of the Object which I contemplate. God, in intuing Necessary Truth, intues Himself; a creature, in intuing Necessary Truth, intues God. Nor is there absence of high Catholic authority in support of this view ; Bossuet, e. g. states the doctrine which we advocate in the strongest and most express terms : Tout ce qui se demontre en Mathematique, et en quelque autre science que ce soit, est eternel et immuable : puisque Peffet de la demonstration est de faire voir que la chose ne peut etre autrement qu'elle est demon tree. Aussi, pour entendre la nature et les proprietes des choses que je connois, par exemple, ou d'un triangle, ou d'un carre, ou d'un cercle, ou les proportions de ces figures, et de toutes autres figures entre elles, je n'ai pas besoin de savoir qu'il y en ait de telles dans la nature ; et je suis assure* de n'en avoir jamais ni trace ni vu de parf'aites. Je n'ai pas besoin non plus de songer qu'il y ait quelques mouvemens dans le monde, pour entendre la nature du mouvement meme, ou celle des lignes que chaque mouvement decrit, les suites de ce mouvement, et les proportions selon les- quelles il augmente ou diminue dans les graves et les choses jetees. Des que 1'idee de ces choses s'est une fois reveillee dans mon esprit, je connois que, soit qu'elles soiente, ou qu'elles ne soient pas actuellement, c'est ainsi qu'elles doivent £tre, et qu'il est impossible qu'elles soient d'une autre nature, ou so fassent d'une autre fa^on. Et pour venir a quelque chose qui nous touche de plus pres, j'entends, par ces principes de verite eternelle, que quand aucun autre etre que 1'homme, et moi-meme ne serions pas actuellement ; quand Dieu auroit resolu de n'en creer aucun autre ; le devoir essentiel de I'homme, d£s-la qu'il est capable de raisonner, est de vivre selon la Raison, et de chercher son Auteur, de peur de lui manquer de reconnoissance, si, faute de le chercher, il 1'ignoroit. Toutes ces verites, et toutes celles que j'en deduis par un 46 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. raisonnement certain, subsistent independamment de tons l*>s temps: en qnelqne temps que je mette un entendement humain, il les connoitra ; mais, en les connoissant, il les trouvera verites, il ne \vsfera pas telles: car ce ne sont pas nos connoissances qni font leurs objets ; elles les supposent. Ainsi ces verites subsistent (levant tous les siecles, et devant qu'il y ait eu un entendement humain : et quand tout ce qui se fait par les regies des proportions, c'est-a- dire tout ce que je vois dans la nature, seroit detruit, excepte moi, ces regies se conserveroient dans ma pensee ; et je verrois claire- rnent qu'elles seroient toujours bonnes et toujours veritable?, quand moi-meme je serois detruit, et quand il n'y auroit personne qui fut capable de les comprendre. Si je chercJie maintenant, ou, et en quel sujet elles subsistent e'ternelles et immuables, comme elles sont, je suis oblige d'avouer un Eire, ou la verite est Eternellement subsistante, et ou elie est toujours entendue ; et cet Etre doit etrela Verite meme, et doitetre toute Verite; et c'est de Lui que la verite derive, dans tout ce qui est et ce qui s'entend hors de lui. C'est done en Lui, d'une certaine maniere qui rrfest incomprd- hensible, c^est en Lui, dis-je, que^'e vois ces verites dternelles ; et les voir, c'est me tourner a Celui, qui est immuablement toute Verite, et recevoir Ses Lumieres. Cet Objet Eternel, c'est Dieu, eternellement Subsistant, eter- nellement Veritable, eternellement la Verite meme. — De la Con- noissance de Dieu et de Soi-meme, cap. iv. n. o. I was led to this passage of Bossuet, by a work of M. Jourdain on St. Thomas's Philosophy. The author adds, that c les maitres les plus autorises de la philosophic du 17e siecle . . tombent d'accord avec Bossuet 'in this statement (vol. ii. p. 375). Fenelon certainly holds the same doctrine ; as large passages from his work on the Existence of God amply demonstrate. The following may suffice: — Toutes nos connaissances universelles ont Dieu meme pour Objet fmmediat ; mais Dieu considere avec certaine precision, par rapport aux divers degres selon lesquels il peut communiquer Son Eire.— Part 2, n. 56. The 'Prselectiones Philosophies,' used at St. Sulpice, make the same statement : — f In Essentia Diviria continentur relationes essentiales et neces- sariaB rerum.' — n. 1557. Nay, M. Jourdain tells us that William of Auvergne, as bishop, condemned in the year 1240 the ' heretical ON INTUITIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 47 ' proposition/ c qu'il y a des ve*rites e*ternelles, qui ne 'sont pas Dieu meine.' (Vol. i. p, 51.) A little research would enable me (no doubt) to accumulate a large number of such passages, from the highest authorities. But there is no need of such research ; for the conclusion is one, which will at once commend itself both to the judgment and feelings of all devout Catholics.* 20. Having now then sufficiently prepared the way, for those theses which I am mainly anxious to prove, I shall here close the present Section, the various pro- positions, which we have (I think) established in the course of it, are very closely connected with philo- sophical controversies, which have been at all times most keenly and earnestly discussed, and never more so than at the present time. I have endeavoured how- ever to steer clear of these controversies, so far as was consistent with what was absolutely necessary for my design. Not that I regard these controversies as unim- portant : on the contrary, they appear to me vitally momentous ; and perhaps more so now than at any former period. Nor has the reason of my procedure altogether been, that I am without a decided opinion upon them ; for on some of the matters at issue, I have been led to form a very decided opinion. But my direct subject being Theology and not Philosophy, I have felt all through, that it was very desirable to con- fine strictly our philosophical discussions to the estab- lishment of those truths, which are indispensably requisite as a foundation for what is to follow. * A very able and learned writer in the 'Dublin Review' (June 1857, p. 411, note) has some remarks on this doctrine. I do not understand him however to question it, but to deprecate its adoption as the basis of ' Ethi- cal Science :' 'it were an unsuitable basis,' he says, 'on which to build up * Ethical Science.' And I the rather think this must be the writer's mean- ing, because only a few pages back he himself seems to have asserted the same doctrine. ' Necessary and absolute ideas,' he remarks (p. 407) { are 'the Divine Idea itself, presenting itself under different aspects.' It is a very interesting question, and one which it is very desirable that some competent person should treat, how far the scholastics, in all which they say about the immutable essences of things, do not tend in some measure to imply the doctrine stated in the text. See a very remarkable passage in Vasquez, on the 1' 2'e, d. 97, n. 9. 48 SECTION II. On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth. i 21. We may begin this Section, by stating two or three extremely simple moral judgments, which would be formed spontaneously by any human being, who should know the circumstances of the respective cases. The first judgment given shall contain the special idea of moral obligation. A friend of mine, who has loaded me with benefits, entrusts to my keeping a jewel of great value, for the sake of its safe custody ; while he goes to seek his for- tune in other lands. He returns in a state of great distress, and reclaims his jewel. I recognise imme- diately, and without the faintest shadow of doubt, that I ought to restore it ; or in other words that I am under the moral obligation of restoring it. Now, before going further, let us consider what is precisely meant here by the phrsse 'moral obligation.' When I say that I am under the moral obligation of restoring the jewel, I mean neither more nor less than that the not restoring it would be ' morally evil.' If we examine our own consciousness, we shall find that invariably this term ' moral obligation ' is but corre- lative to the other term ' morally evil.7 When I say that such an act, under such circumstances, is of 'moral obligation,' I mean neither more nor less, than that to abstain from doing it would be 'morally evil.' When I say that c the avoidance of such an act would be of moral obligation/ I mean that ' the doing it would be morally evil.' The term ' moral obligation ' then, by no means need imply the existence of some other person, THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 49 who imposes the obligation;* it implies no more, than the existence in certain acts of this quality, 'moral evil.'f Of this particular term ' moral obligation ' then, I need not make any further explicit mention ; because its explanation is necessarily contained, in the explanation of its correlative ' morally evil.* The first moral judgment then, which I have given for illustration, may be stated thus : ' to refuse restora- tion of the jewel under these circumstances would be morally evil/ Take this as a second judgment. A rich man, instead of giving himself up to luxurious indolence, devotes himself indefatigably to some object of great public importance. If I believe that his motives for doing so are pure and simple, I judge that this conduct is 4 morally good.' And take this as a third judgment. A and B are two men of my acquaintance. A devotes the main current of his life, — devotes his labour, his time, his wealth, — to instructing the ignorant, relieving the dis- tressed, promoting the cause of virtue. B on the other * " Ceux qui ne veulent pas, que la connaissance du juste et de Vinjuste suffise pour imposer une obligation proprement dite, sont fort embarrasses de trouver le fondement de Fobligation a la Loi Naturelle." — Gerdil, to be quoted at length in Sec. iv. t The text is so worded as to imply a doctrine, which I hold to be certainly true ; viz., that the ' malitia ' of a bad act is a positive attribute : This question is to be considered, among others, in the third Book ; nor •would it have been alluded to here, had there not been an impression (as I find) in the mind of some Catholics, that the doctrine which I follow is of questionable theological soundness. Some Catholics, I say, are under the impression, that there is at least a consent of theologians in favour of a. proposition, contradictory to our doctrine ; the proposition, namely, that the ' malitia ' of an evil act consists entirely in the ' privatio rectitudinis debitse.' The following extract will abundantly show how totally mistaken is any such impression ; and how completely the question is an open one among theologians. It is taken from the ' Theol >gia Scholastica ' of that well-known English theologian, F. Compton Carleton, S. J. 'Secunda ergo et probabilior sententia affirmat, malitiam moralcm actus peccaminosi consistere in aliquo positive, positivd scilicet difformitate ad rectam rationem. Ita Medina ; Bannez ; Zamel ; Caietanus, asserens se non ausurum fuisse hoc dicere, nisi id clare docuisset S. Thomas. Addit tamen huic actui Caietanus aliam malitiam privativam, in carentia rectitudinis sitam. . . Eandem sententiam sequitur Vasquez, Lessius, Erice, Coninck, Gabriel, Raymundus, Arriaga, Amicus ; estque communissima hodie inter recentiores opinio.' — d. 100, § 3, n. 1. E 50 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. hand, without grossly neglecting any of his immediate duties, leads on the whole a life of great comfort and enjoyment. If I believe A's motives to be good, I judge without the slightest doubt that A's course of life is * morally better ' than B's. These three judgments, I need not say, are very closely related to each other. In the first, I hold that a certain act is 'morally evil;' in the second, that a certain course of life or series of acts is 'morally good;' in the third, that one course of life or series of acts is more ' morally good ' than another. I have the idea then, however I came by it, of a certain quality which I call ' moral goodness.' This quality is of such funda- mental importance, that no more momentous question can possibly engage our mind, than an examination into its real nature. I begin with making one statement, which will be found (1 think) of the utmost value, both in promoting clearness of thought on the subject, and also in serving as a basis for the argument which will succeed. The idea, expressed by this term 'morally good,' is a 'simple' idea. And in a matter of such very great importance, you must allow me to proceed, first of all, at some little length, in merely explaining what is meant by this statement. 22. The idea expressed by the term ' sweet,' — when I judge e. g. that this lump of sugar is 'sweet' — is a simple idea. I may explain ' sweet ' indeed, by saying that it is the opposite to ' bitter ;' just as I may explain ' bitter ' by saying that it is the opposite to ' sweet.' But any further explanation than this is impossible : he who has never experienced the sensation in question, can- not possibly understand the term. So I may explain ' morally good,' by saying it is the opposite to ' morally evil ;' or I may explain ' morally evil,' by saying it is the opposite to ' morally good.' But I maintain that WKJ further explanation of the term is impossible ; that if a man had never experienced the exact thought in question, he would not by possibility be made to under- stand the term. TUB ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 51 The opposite to a ' simple idea ' is a { complex idea ;' and the great majority of those which the mind con- ceives are of this character. Take for instance that idea, which we express by the term l a poetical tempera- ment:'— of how many simple ideas is it not composed! Numbers of men no doubt use the term, having learned from others to use it with this or that application, who attach to it very little definite meaning. But how different is the case with those who intelligently apply it ! That it is a most complex idea, is admitted by all philosophers : what precisely are those simple ideas whereof it consists, — this is among the most difficult, as among the most interesting, of psychological ques- tions. There are certain qualities of mind, which are found, in certain marked instances, to exist together in very special intensity ; while other qualities are not found to exist in all these marked instances to any intense degree. From the fact of the former qualities being so often found united with each other in special intensity, we think of them in combination; and we give to that combination a name of its own. But to resolve that combination into its component parts, — in other words, to analyse that complex idea into the simple ideas of which it consists, — this requires the most care- ful and accurate observation. Let us suppose the analysis rightly performed. By a 'poetical temperament' then, is meant the possession in an intense degree of certain mental qualities ; A, B, C, D, and E. Enough has been said to show how complex is the idea expressed by that phrase, — c the poetical tempera- ment.' For another illustration, consider how complex is the idea which we express, in saying that ' A and B are attached friends.' That they sincerely desire each other's welfare, — this is part of the idea: but how much more does it not also contain! A third instance shall be given, because of its theo- logical importance. The One Perfectly Simple Being, Who exists or possibly can exist, is Almighty God : and 52 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. moreover, if we are so happy as hereafter to see Him in Heaven, that idea of Him, which we shall receive from His Facial Vision, will be simple even as He is Simple. But here in via our idea of Him becomes more complex, in proportion as it becomes more real and definite. We may think of Him vaguely, as the ' Cumulus of all Perfections : ' but if we wish to grow in His knowledge and love, we must obtain of Him a far more real and definite notion. How do I form for myself such a notion ? I ponder on one Perfection after another: Power, Knowledge, Sanctity, and the rest ; and I reflect on His possessing all these per- fections in infinite extent. The highly complex idea which I thus obtain, is a very real knowledge of Him, so far as it goes ; and it is the nearest approach to a full knowledge which we can possibly gain, so long as we are exiles (alas!) from our True Home. But as there are c complex ideas,' so evidently there must be 'simple ideas.' Complex ideas are analysed into simpler ones; these again perhaps, into others simpler still. At length then, we must come to a position where further analysis is impossible; a posi- tion where the ideas, into which we have decomposed the original idea, are themselves perfectly simple. 23. We are now able to understand two terms, which are frequently used by modern philosophers, and which will greatly assist us in our subsequent enquiries. Some judgments are ' analytical,' others c synthetical.' And in like manner, — since a ' proposition ' is merely the verbal expression of a 'judgment,' — some pro- positions are ' analytical,' and others ' synthetical.' An ' analytical 'judgment is one, in which it is judged that the idea of one term is contained in the very idea of the other.* Thus if I say that 'he who possesses a 4 poetical temperament, possesses in an intense degree * the qualities B and E,' I shall be forming an analyti- * Perhaps I should make some apology for using the words 'term,' ' subject,' ' predicate ' (both here and elsewhere), not only when speaking of propositions, but of judgments not expressed in words. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 53 cal judgment; for I consider that the idea of possessing these qualities in an intense degree, is contained in the very idea ' a poetical temperament.' Those judgments, which are not ( analytical,' are called ' synthetical :' and we may give an illustration or two almost at random, for the purpose of making clearer the distinction between these two classes. Sup- pose I form this judgment ; ' my parents were instru- ' mental to my birth into the world :' here is an ' analy- tical ' judgment ; this is part of what I mean, when I say 'my parents.' But suppose I form this judgment; ' my parents should be honoured and obeyed by me : ' here is a ' synthetical judgment.' We may consider this latter judgment indeed to be intuitively evident: but still the idea of * claiming justly my honour and obedience,' is not part of the idea which I express, when I say i my parents.' Another illustration may be taken from a thesis, which I argue in the fifth Section of the second Chapter. To judge that happiness consists in a gratification of the propensions, — is to elicit an 'ana- lytical' judgment: the judgment results at once, from considering what is meant by ' happiness,' ' propension,' 'gratification.' But to judge that 'earthly happiness 4 is most surely obtained by means of virtue,' — this, however true, is no 'analytical' judgment: its truth is made manifest, by examining, not the sense of words, but the properties of things. Analytical judgments may be ' true ' or ' false ;' for it is evident that I may be mistaken in my opinion, that this idea is contained in that. In regard to the more complicated phenomena even of my own mind, I may make very serious mistakes when I attempt their analysis. A second division of analytical ' judgments may be into ' objective ' and ' subjective.' For (1)1 may judge, that one idea is contained in another, as I am at this moment conceiving the latter idea. Or (2), I may judge that those who conceive the complex idea most clearly and fully, those who use the word expressing it most intelligently, — that those men tend more and more to 54 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. include in it such and such simpler ideas. In the former case, I judge that the complex idea, as I now conceive it, contains these simpler ideas : in the latter case, I judge that the complex idea, in its full objective sense, contains them. The former class then may be called 'subjective,' the latter ' objective ' analytical judg- ments ; and great confusion of thought sometimes arises from the neglect of this distinction. Then again we may divide analytical judgments into ' exhaustive ' and * partial : ' accordingly as I judge that I am recounting the whole, or merely some part (greater or less), of those simpler ideas, which together constitute the 4 complex.' There is one class of propositions, which must rank under the head 'analytical,' but which are quite un- worthy of so respectable a name ; nay, which hardly deserve the appellation of propositions at all. I mean c tautological ' statements, or truisms. In these state- ments,— not merely the idea of one term is contained in that of the other (as it is in all analytical proposi- tions), but there is no idea expressed in either term, which is not clearly, distinctly, and explicitly expressed in the other. Suppose for instance, that I define a penta- gon to be ' a rectilineal figure with five sides ; ' and then proceed gravely to enunciate the proposition, ' every pentagon has five sides.' This is the same kind of proposition, as though I affirmed ' a table is a table,' or ca tree is a tree.' We may call ordinary analytical propositions by the name 'solid/ to distinguish them from such empty statements as these tautologies. It may be asked in conclusion, ' can those judgments of Consciousness, spoken of in the preceding Section, ever amount to solid analytical judgments ?' Most clearly not. A judgment of consciousness is one, which does not require at all for its evidence the mind's ' in- tuitional light ; ' it is simply the mind's momentary glance on its actually present phenomena. It is per- fectly impossible, that I can perform a solid analysis of any one among my mental phenomena, except by fixing my gaze on it for some period of time. In doing THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 55 this, I take for granted that the phenomenon in question is substantially the same at each separate instant, which it was in the previous instant. But this fact cannot be known to me by ' consciousness : ' it is only known to me by c intuition ; ' by that particular kind of intuition, which I call an act of memory. A judgment of con- sciousness then is, by absolute necessity, a simply tautologous judgment: 4my present feeling is what it is ;' or ' is what I now feel it to be/ 24. Proceeding then to our immediate theme, — it is plain, from what has been said, that nothing can be more thoroughly intelligible, than the inquiry on which we are about to enter. If I say that the taste, which I receive from this lump of sugar, is c sweet/ this term 'sweet' expresses a simple idea. If I say that the lump itself is c hard/ this term expresses a complex idea; for it includes (1), the idea of muscular pressure, and (2), of resistance to that pressure. Now in con- • 1 • . • .• T • 1 . 1 . • . • x 11 rally is that this is * morally better ' than that. The question before us is, whether this idea, c morally good,' and its opposite 4 morally evil,' be simple or complex ideas ; whether they be simple, like the idea 4 sweet ; ' or complex, like the idea ' hard.'* On questions of this sort, Reason has one, and one only, court of final appeal ; the impartial judgment of a reasonable man, who will reflect on what passes in his own mind. It is simply unmeaning to ask for any proof except this ; all that a controversialist can do, is * So the " Prselectiones Philosophies" speak of those philosophers who hold, * boni et mali notionem primitivam esse et in aliam clariorem irreduc- 'tibilem* (n. 1510): and they distinguish these from others, who think * bonitatem et malitiam ex pluribus conceptibus coalescere* (n. 1513). I should add in candour that the author of the "Prselectiones" differs from me, and regards 'morally evil' as a complex idea. He states however (n. 1511), that the whole Scotch school of Philosophy take the view which I advocate ; and I need hardly add that Catholic writers always express great respect for the dicta of this school. An instance will be found of this, in the quotation from Perrone to be inserted in Sec. 4. 56 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. to lead men (as best lie may) to fix their attention, each for himself, on those particular facts, of which he may wish to obtain their recognition. And obviously our most satisfactory course in the present instance will be, to begin by examining what our opponents maintain. We will proceed then at once to consider the different analyses of the term ' morally evil,' which have been attempted by those various philosophers, who have regarded it as capable of analysis. 25. By far the most plausible of all these analyses, are those which would explain ' morally evil,' as mean- ing 'worthy of disapprobation,' or ' worthy of blame,' or ' worthy of punishment.' The connection is undoubtedly most close and indissoluble, between the various phases of the idea 'moral goodness,' on the one hand, — -and of these ideas, — ' deserving approbation' or ' praise' or 're- ward,'— on the other hand. Consider such judgments as the following: — 'All wicked actions are worthy of disapproval, of blame, of punishment.' 'All morally good acts are worthy of approbation, of praise, of reward.' ' If act A is morally better than act B, it is more worthy of approbation, of praise, of reward.' All these judgments are formed so readily and unmistake- ably, — it is so impossible even to imagine their contra- dictories,— that the predicate in each case might not unnaturally be regarded, as containing an analysis of the subject. If then it be found that no such claim can be maintained, much less is it probable that any other attempt at analysis will be found successful. And yet a very little consideration will suffice to overthrow the hypothesis before us. Let us first take the first of these three alleged analyses, — ' worthy of disapprobation.' Evidently this is no real analysis. The idea ' disapprobation ' is not more simple than the idea f morally evil,' but the very contrary. It is more complex ; it contains the idea ' morally evil ' as part of itself. For what at last is meant by my ' disapproba- tion ' of an act ? simply my recognition of it as ' morally evil.' The quality ' morally evil ' is presupposed as THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 57 appertaining to the act ; and the word 4 disapprobation/ expresses the recognition of that quality, whether by the agent or by some other person. Neither therefore can i morally evil ' be analysed as signifying ' worthy of blame ; ' for ' blame is but the expression in words, of that intellectual judgment which we call c disapprobation/ The ideas then, 4 disapprobation ' and ' blame,' are more complex, not more simple, than the idea ' morally evil:' and even more obviously is the same assertion true, of the idea * punishment.' We fully understand all that is meant by the proposition that ' an act is morally evil,' before we have so much as considered the question, whether it be ' worthy of punishment.' It happens indeed continually, that we elicit the former judgment, without proceeding at all, explicitly or implicitly, to elicit the latter. On so plain a matter no more certainly need be said. 26. Having disposed of these, the most plausible endeavours at analysis, I will next consider an explana- tion of the terms ' morally evil,' which is not unfre- quently, nor unnaturally, given by devout Catholics. These excellent men consider the idea c morally evil,' as a complex one ; and as signifying neither more nor less than this, — 'forbidden by the Creator.' In the next Section I hope to adduce a series of arguments against this allegation ; here I will confine myself to one. This one, however, I will state at full length and in considerable detail ; because it will be found equally available, against every other imaginary analysis of our term, which has been, or can be, attempted. At starting it is hardly necessary (I suppose) to make one observation. It is of course admitted by all Theists, that everything morally evil is forbidden by the Creator ; we are but enquiring, whether this can truly be called the meaning of the term. And we shall the better arrive at a solution of this question, by giving one or two more illustrations, of ' analytical ' and 4 syn- thetical ' judgments respectively. 58 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Suppose I put before you this proposition, and pro- pose to prove its truth : — ' two mutually attached friends (of whom I have heard) are sincerely desirous of pro- moting each other's welfare.' You will answer at once : 4 no need of proof ; of course the statement is true ; the ' very idea ' mutually attached friends ' includes the idea ' desirous of promoting each other's welfare.' ' Suppose I ask you whether it is true, that all hard substances resist muscular pressure : ' of course,' you will reply; ' that is what we mean by 'hard substances.' ' Suppose I ask, ' is it true that my parents were instru- mental in bringing me into the world?' You will answer, — 'this is included in the meaning of the very ''term parents.' All these judgments then are analytical. But suppose I put before you this proposition : — 'to 4 refuse the restitution of a deposit is morally evil/ Will you say that this statement is included in the very meaning of the subject ? Of course not. You fully understand all that is meant\>y the term, — ' refusing 'the restitution of a deposit,' — before you so much as consider the question, whether such refusal be morally good or evil. If any one of you were so morally insensible as not to admit that such refusal is morally evil, he would none the less call such refusal ' the refusing restitution of a deposit.' This judgment then, however certain and obvious, is not ' analytical,' but ' synthetical.' Again suppose I put before you this proposition : — ca child's disobedience to his parents in an indifferent matter is morally evil :' — you will make the same remark as in the former case. You understand all that is meant by the term 'a child's disobedience, &c.' before you consider the question whether it be morally evil. The proposition is synthetical. Or, suppose I put before you this proposition : — ' disobedience to the Creator is morally evil :' — you will be quite as ready, as in the former instances, to make the very same remark. You understand what is meant by 4 disobedience to the Creator,' before you consider the THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 59 question whether or no it be morally evil. If a monster could be found who denied that such disobedience is wrong, he would none the less call it ' disobedience.' This judgment, like the two former, is plainly synthetical. I am quite certain that you would give this answer, quite as readily in the latter as in the former instances ; and I have been anxious to obtain your spontaneous judgment, before you should be aware of its bearing on our question. The one appeal of Reason in such cases, as I have already said, is to the impartial judg- ment of an intelligent person, who will reflect on what passes in his own mind. Now the best mode of secur- ing the requisite impartiality, is that you should be induced simply to examine your own consciousness, without even knowing the philosophical effect of your answer. That answer however having been given, I would next beg you to observe that it is absolutely decisive on the point at issue. ' Disobedience to the Creator,' is neither more nor less than the 'doing that which is 'forbidden by the Creator ;' and our opponents main- tain that the very meaning of the term ' morally evil ' is simply this. But so far is this from the case, that you have already admitted its precise contradictory. We have been considering this proposition, — c the c doing what our Creator forbids is morally evil.7 On our opponents' view this proposition is analytical : for on their view the very meaning of the subject and pre- dicate is precisely identical. But you have already admitted it as most clear and undeniable, that the pro- position is ' synthetical,' and not analytical ; or, (in other words) you have admitted it as clear and unde- niable, that the idea ' morally evil,' is not equivalent to the idea ' forbidden by the Creator.' Nothing more need in strictness be added : but since it is of fundamental importance, that your full assent should be given to the thesis which we are ad- vocating, I will still proceed in defending it ; I will adopt yet another method for bringing home to your consciousness the same argument for its truth. 60 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Let there be a ' true subjective analytical ' judgment, whether ' exhaustive ' or c partial.' It is literally impos- sible for us to to elicit a judgment contradictory to this ; and the proposition, which would express such contra- dictory judgment, is simply unmeaning. This is so evident, that it belongs to the region of Formal Logic. By the term Z, I mean at this moment to express a complex idea, which includes as parts of itself the ideas A, B, and C. If this be so, to speak of Z as existing without A, B, or C, is simply unmeaning : it is like speaking of a ' table which is not a table,7 or 4 a friend who is not a friend.' Illustrative instances of this are ready to our hand, in any number. I put before you e.g. this statement : 'there are two mutually attached friends of my ac- quaintance, who have no desire for each other's welfare/ I beg you to apprehend fully the meaning of this pro- position, in order that afterwards you may form some judgment on its truth or falsehood. You will reply of course : ' the statement has no meaning which can cbe apprehended; one of its terms contradicts the ' other ; [ there is no corresponding judgment at all ; * it is as though you said that there is a certain table ' which is not a table, or a certain tree which is not a * tree.' And the same would be your answer, if I put before you any statements which are contradictory to 'true subjective analytical ' propositions. Suppose e.g. I said, — ' there is a certain hard substance, which offers ' no resistance to muscular pressure ; ' or l there is a cer- 'tain effect, which has no relation to its cause.' In all such cases, the more carefully you should examine the terms of the statement, the more irresistibly would you recognise the fact, that it has no real meaning what- ever. But now on the other hand consider such a state- ment as this : ' it is not wrong to refuse restitution of a deposit.' Nothing surely can be more intelligible than such a statement, though nothing can be more obviously false. Or this : ' a child's disobedience to his parents in indifferent matters is not wrong.' Or this : ' dis- THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 61 ' obedience to the Creator is not wrong or morally evil/ This last statement, like the two former, is most readily intelligible; its meaning is only too obvious ; it is because you at once so fully understand it, that you feel against it such prompt and irrepressible detesta- tion. We proceed then to apply our principle. Since this statement is thus readily intelligible, — since it is in the farthest possible degree removed from the attribute 'unmeaning,7 — its contradictory is not a 'true sub- jective analytical7 proposition. But according to our opponents, its contradictory is a ' true subjective ana- * lytical ' proposition. For what is its contradictory ? this : ' disobedience to our Creator (i.e. the doing what our Creator forbids) is morally evil.' Now it is the exact and definite allegation of our opponents, that this is a ' true subjective analytical 7 proposition ; that whenever I use the term ' morally evil,' I precisely mean ' that which the Creator forbids.7 Since therefore, according to our opponents7 doctrine, this would be a true subjective analytical proposition; — and since we have fully established, that in fact it is not such a pro- position ; — we have fully established, that our opponents' doctrine is mistaken. I have been here making use of the undeniable truth, that a judgment, contradictory to a true subjective analytical judgment, is impossible ; and that the pro- position, which purports to express it, is unmeaning. My argument in no respect requires me to deny, that there are many other unmeaning propositions besides these ; but only that these are unmeaning. 27. Now, as I remarked at starting, precisely the same mode of argument which I have adopted in the last number, will apply, with precisely the same force, to the refutation of every other analysis, which has been, or which can be, attempted, of our idea ' morally good.7 Thus various philosophers have maintained, that * morally evil7 signifies 'adverse to the interests of 'society.7 Take then this proposition: — 'the acting 62 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. ' adversely to the interests of society is morally evil.' Is this an ' analytical ' or a ' synthetical ' proposition ? Plainly the latter. For (1) we understand what is meant by ' acting injuriously to society/ hefore we have even considered the question whether it be 'morally evil.' And (2) the contradictory to this proposition is most fully intelligible, however obviously false: viz. 4 the acting adversely to the interests of society is not ' morally evil.' Our proposition, therefore, is most un- deniably synthetical. But on our opponents' view it would be analytical ; for the ideas expressed respectively by the subject and predicate would be precisely identi- cal. Since, therefore, the proposition is undeniably synthetical; — and since it is equally undeniable, that on our opponents' view it would be analytical; — it follows that our opponents' view is mistaken. I may now safely leave to you the easy task, of ap- plying precisely the same argument, in refutation of any other attempt at analysing the idea ' morally evil.' And we may consider therefore the thesis as incontestably established, that this idea, and its correlative ' morally 'good,' are perfectly simple, and incapable of further decomposition. We will proceed then, without further delay, to the argument which we propose to build upon that thesis.* * It will have been seen then that self-evident moral judgments are considered by us as being synthetical intuitions. Now I have already (note at p. 29) expressed how totally I condemn that scepticism, which (I believe) is at the very foundation of Kant's whole philosophy. I shall not, therefore, be misunderstood, if I say that on a comparatively sub- ordinate question, if I rightly understand his meaning, I cannot but strongly concur with him. I refer to his position, that the human mind forms various ' a priori synthetical judgments,' and that moral judgments are in the number. The very thoughtful writer in the "Dublin Review," to whom I have already referred (note to p. 47), although declining through- out to express his own moral system, yet has the following very significant remark. He says that a certain statement of M. Laforet ' must inevitably ' force on one's mind the conclusion, that ihe subject' — i.e. the foundation of moral obligation — 'is too difficult to be resolved otherwise, than by ' taking refuge in Kant's theory of a synthetic judgment a priori.' (D. R. for July 1857, p. 434.) And elsewhere he says of Kant: ' a certain class of ' philosophers .... are unable to measure the height and the breadth of ' the great philosopher of Konigsberg. . . . Kant has done great good service 1 in Moral Philosophy as well as elsewhere. He has committed grave ' mistakes ; but these should not cause us to forget his good deeds' (p. 420, 1). THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 63 28. Let us revert to the particular moral judgment, stated at the opening of the Section : 4 the refusing to 4 restore my friend's jewel would be an act morally evil/ We now set ourselves to establish in order the three following propositions. First, this moral judgment is intuitive and not inferential. Secondly, it is a legiti- mate intuition ; that which is intued is a real intuem. Thirdly, that which is intued is a necessary intuem (see n. 18, p. 42). First, I say this moral judgment is an intuition; it is not one of those cases mentioned in n. 2, where I fancy that to be an intuition which is really an inference. In those cases we can state various propositions, either already recognised as true or now themselves intued, which lead by way of logical consequence to the judg- ment in question. The whole distinction between in- tuitive judgments and inferential, I need hardly say, turns upon this very fact. But it is perfectly impos- sible to do this in the present case ; as any one will find who makes the experiment. Various judgments no doubt are formed, antecedently to the moral judgment which we are now considering ; but they are formed, merely as the matter on which the moral judgment is exercised, not as premisses whereof the moral judgment is a conclusion. Thus, before the moral judgment in question, I have judged that 4 he who now reclaims the 4 jewel once deposited it in my hands ;' that * he formerly 4 loaded me with benefits;' that 'he is now in great 4 distress;' and the like. But no number of such judg- ments as these, however brought into connexion with each other, could possibly lead by way of logical in- ference to the moral judgment founded upon them. It is perfectly impossible, I say, to array these antecedent judgments in any logical shape, such that the moral judgment which we are considering can ever emerge as a conclusion. The proof of this is obvious. That idea For myself, I cannot profess any such acquaintance with Kant's philosophy in its entireness, as would warrant me in holding any confident judgment on its merits. 64 PHILOSOPHICAL INTKODUCTION. of moral good or evil, which is the most characteristic element of this moral judgment, is not met with ever so distantly, in any of those antecedent judgments to which we refer. If indeed 4 morally evil ' were a complex idea, this argument would not be conclusive. It might be argued in reply, ' True, the idea " morally evil" does not occur 4 eo nomine in those anteeedent judgments ; but they 4 may nevertheless very possibly contain those simple ' ideas, whereof the complex " moral evil" is composed. ' It is very possible, then, that our moral judgment ' may be the result of a logical process.' But * moral evil,' as we have seen, is a perfectly simple idea ; and this objection, therefore, cannot be made. Suppose I am placed in the circumstances above mentioned, and that my friend reclaims his jewel. I readily form the judgment, that ' to refuse its ' restitution would be morally evil.' The only ante- cedent judgments, whereon this persuasion can possibly be supposed to depend, are those judgments whereby I am cognisant of the facts of the case. Not one of those judgments contain the idea 'morally evil' directly or indirectly ; while of the moral judgment, on the other hand, this idea is the most prominent character- istic. It is perfectly impossible, then, that this moral judgment can result by logical process from any earlier judgments ; or, in other words, that it can be ' inferential.' But if not i inferential,' it is ' intuitive.' 29. Having shewn then that this moral judgment is an intuition, our next statement shall be that it is a legitimate intuition. In order to establish this, let us begin by applying F. Buffier's three criteria. (See n. 15, p. 37.) (1.) The first of these criteria is, that the judg- ment intued is so clear, that when we undertake either to prove or to attack it, we can only do so by means of propositions, which are manifestly neither clearer nor more certain. This most undoubtedly holds here. Suppose you set about proving to me my duty of re- storing this jewel ; what proposition can even be ima- THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 65 gined, which could serve you as a premiss ? which could strike me as in any respect clearer or more certain, than the very conclusion at which you would aim ? If I do not see my duty at once, it may very safely be said that no imaginable course of argument could make me see it. (2.) The second criterion is, that the judgment intued shall be one, so universally received among men in all times and places and by every sort of character, that those who attack it shall be plainly, as compared with the rest of mankind, fewer than one to one hundred or to one thousand. The moral judgment before us does more than satisfy this criterion ; for among all the men possessed of reason, who ever lived or who ever will live, not one could be found to call it in question. (3.) The third, and perhaps the most important, criterion suggested by the Jesuit philosopher, is the following ; that the judgment shall be so strongly im- pressed on our minds, that we always conform our conduct to it, notwithstanding the refinements of those who imagine a contrary opinion : which very men in- deed themselves act conformably, not to their opinions thus imagined, but to those first truths which are univer- sally received. Now to apply this. Certain ingenious philosophers maintain, that he who keeps back a deposit may legitimately be regarded by us with hatred, such as that which we feel towards a foreign invader, as an enemy to the peace and welfare of society. Or again, they say that he may be regarded by us with pity, as a man who has calculated wrongly his own chances of happiness. But they add, that the judgment which we call that of moral disapprobation; — our judgment that his conduct is morally evil, and consequently deserving of reprobation and punishment; — that all this is un- founded and delusive. I ask, in conformity with F. Buffier, can these philosophers themselves carry out their principles consistently on one single occasion ? Is it possible for them to hear of conduct so flagitious, 66 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. without the judgment spontaneously arising in their mind, and influencing their whole demeanour to the offender, that it is flagitious ? I repeat, not merely that it is injurious to society or injurious to the agent, but that it is also flagitious ? So much on F. Buffier's criteria. But again. Suppose we wish to establish, that some mathematical axiom is an intuem : how should we set about the enterprise ? For instance, ' every rectilineal 4 figure which has three sides has three angles :' how do we know that our intuition of this verity is legitimate ? I suppose it is a sufficient answer to say, that every one, who possesses an intellect sufficiently cultivated to understand the terms of the proposition, by the con- stitution of his nature must assent to it. To apprehend precisely what is meant by a rectilineal figure of three sides, and again of three angles, — in other words, to apprehend what is meant by the subject and the predi- cate respectively, — this may require some little mental effort. But so soon as any one has apprehended this, he forms by necessity that judgment, which recognises that the subject and predicate agree together. I am not aware that any further proof than this can be brought, for the legitimacy of this mathematical intuition. Now a proof in every respect equivalent is avail- able, to establish the legitimacy of that moral judg- ment which we have been considering. 4 He to whom a kind and bountiful friend has entrusted a deposit, ought to restore it when reclaimed ; or acts wickedly if he refuses to do so.' To enter sufficiently into the meaning of this sentence, — in other words to master the circumstances of the case, — may require some little effort ; but any one who is enabled to master it, by the constitution of his nature forms necessarily the above judgment. I may add also, that any one who Jinds himself under similar circumstances, and who by consequence penetrates most thoroughly into the con- ditions of the case, forms the relevant moral judgment with far greater keenness and promptitude, than that THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 67 with which he would form any mathematical judgment whatever. 30. The moral evil, then, of refusing restitution is an intuem. I now lastly maintain that it is a necessary intuem. It is admitted by all Catholic philosophers, that mathematical axioms are necessarily true. I ask, how they would profess to establish this important state- ment ? For I am convinced that any test, which would be serviceable to their purpose, would quite as fully establish the necessary character of those moral axioms, which we are here considering. I suppose, in the case of mathematical axioms, they would put the thing in some such way as the following. When I intue that a rectilineal figure of three sides has three angles, I intue this in the first instance, simply with reference to that particular three-sided figure, which I have summoned up in my imagination. Yet a moment's further consideration shews me, that the proposition is not confined exclusively to this figure ; that it can be predicated with equal truth of every three-sided recti- lineal figure, which ever did, which ever will, which ever possibly can, exist. The test, whereby we deter- mine that the axiom is legitimatelyintuedas necessary, is precisely this absolute universality of the judgment which we form concerning it. Now in the moral case before us, this identical test applies in all its fulness. Supposing me to be circum- stanced as originally supposed, I intue in the first instance that I am under the moral obligation of re- storing the jewel. But a moment's consideration enables me to carry the judgment much further. On reflection I further intue, that this obligation is by no means peculiar to myself, and to this present case ; I intue that every one would most certainly be under the same obligation, who in any time or place should be found under the same circumstances. One explanation only has here to be made. When we say ' under the same circumstances/ we suppose that the whole circumstances, which can have any 68 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. bearing on the morality of the act, are identical in the various instances. I might imagine the case, e. g. in which this friend of mine, to my certain knowledge, should require the jewel, for the purpose of committing some great crime. To say the least, I should no longer intue with any clearness that it would be my duty under such circumstances to restore it. But I do intue with the greatest clearness, that, so long as the circumstances bearing on the morality of the act remain the same, every rational being, in every time and place, would be under the same obligation with myself. 31. We intue it then as a necessary truth, that under the supposed circumstances the jewel ought to be restored ; that its retention would be sinful or morally evil. Nothing of course would be easier, than to mention various other combinations of circumstances, under which also the path of duty would be marked out with extreme clearness. In every such case, the arguments which have been brought forward in this Section retain their entire force ; and the same conclu- sion therefore holds. I say, we legitimately intue it as a necessary truth, that in every such combination of circumstances a certain course '-ought' to be pursued ; or in other words, that there is a c moral obligation' of pursuing it ; or in other words again, that pursuing any different course would be ' morally evil.' Since then it is a necessary truth, that there are various combinations of circumstances (be they more or fewer) under which a certain line of conduct would be morally evil, one most obvious, yet most important, proposition results. It is a necessary truth then, that there is such an attribute as we denote by the term ' morally evil ;' an attribute, which is not a combination of other simpler attributes, but is itself perfectly simple ; an attri- bute, which appertains to certain courses of conduct, pursued by certain beings, under certain circumstances. I am not, of course, maintaining it as a necessary truth, that there are such beings, or that they are ever placed in such circumstances. But we have shewn it to be a THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL TRUTH. 69 necessary truth, that if these beings exist, and if they are placed in such circumstances, certain acts done by them would be morally evil. On precisely the same principles, it is a necessary truth that a second class of acts done by them would be ' morally good ; ' and a third class, again, c morally preferable' to certain others with which we may compare them. This body of Necessary Truth, whether greater or smaller, we call Moral Truth. 32. There are two theses then, for which we have been principally and prominently contending in this Section. The first is, that 'morally evil,' and its correlative ' morally good,' are simple ideas. The second is, that the applicability of these respective ideas to certain acts, done under certain circumstances, is intrinsecally necessary. There are many philoso- phers, who hold the latter of these theses without holding the former; who regard Moral Truth as necessary, but do not consider the idea of moral good- ness to be simple. But there are none whatever who hold the former thesis apart from the latter : or, in other words, every thinker, who regards the idea ' morally good ' as simple, proceeds to the further con- clusion, that Moral Truth is necessary. The whole body of philosophers then, whether Catholic or non- Catholic, who are opposed to the principles of this Section, are precisely those (neither more nor fewer) who deny that the idea ' morally good ' is simple. These philosophers may be divided into two classes, essentially different from each other. Those of one class consider that the idea in question may be analysed, as expressing some relation to God ; * those of the latter * It may be objected that I myself regard the idea as including the idea of some relation to God ; because I regard all Moral Truth as necessary, and also hold that all Necessary Truth is identical with God (see n. 19). I reply thus. I hold most firmly that all Moral Truth is identical with God ; and I hope to enlarge on this proposition in the following Section. But it by no means follows from this, that the idea 'morally good' includes the idea of some relation to God. Mathematical Truth is no less necessary than Moral ; and accordingly the intuem that every pentagon has five angles is a truth identical with God. Yet no one will say that the idea 'pentagon,' or the idea ' angle,' includes the idea of some relation to God. 70 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. class deny this, but consider that it may be truly analysed in some other way. Of these two classes, the latter, as it seems to me, in no way calls for any more detailed refutation than has been already given. Take for instance the follow- ing proposition : — 'It is morally evil to disobey God.' Then consider how those philosophers stand, in regard to this proposition, who explain ' morally evil ' as signifying c adverse to the interests of society.7 They are bound to maintain that, when we say ' disobedience to God is morally evil,' we mean neither more nor less than that * such disobedience is adverse to the interests of society.' There is no Theist in the world, who will not see how obviously and on the surface absurd is such a statement. Nay, any atheist surely of the most ordinary candour will admit the same. Any atheist, I say, of the most ordinary candour will admit, that if we were created by a Being Infinite in all Perfections, dis- obedience to such a Being would be c morally evil,' in a sense totally distinct from ' adverse to the interests of society.' And the very same remark holds in reference to the above proposition, whatever other analysis of the idea c morally evil ' philosophers of this class may attempt. I need only add, therefore, that no Catholic writers are to be found in this number. But the case is very different with philosophers of the former class. I am thoroughly convinced indeed, that the more carefully we examine their doctrine, the more irresistibly we shall be convinced of its total untenableness ; still no one can say that, like the former doctrine, it carries absurdity on its face. Now we shall be engaged, throughout the next Section, in considering the relation which exists between God and Moral Truth. It will be an important part therefore of that Section, to pass under our review those various attempts at analysing the idea 'morally evil,' which have been made by these philosophers. 71 SECTION III. On the Relation between God and Moral Truth. 33. There are two different senses in which the title of this Section may be understood. It may be understood as raising the question, 'What are those propositions concerning God, which stand as part of that fabric, which we call Moral Truth?' And this question would be answered, by stating e.g. that 4 the obeying and loving God are our highest duty;' that 4 God's Commands, on matters otherwise the most indifferent, are of peremptory obligation;' that ' God, by His interference, may make many acts morally good, which would otherwise be morally evil ; ' &c. &c. These statements, and others of a similar kind, are most highly important, and will be found drawn out (I hope) at sufficient length, in the 6th and 7th Sections of this Chapter. They are not however those statements, with which the present Section is concerned. What we are here to consider, is the relation which exists, between God on the one hand, and Moral Truth as a whole on the other hand. Moral Truth is Necessary Truth ; He is the One Necessary Being : we are here to enquire, what is the relation, between that One Necessary Being and this particular part of Necessary Truth. I intend first to state what appear to me the dictates of sound Philosophy on this question ; and afterwards to examine those views on the matter, different from my own, which various theologians and philosophers have advocated from time to time. I shall make two assumptions throughout this Sec- tion. I shall assume (1) that Moral Truth, as appli- 72 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. cable to those circumstances in which God has placed us, is of considerable extent. In other words I shall assume, that the number of acts is considerable, elicited by us men under our present circumstances, of which it may truly be said that ' A is necessarily virtuous ; 7 that c B is necessarily wicked ; ' that ' C is necessarily preferable to D.' And I shall assume (2) that Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, Humility, Purity, are to us virtuous ends of action, while their opposites can never be so. Both these truths will be (I trust) fully explained and established in the sixth Section ; and it is in no respect illogical to assume them here, because the arguments of that Section in no single respect depend on any thing which will here be said. This assumption is made convenient, and almost necessary, by the fact, that all the Catholic schools of Philosophy agree in the above propositions : so that, unless we make these assumptions, we cannot fairly bring the tests of those schools into mutual comparison. In fact, the logical place of this and the following Section would be between what now stand as the sixth and seventh. But I anticipate the logical order, for what seems to me a very sufficient reason. No devout Theist could apply himself, calmly and without em- barrassment, to investigating the full extent of Moral Truth, — until he had first satisfied himself on the matter which we are now to consider. Before all other things he will wish to understand, the relations which exist between those moral doctrines which are to be the one guide of his life, and that Almighty Creator, whom he regards as its One Lord, Governor, and Disposer. This relation being once thoroughly understood, he will proceed tranquilly and at ease with the interrupted thread of argument. However, there will be no kind of inconvenience, should any of you prefer it, in your studying the fifth and sixth Sections before you begin the present. In that case, you will have mastered the proof of those two propositions which we here assume. 34. Now, we have already considered the relation THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 73 which exists between God and Necessary Truth in general ; taking Mathematical Truth as our particular instance : (see n. 19) I will ask you then to consult again that part of the first Section, and refresh your memory of the principles there stated ; as our business here of course is merely the applying those principles to the particular case of Moral Truth. And here, as in the former instance, we will begin by considering two propositions which are implied by the word ' necessary,' as to the relation between such truths and Almighty God. (1.) Necessary truths are not derived from the fact that God necessarily iritues them ; the very contrary holds. God necessarily intues that Justice and Bene- volence are virtuous ends of action, because they necessarily are so. Hence we may again quote the same passage from Vasquez, which we cited in n. 19: 4 ante omne (Dei) Imperium, ante omnem Voluntatem, est regula qusedam harum actionum, quae suapte natura constat.' (2.) It is not only certain that necessary truths are not derived from God's intuition of them, but in some sense they seem to limit His Power. God cannot create a triangle, whose angles shall together exceed two right angles ; neither can He create a being, who shall be under an obligation of cultivating the disposi- tions of pride, malice, and impurity. These propositions then hold, in regard to Moral Truth, no less than to Mathematical. As God is necessarily gazing on the latter through all Eternity, so also He is gazing on the former. In accordance with His Attribute l Verus in cognoscendo,' He intues with the most unfailing accuracy the precise moral quali- ties, which appertain to all the various actions of man- kind. Nay, indeed He intues immeasurably more than this. He intues what would be morally evil, what would be of obligation, what would be preferable, under every possible circumstance in which any rational being could be placed. It is this vast assemblage of verities, to which we may most appropriately give the 74 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. name ' Moral Truth ;' and its whole mass is evidently as vast, and as apparently inexhaustible, as the whole mass of Mathematical Truth. (3.) But now Moral Truth, as distinct from any other part of Necessary Truth, gives scope to another Attribute of God altogether, as well as to the Attribute c Yerus in cognoscendo ; ' it gives scope to the Attribute * Sanctus.' In virtue of that Attribute, God necessarily detests that which is intrinsecally evil ; and necessarily prefers that which is intrinsecally prefer- able. It is the very excellence of God's Intellect, as we have seen, that it is necessarily determined by what is true ; and so it is the very excellence of His Will, that it is necessarily determined by what is good. Here then again, as in the case of Mathematical Truth, we make one final enquiry. Is the assertion endurable, that God is gazing through all Eternity on some body of Necessary Truth, external to, and inde- pendent of, Himself? Nay, that He is regulating necessarily His whole conduct by a Rule, which is co- eternal with Himself, and yet distinct ? which is equally necessary with Himself, and yet not Himself? It is quite ^credible. This great mass of neces- sary Moral Truth, is not distinct from God Himself; but in some way, wholly incomprehensible to us, it is identified with Him. In gazing on it, in regulating necessarily His conduct by its dictates, He gazes on nothing external to Himself; He constitutes nothing, external to Himself, as the authoritative rule of His actions ; He is but penetrating and comprehending the depths of His Own Nature. This conclusion, that Moral Truth is identical with God, is based on the same grounds, which establish the parallel conclusion in the case of Mathematical Truth : in this case, as in that, such a conclusion is the only possible mode of avoiding objections, otherwise insuper- able. But there are reasons in this case, of quite a different kind, which also press most strongly towards the same conclusion. In order however to appreciate those reasons, it THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 75 will be necessary that you shall have studied the views advocated in our sixth Section. In that Section we speak of those various intuitions, whereby we become (faintly and very partially) acquainted with that body of Moral Truth, which concerns ourselves. These intui- tions, though at best most partial and incomplete, yet grow indefinitely (as we there argue) in accuracy, in distinctness, in number, by means of consistent moral action. In proportion as they do so, they more and more point to Moral Truth as no mere abstraction, but as identified with some Superior Being. I recognize Moral Truth, as an authority which legitimately claims my most abject and unreserved submission ; which possesses by right an absolutely paramount and inde- feasible claim on my allegiance. Is it possible to think that such an authority as this is a mere abstraction ? "Who can suppose it ? Surely, in intuing such an authority, we intue a Personal Being: and so the unanimous testimony of mankind proclaims. Indeed, among all the various ways whereby men are drawn to a knowledge of their Creator, there is probably none so universally efficacious, as that which leads them to Him, through their obeying the Moral Voice within them.* Such then is the relation, as it appears to me, or rather the identity, which exists between God and moral truth. Those innumerable verities, — whether intuems or deduced from intuems, — which together constitute the body of Moral Truth, are identical (each and all) with Almighty God. In gazing on Himself, He gazes on them ; His Intellect is necessarily deter- mined to them as true ; His Will is necessarily deter- mined to them as good. As ' Verus in cognoscendo,' He intues that the opposites to Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, are morally evil ; as 4 Sanctus,' He is Just, Veracious, Benevolent. He cannot be called, in any proper sense, the Originator, or Author, or Foundation, of Moral Truth ; any more than He could be called the * See the second part of the quotation from Father Newman in the note at p. 143. 76 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Originator, or Author, or Foundation, of His Own Aseity, of His Own Indestructibleness, of His Own Omnipotence. Moral Truth is not some distinct thing, originated by God; it is God. 35. This is the one doctrine, as it seems to me, which necessarily results from combining two beliefs : (1) the belief that God exists; (2) the belief that ' morally good' is a perfectly simple idea. Those on the other hand, who regard the latter idea as containing in some shape the idea of God, are led to quite a different doctrine from ours, on the relation between God and Moral Truth. And the soundness of our own, as compared with theirs, will still more clearly appear, by our proceeding to criticise their various systems. Before doing this in detail, it may be interesting to inquire, whether there be any propositions, on which these philosophers agree with each other, while differing from us. There is, of course, the fundamental pro- position, which is the very point at issue ; viz. that the idea l morally good7 includes the idea ' God.' But are there any others ? (1.) They, would all agree in saying, that God is in some sense the Author, or Originator, or Foundation, of Moral Truth ; that the latter is not simply identical with Him, but in some sense distinct. (2.) Although they would agree with us in holding that, whenever I form a true moral judgment, I have the idea of God in my thoughts ; yet they would totally differ from us, in their way of explaining this statement. They would maintain, that on such occasions I have the idea of God in my thoughts, because the idea ' morally good' or ' evil3 includes it. But we maintain that on such occasions I have the idea of God in my thoughts, because the moral judgment itself includes the idea of 'necessity;' and the idea of ' necessity ' is in fact the idea of ' God.' Let the moral judgment be expressed in a proposition : — they regard the idea of God as contained in the predicate ; we, as contained in the copula.* * See note to p. 69. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 77 There may probably enough be other propositions, held in common by them, and rejected by us : but none other at present occur to my mind. Without further preamble then, let us proceed to consider the various doctrines, put forth respectively by these various philosophers. 36. The first system opposed to our own which comes before us, is in fact (as we shall presently see), divisible into two theories, essentially different from each other. But we will first consider it, so far as it belongs in common to both those theories. It is some- times pithily expressed by the seeming truism, ' every law implies a lawgiver.' How far this is a truism, and indeed how far it is true, depends on the sense which you affix to the word ' law ' ; and it need not be discussed in this place. But those who adopt the phrase commonly mean to say, that all moral obligation implies the existence of some Being, possessed of legitimate authority, who imposes that obligation. The thesis then, intended by these philosophers, is this : ' Whenever an act is said to be ' of moral obliga- ' tion,' such a proposition cannot be true in any other 4 sense, than that it is commanded by the Creator.' Now, they do not, and indeed they cannot, deny that the phrase 'moral obligation' is altogether cor- relative to the phrase c morally evil/ Whatever is 4 morally evil ' we are self-evidently under the ' moral ' obligation' to avoid ; the violation of a 'moral obliga- ' tion ' is self-evidently ' morally evil.' Their theory therefore is the following; and so I have no doubt they would themselves admit. ' The only sense in which it fc can be truly said that an act is c morally evil,' is that < it is c forbidden by the Creator.' The only sense in ' which it can be truly called of ' obligation,' is that it 6 is ' commanded by the Creator.' The only sense in 4 which it can be truly called ' morally preferable to ' another,' is that it is ' counselled by the Creator in ' preference to that other.' ' Now I have already observed, that this general view is divisible into two theories, essentially different from 78 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. eacli other. The first of these indeed would be renounced with horror by every Catholic : still, since it is in itself imaginable, — since it was at one time actually held by some few Catholics, — and since it has met with countenance from several eminent Protestants, — we must not altogether omit its mention. According to this theory, * those Commands of the Creator and 1 those Counsels, which constitute Morality, are free 6 Commands and Counsels. Cruelty, lying, and im- 4 purity, are wrong, because the Creator has freely ' forbidden them, and for no other reason ; He might 4 as readily have counselled or commanded them.' On this blasphemous statement, I shall say no more : for three reasons. First, no Catholic now-a-days dreams of holding it. Secondly, the argument in the last Section for the necessity of Moral Truth directly refutes it. Thirdly, the chief arguments to be adduced against the second adverse theory, are a fortiori applicable against this ; as I will show in the next number. 37. The second adverse theory then, and one held by many Catholics, is this : ' Morality is constituted, ' indeed, by the Creator's Commands and Counsels, as above explained ; but such Commands and Counsels are necessary and not free. The Creator, by His Nature, is necessitated to forbid injustice, impurity, and the whole catalogue of vices ; He is necessitated to command or counsel our cultivation of the opposite 4 virtues. Still, the only sense in which an act can be 4 called with truth 'morally evil' is, that such act is ' forbidden, — necessarily however forbidden, — by the ' Creator.' Against this theory I will adduce six different arguments, any one of which by itself would be amply sufficient to refute it. The third of these arguments indeed depends partially on the second ; but otherwise they are mutually independent. (1.) Our first argument shall be merely a re- production of what has been urged in the previous Section. We will endeavour to bring the argument of that Section home to our opponents, by thus addressing THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 79 them. You must hold one or other of the three fol- lowing positions. Firstly, you may say that the term 4 morally evil' does not, in any man's mouth, stand for a simple idea, but a complex one ; viz. ' forbidden by 4 the Creator.' Secondly, you may admit that when men form e. g. the judgment, ' retention of a deposit is 4 morally evil,' the idea c morally evil' is simple ; but you may add, that this universally-formed judgment is a totally mistaken one. Or, lastly, your position may be more complicated : you may say that with some men the idea 'morally evilf is simple, but that with others it merely signifies ' forbidden by the Creator.' And then, since all mankind do undoubtedly judge that ' the retention of a deposit is morally evil,' you will add that the former class of men are mistaken in forming their judgment, and the latter class correct. Let us consider in order these three positions. If you occupy the first of these positions, I will beg you to consider this judgment : 4 disobedience to the 4 Creator is morally evil.' According to you, this is a true subjective ^analytical proposition; and its contra- dictory therefore is simply unmeaning. Accordingly, the proposition, ' it is not morally evil to disobey the 4 Creator,' will not be regarded by you as expressing a false judgment, a monstrous or detestable judgment, but simply no judgment at all. You must maintain, I say, that this proposition is as simply unmeaning^ as the proposition, l There is a certain effect which has no * relation to its cause ; ' or, ' there are two mutually * attached friends, who are perfectly indifferent to each 4 other's welfare;' or 'my parents were in no way 4 instrumental to my birth;' or any other such self- contradictory proposition. Seen. 26, p. 60. Thereductio ad absurdum is of course complete. Your second imaginable position, as above stated, is totally different. According to this position, you will admit that every intelligent man, who should understand the circumstances of the case, would at once consider the retention of a deposit to be ' morally 4 evil;' and that the idea 'morally evil,' contained in 80 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Ills judgment, is a simple idea. But then you must go on to hold, that this judgment, so universally formed by all intelligent men, is a totally mistaken judgment ; nay, that most serious evil would result, — nothing less than derogation from God's Absolute Sovereignty, — if this judgment were admitted to be well founded and true.* Surely, on reflection, you must admit your- selves, that to discredit the spontaneous and universal judgment of all mankind, is to overthrow (so far as you can overthrow it) your only possible barrier against the most desolating scepticism. The axioms of geometry themselves have no stronger foundation, than that which you thus denounce as worthless and treacherous. Lastly, if you occupy the third position, you maintain that some men, but not all, conceive ' morally c evil' as a simple idea. I would ask, Who are the exceptions? are you yourselves such? have you ever met with such? Revert once more to our old pro- position, 'disobedience to the Creator is not morally 1 evil :' do you yourselves regard it as a simply unmeaning proposition? a proposition which conveys no imaginable sense, and which no one therefore can censure without absurdity? Do you believe that any intelligent man ever existed, who could so regard it ? You must answer in the negative ; and yet such negative answer is simply subversive of your position. (2.) Our second argument shall be the following. Perhaps the highest and most vital proposition in all Theology is the following : ' Our Creator is All- holy.' But on our opponents' theory, this proposition is literally destroyed and emptied of all meaning. Now to shew this. There are various acts recognised by all mankind as morally evil ; whether they be offences against Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, or some other virtue. * Those who maintain the theory which I am opposing, universally regard the theory which I advocate, as derogating from God's absolute Sove- reignty ; inasmuch as it maintains the existence of moral obligation, apart from God's Commands. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 81 Our opponents maintain, that in calling these morally I'vil, it is only meant that they are forbidden by the Creator ; we on the contrary maintain that they are intrinsecally eyil, apart from all reference to the Creator's Will. Our opponents must necessarily, and do in fact, nl ways proceed to say, that when I speak of some man, A or B, as morally good in such or such a degree, I mean no more than this, that in such or such a degree he conforms his conduct to the Creator's Wishes. But we maintain, that when I speak of A or B as morally good in such or such a degree, I mean that he possesses in such or such a degree those qualities, which are in- trinsecally virtuous, independently of the Creator's Wishes ; Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, and the rest. We understand by 'holiness' or 'moral goodness,' the possession of certain qualities intrinsecally vir- tuous ; they understand by it, the habit of conformity to the Creator's Wishes. The question is now to be decided, whether their explanation or ours be the true one. Now let us again enunciate that solemn truth, which is the very foundation of all possible religion : — ' The 'Creator is All-holy ;' or (which is of course synony- mous) 'possesses Moral Goodness in the most perfect * possible way.' What can be more satisfactory, than the sense which we affix to this proposition ? ' The Creator 'possesses, in the most perfect possible way, Justice, ' Veracity, Benevolence, and all those other qualities 4 which are intrinsecally virtuous/ But what must be our opponents3 version of this proposition ? ' The 'Creator possesses, in the most perfect possible way, 4 the quality of always conforming His conduct to His 4 Own Wishes.1 Or to put it otherwise, this most solemn and fundamental truth, the Creator's Sanctity, becomes in their mouths no more nor less than this ; 'the 4 Creator does in every respect exactly as He likes.' Indeed let any one of common sense ponder these two propositions ; what can be more monstrous than to say that they are equivalent ? G 82 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Prop. I. ' The Creator possesses Moral Goodness in the most perfect possible way.' Prop. II. ' The Creator always does exactly what He likes/ The one strength of our opponents is their view (I think of course a most mistaken one) of what is due to piety. How singularly significant, that their doctrine issues at once in a conclusion, so frightfully revolting to piety ! (3.) The great doctrine, for which our present opponents are jealous, is the Creator's Absolute Sove- reignty over the creature ; the main reason for their dislike of our theory, is their belief that it is prejudicial to that doctrine. I am now, however, about to argue, that our theory is the only method of establishing that very doctrine, for which they are so zealous ; and that their theory is wholly subversive of it. The doctrine of this Absolute Sovereignty may be expressed thus : — 'In all possible cases it is of moral ' obligation that the creature obey the Creator.' This is the judgment which we are now carefully to consider, for the purpose of investigating the grounds on which it rests. Our opponents regard it as even an analytical judgment; they hold that both subject and predicate contain the very same idea. But we maintain, against them, not only (1) that it is synthetical and not ana- lytical ; but (2) that even as a synthetical truth, it is not intued but deduced. Undoubtedly it seems at first glance, that the judgment in question is very obviously and immediately intued ; yet a very little thought will suffice to shew that the case is otherwise. A very little consideration will suffice to shew, that a most important qualification is always understood ; and that the truth really intued is this : ' it is of moral obligation to obey c the Holy Creator.' Let us first vindicate this state- ment, and then shew its bearing on our argument. I maintain, then, that we never form the judgment 'our Creator ought to be obeyed,' in that unqualified sense which would include a morally evil creator. Yet it is perfectly imaginable, that some wicked demon might THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 83 possess the power of calling into existence rational creatures. We are all of course very well aware, that such a hypothesis is intrinsecally impossible ; but many a thing is imaginable, though it be intrinsecally impossible. Take as an instance of this, any one of Euclid's ' reductiones ad absurdum.' Take e.g. the case, where he is wishing to prove it as an intrinse- cally necessary truth, that if the angle A B C is equal to the angle A C B, the straight line A B is equal to the straight line A C. (Book I. Prop. 6.) He says, 'for if not,- let us suppose, if possible, that the 'straight line AB is greater than the straight line 4 A C.' He is calling on us to imagine that very thing, which he is going to prove intrinsecally impossible. And so here : that an evil being can have creative power, is intrinsecally impossible ; but it is readily enough imaginable. Let us imagine then, that certain rational beings had been created by some demon, who commands them to cultivate diligently the dispositions of pride, vindic- tiveness, mendacity, and impurity ; threatening them with the extremity of his anger if they refused to obey. Do we hold that in such a case compliance would be a duty ? — that they would be under the strict obligation of practising mendacity, injustice, and impurity accord- ingly ? — of hating each other with all their hearts? — in one word, of seeking by every possible means to please this detestable demon ? Yet all this would be so, if it were really true, that so soon as I recognise any being for my creator, I at once legitimately intue an obligation of obeying him. On what ground then do we hold, as true and necessary, the judgment that ' it is of moral obligation to ' obey the Creator ?' By inference, not by intuition. Whatever philosophical process be chosen for establish- ing God's Existence, that process gives us warrant for the requisite premiss. In virtue of that process, we hold it as a necessary truth, that He, Who Alone has the power of creating, is intrinsecally Holy. A syl- logism then arises : — 84 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. * It is of moral obligation to obey in all respects a < Holy Creator. * He, Who Alone can be a Creator, is essentially Holy . Conclusion. ' It is of moral obligation to obey in all respects our Creator.' And now comes the point of this third argument against our opponents. They are precluded from the use of this syllogism ; and by consequence they are pre- cluded from establishing that Absolute Sovereignty of God, for which they are so commendably zealous. How precluded? Thus: There is no intuitive judgment, such as the major in the foregoing syllogism, to which they can consistently appeal. With them, if they would argue consistently, a 'holy creator/ can only mean a ' creator who acts in every respect exactly as he wishes.' See arg. 2. But in this sense of the word, the creating demon above supposed is as absolutely holy, as is our Adorable God Himself; for he acts quite as unreservedly in accordance witli his own wishes. Now no one will say, that it would be of moral obligation to obey in all respects such a creator as him ; far less would any one say, that we recognise intuitively such an obligation. We cannot possibly then regard it as an intuem, according to our opponents' sense of the word ' holy/ that it is of moral obligation to obey in all respects a holy creator. It is absolutely impossible then for them, according to their theory, to establish that doctrine of God's Absolute Sovereignty, which is in their eyes, and most deservedly, so precious and all-important.* * It may be thoughtlessly objected to this whole argument, that an evil creator would have given me faculties, which should mistake evil for good, and good for evil. This most superficial objection will be considered in the present Section ; here, therefore, the following brief remarks may suffice. We have already seen (Sec. 1) that it is our existing faculties which cor- respond to objective truth ; and that any imaginable faculties which should be at variance with them, would (so far) declare what is objectively false. Accordingly, the mode in which we are to arrive at truth on this matter, is to consider how far our existing faculties would declare, that obedience is due to a creating demon. Dr. Brownson, on totally different grounds, would be prepared (I sup- pose) to question the argument in the text. So at least it may be inferred from the following passage, which occurs in his Review of Jan. 1 859 : — THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 85 (4.) My fourth argument is perfectly distinct from any one of the previous three. How am I enabled to arrive at the knowledge, that my Creator does in fact command me to cultivate the dispositions, e. g. of Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence ? or that He Him- self possesses those qualities ? I must arrive at this knowledge, either by Reason or by Revelation, If you suppose this knowledge to be obtained by Reason, I ask by what process of Reason ? I never heard of any process except this. I first recognise by Reason (whether intuitively or inferentially) that our Creator is a Being Infinite in all Perfections. I then accept, as another truth declared by Reason, that Sanc- tity is a Perfection, and that Sanctity includes these qualities of Justice, Benevolence, and the rest. Hence I conclude that our Creator possesses these qualities. But there is no process of Reason imaginable, which can shew that there is a Perfection called Sanctity, except that which shews that certain things are in themselves morally evil, apart from God's Prohibition. This has been shewn under our second argument. You see then (1) I must recognise by Reason that there is a perfection called Sanctity, before I can infer that my Creator possesses these qualities; and (2) I must know that certain things are morally evil apart from God's Prohibition, before I can recognise by Reason that there is a perfection called Sanctity. I must know therefore that these things are independently evil, before I can discover by Reason that God prohibits them. Let us pass then to the other supposition, that " * Therefore,' said Winslow, ' nothing is gained by the attempt to found the Sovereignty of God on his intrinsic Justice, Goodness, Love, distinguished from his Omnipotence, or Creative Power. Goodness, Justice, Love, so dis- tinguished, give the law according to which the sovereign power must be exercised, if you will ; but they do not give dominion itself. If, per impos- sibile, some other power had created us, we might still love and revere God, for what He is in and of Himself: but He would have no right to command us as a sovereign, for in that case we should not be His creatures, but another's.' " ' If, then, the Devil had created us, we should have been bound to obey the Devil,' concluded De Bonneville. " ' Give the Devil his due, is a maxim one often hears repeated,' replied Father John. ' If the Devil were an independent being and were really our 86 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. by Eevelation alone we know of God's commanding Justice, Benevolence, and the rest. No Catholic of course would venture to take this alternative ; but it is well nevertheless to consider it on grounds of Reason. We ask then at once, by what imaginable means of information can we know of any such Reve- lation, as coming from our Creator ? You will say creator, we should be his, and bound to obey his commands. But the sup- rition is absurd. The Devil could create us only on the supposition that is not himself created ; that he is real and necessary being ; and if real and necessary being, he cannot be evil, but must be good ; and hence not the Devil but God.' " In this extract, two totally different propositions are stated, which require separate treatment. The first is, that if per impossibile God were not our Creator, He would have no right to command us as Sovereign. This I fully admit : it is not on His being Holy, but on His being our Holy Creator ', that His full claims on our allegiance are founded. But the second proposition is very different from this : viz. that if per impossibile the Devil were our Creator, we should be bound to obey his commands. With the greatest deference to Dr. Brownson's eminent philosophical power, I cannot but dissent most strongly from this proposi- tion. Let us suppose e.g. a wicked creator commanding me to lie. On what ground would Dr. Brownson rest my duty of obedience ? On the following syllogism : — ' Whatever my creator commands, however wicked he may be, is of moral obligation.' * But he now commands me to lie.' Therefore, ' This lie is now of moral obligation.' Now I totally deny that the major premiss of this syllogism is declared by Reason at all. But let me first suppose, for argument's sake, that it were; still Reason declares, and with no less certainty (to say the very least), that lying is intrinsecally evil. The obligation to abstain from a lie, I say, is declared by Reason with no less clearness, than is the obligation to obey a wicked creator. Even then if we granted Dr. Brownson his premiss, the very utmost which would follow would be something far short of his con- clusion : it would follow, net that we owe simple obedience to this command, but that we are under two contradictory obligations in regard to it. Nothing can be more certain, than that if a wicked creator commanded that which is intrinsecally evil, we should be under the indefeasible obligation of disobeying and defying him. This would hold true, even if it were also true, that we should (on that impossible supposition) be under the inde- feasible obligation of obeying him. Nor, of course, is there any difficulty in the supposition, that, if we imagine an intrinsecally impossible hypothesis, two contradictory obligations should result. (2.) But further, — still granting to Dr. Brownson his premiss for argu- ment's sake, — I go further : I think that we should be bound to disobey a wicked creator, not only when he should command things intrinsecally evil, but when he should command things intrinsecally indifferent. It is most difficult of course to pursue an argument, based on an hypothesis which is admitted on both sides to be intrinsecally impossible. It is Dr. Brownson however, who has made the hypothesis ; and I am but following him over the ground which he has chosen. And so much as this seems very safe. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 87 perhaps, that the revelation might be attested by miracles; but I rejoin at once, that no amount of miracles, by themselves, can tend to make an alleged revelation even remotely probable. Most certainly not ; and all Catholic theologians are here in accord- ance. On what principle do we accept of miracles, as evidencing the Christian religion ? On this principle, Every command, issued by a wicked creator, would be issued for the purpose of promoting his detestable schemes. Now it is intrinsecally sinful in any rational creature, to put forth any direct co-operation with such schemes : and it would therefore be intrinsecally sinful, to obey commands, the most indifferent, issuing from so foul a source. I have hitherto assumed Dr. Brownson's premiss : viz. that Reason declares the intrinsic obligation of obeying a creator, however wicked. And I have argued, that even if we granted this premiss, Dr. Brownson's conclusion would not follow. In the impossible case of a wicked creator, it would not follow from that premiss, that we should be simply bound to obey him ; but that, whether he commanded things intrinsecally evil or indifferent, we should be under two contradictory and inconsistent obliga- tions. We should be morally bound to obey, and morally bound to disobey. (3.) But I cannot think that Dr. Brownson, on mature reflection, will adhere to his premiss. Imagine the case supposed by him, that we had been created by the Devil. Imagine that we had been called into existence, for diabolical purposes and by diabolical agency ; and that we were pursued by our Creator's hatred, from birth to death, as the Devil does hate all other rational creatures. Surely no one, who takes pains in realising this supposition, will seriously maintain, that any obligation would exist of obeying this hated, hateful, hating, author of our existence. There would be the distinct obligation (as we have seen) of disobeying and abhorring him ; but surely there would be no obligation, no semblance of obligation, on the other side, grounded on the fact of his having created us. In one respect however it does appear to me, that (on this fearful hypothesis) we should be under two contradictory obligations. We shall see in the third Chapter, that I am under the intrinsic obligation of promoting my own permanent happiness ; and this happiness would be destroyed, by such torments as this demon might inflict in revenge for my disobedience. On this ground, therefore, I should be under the obligation of avoiding his wrath ; while on other grounds I should be under the con- tradictory obligation of incurring it. Yet even on this head something more has to be said. How do I know that such torments will be inflicted on me for disobedience 1 Because the demon threatens them ? What reason have I for believing the threats of this arch-liar 1 Once suppose Dr. Brownson's hypothesis of the Devil having created us, — and what is more probable than such a further supposition as the following 1 What is more probable, than that such a being would first incite his ' creatures ' to every kind of wicked- ness, through the promise of reward; — and then, when he had perhaps almost debased them to his own level, should deride their expectations and inflict on them his heaviest vengeance 1 Is not his course of action now precisely similar to this 1 He seduces his miserable victims, by representing the pleasures of sin in the most attractive light ; and rejoices in adding to their torments, when they become his fellow-prisoners in Hell. 88 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. that we previously recognise our Creator as essentially Veracious. Suppose per impossibile that a being, not essentially veracious, had created us, it is obvious at once that he might have multiplied miracles to an indefinite extent, for the express purpose of deluding us. It is absolutely necessary therefore, that we shall establish God's Veracity on grounds of Reason, before there is so much as an opening for the entrance of Revelation. And (as was just now observed) noway has ever been so much as suggested, for proving that God is Veracious, which does not assume as a premiss that Veracity is of independent obligation. If then you admit that Veracity is of independent obligation, — is obligatory apart from God's Commands, — you totally give up your principle, that those Commands are the source of all moral obligation. But if you do not admit that Veracity is of independent obligation, you have no means of establishing by Reason that God is Veracious ; nor any reasonable ground therefore whatever, for be- lieving either His Sanctity or any other doctrine, on the authority of His Revelation. This then is my fourth argument. If you hold that God's Commands are the foundation of morality, you have no reasonable ground whatever for believing that God does in fact command Justice, Veracity, and the rest : neither the ground of pure Reason, nor the ground of Revelation. (5.) Our fifth reason again, for the thesis which we are defending, is perfectly distinct in character from the other four : being based on the admitted Catholic doctrine * de Deo ; ' a doctrine which Reason, no less than Revelation, conclusively establishes. In Catholic Theology we ascribe to God every pos- sible Perfection, excepting only those which are intrin- secally incompatible with some higher Perfection. Thus it would be a very great perfection, if God possessed the attribute of clearly and infallibly seeing every future thing as future ; yet we never ascribe to Him that per- fection, but on the contrary deny that He possesses it. Why is this? Of course, because it is intrinsecally THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 89 incompatible with a still higher Perfection ; viz. the existing extra tempus altogether, and viewing alike, as iin mutably present, what we regard as past, present, and future. Let us proceed to apply this undoubted doctrine. We all agree in this, that we deny to God the intrinsic power of acting in violation of Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence. In denying Him the power of acting in every possible direction, we plainly deny to Him a cer- tain perfection. Such denial then, as we have seen, can only be defended, by maintaining that the particular perfection which we deny Him, is intrinsecally incom- patible with some still higher Perfection. This pro- position, according to our thesis, is manifest enough. Since the violation of Justice Veracity and Benevolence is independently sinful, it is an indispensable part of God's Perfections, — it goes in fact to constitute that very Perfection which we call Sanctity, — that He is neces- sitated by His nature to abstain from any such viola- tion. But our opponents maintain, that there is nothing independently evil, in the violation of Justice, Veracity, or Benevolence; that such violation is only evil at all, because God has forbidden it. On this theory then, God's inability to act inconsistently with these three qualities can only be a direct imperfection. A con- clusion, I need hardly say, absolutely fatal to that premiss, of which it is the legitimate result. (6.) My sixth argument shall be an appeal to your own present convictions. God imposed on the Church, before Christ, the obligation of circumcision and other rites ; but when the Holy Spirit came, He removed that obligation. I would beg you to imagine what your feelings would be, if you were told that God did not possess the physical power, either on the one hand of commanding circumcision, or on the other hand of removing that command. The Supreme Lord of the Universe is at once degraded to a low and subordinate place in His own creation. Why on the other hand does no feeling of the kind arise in your minds, when you are told that He has not the physical power of 90 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. revealing false doctrine, or of commanding pride and vindictiveness ? Evidently and undeniably, because you do possess the inextinguishable intuition (however energetically men may labour by sophisms to blind you to its existence) that there is an intrinsic difference of character between the two Commands. Because you intue that the practising or not practising circum- cision, is a thing intrinsecally indifferent : but that the cultivating pride or vindictiveness is a thing intrinsecally detestable ; — intrinsecally incapable of being commanded or permitted by a Holy Creator. Your own present convictions, then, attest the truth of that principle for which I am contending. Your own conviction plainly is, not that these sins are detestable because God prohibits them, but the very contrary; that God prohibits them because they are intrinsecally detestable. If, then, they are intrinsecally detestable apart from God's Command, then, apart from such Command, you are still under the moral obligation of avoiding them. Of these six arguments, all, except the fifth, apply a fortiori against the monstrous theory, that morality is based on God's free Command, 38. We proceed now to consider the third adverse theory.* This is frequently expressed by saying, that morality is founded on our Creator's Nature ; not on His Command or Prohibition undoubtedly, but on His Nature. Now these words are in themselves somewhat vague. Those who adopt them may possibly hold no other doctrine, than that which we have been advo- cating ; viz. that Moral Truth, as being necessary, is identical with God. But many philosophers, in using the above phrase, do undoubtedly mean to express a doctrine altogether different from ours. They mean to say, that the foundation of morality is, not indeed the Creator's necessary Command, but His necessary Approval or Detestation. They mean this. c The only * Those readers who are already convinced, that the idea ' morally good' in no sense includes the idea of 'God,' may omit with advantage nn. 38, 39, and 40. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 91 *' sense in which an act can with truth be called ' morally 4 ' evil' is, that it is 'necessarily detested by the Creator;' * the only sense in which it can with truth be called ' 'morally good7 is, that it is 'necessarily approved by * 'the Creator ;7 the only sense in which it can with 4 truth be called ' morally preferable7 to another, is, ' that it is * necessarily preferred by the Creator to ' that other.7 ' Now the very same six arguments, which we adduced against the second adverse theory, are equally applicable (mutatis mutandis) against this. As they must be quite fresh in your mind, I will draw them out far more briefly in their new application. (1.) All men, on occasion, are ready to elicit the judgment, that the retention of a deposit is 'morally evil.7 In eliciting this judgment, do they mean by the term ' morally evil 7 to express ' detested by the Crea- tor ?7 On such a supposition, the proposition ' to do what the Creator detests is morally evil,7 is a true sub- jective analytical proposition ; and its contradictory therefore, is simply unmeaning. Will any one main- tain that this is so ? that the proposition, — ' to do what our Creator detests is not morally evil' — is unmeaning? Or will not every one rather say, that it is false, mon- strous, and the like? We understand its meaning most readily ; and its contradictory therefore is not a true subjective analytical proposition. I would proceed thus to address my present op- ponents. You are obliged then to admit, (1), that all men will elicit this judgment 'the retention of a deposit is morally evil;' and, (2), that in that judgment, they mean by ' morally evil 7 something quite distinct from ' detested by the Creator.' Your theory, however, compels you to maintain, that the judgment, thus uni- versally elicited, is false and pernicious. Such a state- ment must consistently land you in the most absolute scepticism. (2.) Take the all-important proposition, ' The Crea- tor is All-holy.7 On the theory of these opponents, this proposition is literally emptied of all meaning. For on 92 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. their theory, ' morally good/ means simply ' approved by the Creator/ Hence, on their theory, the above proposition expresses neither more nor less than this, —'that the Creator possesses in the greatest degree the ' quality, of always doing what He Himself approves/ But this is a quality, which would equally appertain to any demon, who should be so obdurate in wickedness, as to regard evil as good and good as evil. Hence on our opponents' theory, our Creator is not Holy in any other sense, except that in which an obdurate demon is holy. (3.) Consider that very proposition, which our op- ponents justly regard as so true and so important; 'to do what the Creator detests is morally evil :' they ac- tually debar themselves from all power of establishing this proposition. For consider. Certainly this pro- position is no intuem. Imagine the case of a creating demon : certainly our opponents will not maintain, that we intue a moral obligation of avoiding what such demon detests ; of avoiding with the greatest care all approach to Justice, Purity, or Benevolence. The proposition which we do hold as self-evident is, — 'to do what the Holy Creator detests is morally evil.' Now Reason establishes, that He, Who Alone can create, is essentially Holy ; and thus we are led to the con- clusion, that 'to do what the Creator detests is in all cases morally evil.' But our opponents cannot appeal to any such self-evident judgment as the above ; for on their view, the creating demon, if he were but utterly blind and obdurate, would be as holy as the Adorable God. (4.) I have no means of knowing that the Creator does detest injustice, impurity, malevolence, unless I first know that these qualities are evil apart from His detestation. (5.) The Creator is necessitated to detest these qualities ; but this would be a great imperfection, unless they were independently evil. (6.) I appeal to your own present convictions. Sup- pose you heard it said, that the Creator is necessitated THE EELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 93 to detest intellectual slowness or bodily awkwardness : you would be utterly shocked at such a statement. Yet on the other hand you believe of course, as we also believe, that He is necessitated to detest male- volence and impurity. Why does the former state- ment shock you, while the latter is implied in your very idea of God ? Plainly, because you do recognise an intrinsic difference between these two classes of defects ; because you recognise, that malevolence and impurity are intrinsecally worthy of God's detestation, while intellectual or bodily incapacity is not. You are con- vinced, in other words, that malevolence and impurity are not morally evil because God detests them, but the very reverse : that God necessarily detests them, because they are morally evil. 39. The fourth adverse theory agrees with the third, except that instead of1 The Creator' it would substitute ' The One Necessary Being.' According to this theory, the only sense in which it can with truth be said that an act is morally evil, is that such act is detested by the One Necessary Being ; and similarly as to other shapes of the idea 4 morally good.' As the fourth theory agrees with the third except as to this one substitution, so also will the arguments adducible against it. You will find that the arguments, adduced against the third theory, are applicable word for word against the fourth, if you will simply make in them this one substitution. 40. The fifth adverse theory is the following, c The 1 true sense of * morally good ' is ' that which unites us c to the Creator our true End ; ' the true sense of c morally 'evil' is 'that which separates us from Him.' ' Since however this phrase is somewhat vague, I will state more definitely what I believe to be intended by it. The advocates of this theory, I believe, intend to say, that by ' morally good' is meant c that which brings my * will into harmony and agreement with the Creator's ; ' * and by 'morally evil ' that which places it in opposition to His.' If however, our opponents will mention any distinct sense, different from this, as intended by the 94 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. phrase, our arguments may with perfect facility be adapted as against this other sense also. The first five of our six former arguments are equally available here, as the following recapitulation will shew : though it may be perhaps doubted whether the sixth can be so easily brought to bear. (1.) Consider this proposition, — cto place my will in opposition to the Creator's is not morally evil/ No one will call this an unmeaning proposition ; and consequently the first argument, as drawn out against the second and third theories, is equally efficacious here. (2.) According to this fifth theory, the word choly,7 signifies c having a will in agreement with the Creator's/ When I say therefore, ' the Creator is All-holy,' I mean no more than that His Will is in agreement with itself. But this might be said of an obdurate and consistently wicked demon, as truly as of our Adorable Creator. Hence, according to this fifth theory, God is not Holy in any other sense, than that in which a consistently wicked demon is holy. (3.) Our opponents debar themselves from the power of establishing that very proposition, which they regard as so vitally important : viz. that 4 to place our will in opposition to the Creator's is morally evil.' It is certainly no self-evident truth, unless we add the qualification, ' Holy Creator.' It is no self-evident truth (even if it were a truth at all.) that it is ' morally evil to place our will in opposition to that of a creating demon/ But our opponents are unable to add this qualification * holy ; ' for if they would reason consistently, they must regard the word ' holy ' as expressing no quality, except one which a creating demon, if absolutely obdurate, would possess as fully as God Himself. (4.) If our opponents' theory were true, we should have no means whatever of knowing that we do bring our wiU into harmony with the Creator's, by practising Justice, Veracity, Benevolence. Before I know this, I must know that God is Just, Veracious, Benevolent : but this again I cannot know, except through knowing THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 95 that Sanctity is a Perfection, and that Sanctity includes these qualities. But so soon as I know that Sanctity includes the qualities of Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, I know by the very force of terms that injustice, mendacity, and cruelty are morally evil. I must know therefore that these are morally evil, before I can possibly know, that by practising them I place my will in opposition to my Creator's. (5.) The Creator, as my opponents are even forward in maintaining, is, by the necessity of His Nature, Just, Veracious, Benevolent. But His inability to act in opposition to these ends, would be a great imperfection, unless it were true that such action would be in itself morally evil, independently of His Will's determination. But if so, such action would be morally evil in us, quite independently of the determination of the Creator's Will. But our opponents maintain that things are morally evil to us, not independently of the determina- tion of the Creator's Will, but on the contrary ; in most simple and absolute dependence on such determination. Consequently, if our opponents' theory were true, it would follow that God's inability to act unjustly, men- daciously, malevolently, is a great imperfection. On consideration, it will be found, (I think) ex- tremely difficult to distinguish the whole doctrine which we have just been considering, from the third adverse theory ; the theory, viz. that ' morally evil ' signifies 4 that from which God's Will is necessarily averse/ 41. It is probable enough that certain other theories may be alleged, — closely resembling indeed one or other of those which we have considered, — but differing in this or that subordinate detail. But the same five arguments will be found equally cogent against each and all. All these various theories, whatever their mutual difference^, in one respect agree with each other, while opposed to those principles which we have ourselves advocated. They all represent my idea of c moral good- ness/ as in this or that way dependent on my idea of 96 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. * God ;' whereas we have most earnestly maintained, that my idea of * God ' depends most essentially on my idea of * moral goodness.' One very observable consequence therefore, follows at once from our opponents' doctrine : nay it follows so immediately, so irresistibly, that it can hardly be called a consequence at all, but is rather the very same doctrine differently stated. It is implied then in their position, that we may rightly and suitably give the appellation ' God,' to a being, whom we do not yet conceive as possessing moral goodness or sanctity. According to their doctrine, I say, — if we conceive of a being infinite in power and knowledge, — we may appro- priately call that being God, before we so much as con- sider the question of his moral goodness; before we so much as consider the question, whether on the one hand he love and command Justice, Veracity, and Mercy, or on the other hand love and command oppression, blood- thirstiness, lying and impurity. From such a statement every Theist will at once recoil ; and our opponents, I am well aware, will be foremost in disclaiming any such notion : yet surely their doctrine either means this, or means nothing at all. On this question of words then, I have pursued the course which every good Catholic will approve. I have abstained from using the term ' God ' to express any idea, except one which shall prominently include the Attribute of Sanctity. But now I go a step further. I maintain that men have no possible grounds for be- lieving the Infinite Creator to be Holy, so long as they consider the idea of moral goodness to be dependent on the idea of God. In giving reasons however for this statement, I must not be considered as adducing any argument distinct from those already stated ; but rather as expressing in another shape, what has been already implied in the reasoning above drawn out. The doctrine which we are advocating is of such vital importance, that it is important, in every attainable way, to bring home to your reason and imagination its absolutely certain and irrefragable character. Let us ask then in the first place, what is our ground THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 97 for regarding the Creator as Infinite e.g. in Knowledge. Now there are various philosophical processes, adopted by various schools of Philosophy, for the purpose of establishing God's Existence. Choose then that philo- sophical process, which you may regard as the most undeniably cogent for this purpose ; and call it process P. What is the conclusion in which this process lands you ? This, that the Creator is Infinite in all Per- fections. But then how do you infer from this, that He is Infinite in Knowledge ? In this way ; and no other way is even imaginable. You know aliunde, by some process altogether different from P, that Know- ledge is a Perfection. So soon therefore as you have established that the Creator is Infinite in every Per- fection, you necessarily infer that Infinite Knowledge is included in that statement. Thus, and thus only, you are able to establish, that He is Infinite in Power ; that He is Immense ; and so with various other Attributes. It must be then in a way precisely similar, that we arrive at a conviction of His Infinite Sanctity: or if this be denied, let some other imaginable way be alleged. Process P will only establish, that He is Infinite in all Perfections : it will not tell you, that Justice, Bene- volence, Veracity, are Perfections. Let me then again and again entreat my opponents to consider, how they can arrive at the conviction that these qualities are Per- fections. What other mode is possible, except that which we have advocated ? On the other hand, according to our principles the whole truth hangs together without flaw or confusion. (1) Reason declares the intrinsic excellence of Moral Goodness ; that term being used to express a perfectly simple idea, which all mankind form on various oc- casions, with greater or less distinctness. (2) Reason also declares, (see Sec. 6), that Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, are qualities, of which that term ' Moral ' Goodness ' is truly predicable. From this follows the immediate inference, that Justice, Veracity, Benevolence, are Perfections. Since then, by process P, we are made aware that the Creator is Infinite in all Perfections, we H 98 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. infer that He has these Perfections in an infinite degree, as well as the rest- But let all this once be admitted, and the conclusion is manifest. Consider the result of any such admission. Quite independently, then, of our arriving at a convic- tion of God's Existence, we know that Moral Goodness is excellent ; and we know also that Justice, Veracity, Benevolence are qualities, whereof that term is truly predicable. Independently then of our arriving at a conviction of God's Existence, we know that certain acts of injustice, mendacity, cruelty, are morally evil ; or (in other words) that we are under the moral obligation of avoiding them. We arrive therefore at the know- ledge of moral obligation, by a road which is altogether independent of our arriving at a conviction of God's Existence. And this is the precise question at issue.* 42. An inquiry has been made, which this will be a convenient place for answering. c Can we say,' it has been asked, ; that Veracity, e.g. and Benevolence are Perfections, because God is what He is ?' (1.) I reply in the first place somewhat indirectly, by asking a counter-question : — Can we say that Power and Knowledge are Perfections, because God is what He is ? Whatever answer may truly be given to the latter question, may with equal truth be given to the * My readers may remember two notes in the preceding Section (to n. 24, p. 55), which contained certain extracts from the 'Prselectiones Pbilosophicse.' These extracts may lead to the enquiry, what is the analysis of ' moral goodness,' which the ' Prsclectiones ' advocate ; and how is their doctrine to be refuted. Their statement is this : — ' Hinc sequitur, bonitatem actus voluntatis in 1 eo consistere, quod in suo judicio appretiationis, et in suo amore qui illud ' subsequitur, ro plus entis TM minus entis anteponat : (a preferer Ic plus etre 1 au moins etre)' (n. 1526). I profess myself unable to refute this statement, because unable to understand it. Take our old instance : ' the detention of a deposit is ' wrong.' Our author regards this statement as comparatively obscure. He thinks that a ' clearer ' (see note at p. 55) method of apprehending the same truth will be to say, that by retaining a deposit we prefer the' moins etre ' to the ' plus etre.' Few persons, I think, will follow the author, in regarding the latter as the clearer statement of the two. But this, I admit, is not the precise question : the question is (1), can 'morally evil' be regarded as a complex idea ? and (2) is its true analysis, ' the not preferring le plus etre au moins etre 1 ' Now, the only meaning which I can imagine of this statement, is one THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 99 former. This, in fact, is the only doctrine on the subject for which I am very anxious ; viz. that we have as direct means for knowing Justice and Benevolence to be Perfections, as we have for knowing Knowledge and Power to be such. (2.) I incline to think, however, that we do not know enough of God here in via, to answer the question either way. The very opposite allegation might surely be made with quite equal plausibility. It might be said that God is what He is, because Power, Knowledge, Veracity, Benevolence, are Perfections ; in other words, that He is Omnipotent, Omniscient, Infinitely Veracious, Infinitely Benevolent, because He would be imperfect were He otherwise. (3.) And I incline to think that the formula, above supposed, is at all events an undesirable form of speech in the case of Moral Perfections. I think it is undesirable to say, that ' Veracity and Benevolence are Perfections 4 because God is what He is ;' inasmuch as such a form of speech tends to obscure a doctrine, which it is extremely important on the other hand to place in the clearest and most brilliant light. I refer, of course, to the doctrine, that we know Veracity and Benevolence to be Perfections, as directly and as fully as we know Knowledge and Power to be such. which it is impossible that the author can have intended. In refusing restitution of a deposit, I undoubtedly prefer what is pleasurable to what is morally good : and this the author might conceivably have meant, by his * plus 6tre * and ' moins e~tre.' But so able an author could not really have meant this. He alleges that 'morally good1 or ' evil' is a complex idea : and professes to resolve that complex idea into its simpler elements. And yet, on this view of his meaning, among those simpler elements, he places the original idea itself in all its complexity. * By ' morally good,' * he says, ' is * meant the preferring what is morally good to what is pleasurable.' ' You 1 profess to explain the phrase,' a student will reply, ' and yet you use the * phrase itself in the course of your explanation.' Another similar statement has sometimes been made ; viz. that * moral goodness,' signifies * the preferring what is preferable.' But we may ask, in what sense preferable ? Pleasurably preferable, e. g. 1 l Of course not ; ' but morally preferable !' Your doctrine then is this :' ' Moral goodness is ' the preferring what is morally preferable ;' or in other words, ' moral good- * ness is the acting according to the principles of moral goodness.' If I were able to discover any intelligible sense, as appertaining to either of the above formulae, I am quite certain that I could most readily refute such formula, according to the principles already laid down. 100 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. 43. Our whole case will be made even stronger, (if that were possible,) by considering the principal objections which have been made to our conclusion. The first of these I will state, almost in the very words of an able thinker, who urged it on me in conversation. ' You exalt,' he said, ' an abstract quality, which you 4 call Sanctity, above the Living God. Of course you ' are far from intending this ; but to this your principle 4 comes in fact. The Living God, according to you, 4 has no claims on our obedience, till He shews that 4 His Commands are in accordance with this abstract 4 quality.' I reply, that I am not exalting any abstract quality at all : but vindicating the claim of God's Attribute c Sanctity,' to an equal consideration with His other Attributes. In the case of any other Attribute except Sanctity, I am sure that my opponents would see how unfounded is their allegation. Take e.g. the Attribute of Omniscience. I am sure they would fully concur in such language as the following. ' Suppose the case 4 (impossible indeed, yet not unimaginable,) that our ' creator were a being, infinite indeed in sanctity and 4 in power, but yet limited in knowledge, and capable c of error. Such a being would not be that God Whom 1 we adore ; and our duties to him would in many 4 respects differ, from our existing duties towards God. ' The duty of faith e.g. essentially depends on the circum- ' stance, that God is ^capable of error; and it could not ' be exercised towards such a being as we have imagined/ Who would think of objecting to such a statement as this ? Who would say that such language exalts the abstract quality < knowledge* above the Living God ? Yet such an objection might quite as plausibly be adduced, in this case as in the other. Such is the direct answer to this objection ; and it is here given as such. Should any of you therefore feel doubtful, as to thai further statement which I am now about to make, I will beg you to remember that such statement is in no way essential to my argument. But surely the devout Theist will feel, that the Attribute THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 101 Sanctity is far more prominent, far more characteristic (if I may be allowed the term), of Almighty God, than any other. Let us, on the one hand, imagine a being, who shall be infinite indeed in sanctity, knowledge, and the rest ; but limited in power, and capable of failing in what he attempts : or again, infinite in sanctity and in power, but limited in knowledge and capable of error. Then let me, on the other hand, imagine a being, who shall be infinite indeed in power and know- ledge, but limited in sanctity, and capable of sin ; who shall be capable of injustice and mendacity. Surely this last idea is quite immeasurably more removed from our idea of God, than is either of the other two. In either of the former cases we imagine a being, who falls short of the Living God ; but in the latter case we imagine a being, who may act in opposition to His cause. 44. This brings us to the second objection ; an objection which has really been made by good Catholics, though those who adduce it must have given very little attention to its full import. It is this. ' Of course we 4 feel very certain that mendacity e.g. and cruelty are 4 wicked ; because we have been created by a Being 4 who abhors them, and who has consequently given us 4 faculties which compel us so to regard them. But a * creator, who should love mendacity and cruelty, might ' Avith equal readiness give us faculties, which would 4 compel us to regard them as morally good.' The first answer to this is very obvious. The objector supposes that we have no reasonable ground for absolutely trusting our faculties ; no reasonable ground for certainly knowing, that their testimony corresponds to Objective Truth. In the first Section I have pointed out, in so great detail, the absolute and desolating scepticism in which we must be landed by any such supposition, that not a word more need here be added on the matter. But a second, and even more cogent answer, may be made to the objection. There are various thinkers who hold what I have called semi-sceptical opinions (see n. 4, p. 1 1 ) ; who consider that our belief in the trust- 102 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. worthiness of our faculties depends on our knowledge of God's Veracity. Yet even these persons hold, that we have full means of knowing that God is Veracious. They may be inconsecutive and unphilosophical, — indeed I am sure they are, — in so thinking ; yet they do hold this. But the objector, whom we are now considering, actually denies this : he says that we have no means of knowing God to be Veracious. His very statement contains this. ' It is not certain e.g.1 he says, ' that vin- 'dictiveness or impurity is sinful; it is only certain 'that we have been created by a being, who for his ' own purposes makes us think so.' If it is not certain that those qualities are sinful which our faculties declare to be so, —it is not certain that our faculties are not deceptive. If it is not certain that our faculties are not deceptive, it is not certain that God is Veracious. It is truly amazing, how constantly this sceptical philosophy is intruding in its various shapes : how con- stantly it is reappearing under new forms and features, when we flatter ourselves that it is finally put down. 45. There is a third objection, which perhaps ap- proaches much more nearly than any which has pre- ceded, to expressing the real ground, on which many devout Catholics find a difficulty in our statement. It deserves therefore, and shall receive, our most careful and anxious consideration. 'Surely,' says the objector, 'your principles are c adverse to the alphabet of the spiritual life. In pro- 4 portion as men advance in sanctity, in that very pro- ' portion do they more and more recognise the direct 4 agency of God, in every moral obligation which they 4 encounter. They consider the Law itself to come as 6 fully from God, as does the Grace which enables them * to observe the Law. Wherever there appears a moral 4 preferableness of one act over another, they have ' learned to recognise simply the Voice of God, coun- 4 selling the one and dissuading the other. God's Com- 4 mands and Counsels are regarded by them simply as 4 parts of that sweet Providence, whereby God deals THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 103 4 with them individually one by one. And what all men 1 feel in proportion as they grow in sanctity, — that we 4 find (as might have been expected) most fully testi- 4 fied by the Saints of God. And Holy Scripture speaks 4 throughout in the same tone. " Justificationes Tuas 1 custodiam ; non me derelinquas usquequaque.'' He, 4 who is supplicated never to desert me, is the very 4 Being who imposes on me the Law : I resolve to keep * it, because it is His Law, and because His Grace will 4 enable me to do so. Whereas you on the contrary 4 would disavow that sweet individual Providence of * God, which imposes burdens on each, in proportion as 4 each is capable of bearing them. This you would 4 disavow ; and you would enthrone as lawgiver in its 4 place, a kind of blind pitiless destiny, enforcing on all 4 indiscriminately its relentless claims/ God forbid that we should treat this most serious objection in any li^ht or summary way. God forbid that we should put it on one side, without giving it our most careful consideration. Indeed our cause is best advanced, by considering it with the greatest care ; for it is one of those objections, which appear formidable indeed when first stated, but which altogether lose their force, when closely approached and minutely surveyed. (1.) The first answer, however, which I will make, is but of an indirect and negative character. I would beg you to consider then, how very far the objection would go, if it could be admitted to have any real efficacy. Take the theory most opposed to that which we have advocated, — the theory, viz. that all moral obligation is founded on God's Command. All Catholics, who hold this theory, unhesitatingly add, that this Command is necessary and not free. Now the present objector urges, that if there were an obligation, which exists independently of God's Will, it would be impossi- ble to regard this obligation, as being part of His sweet, free, individual Providence ; of that Providence, which imposes burdens in proportion as each man is capable of bearing them. But plainly, whatever be the weight of 104 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. this objection, it applies with fully equal force, against those Commands of God which He is necessitated to im- pose, and which are irrespective of His free Appointment. Indeed it might be plausibly urged, that the idea of a ' blind, pitiless, relentless, destiny ' is even more power- fully suggested, by this latter theory than by our own. It might be said that this latter theory suggests the idea of a destiny, which does not indeed directly oblige the creature, but which has even greater power ; which necessitates the Will of the very Almighty Creator. c The other theory,' it might be said, c represents this c destiny as God's rival; but this represents it as His i superior.1 Plainly then, the objection which we have stated, cannot be urged in behalf of any adverse Catholic theory, as against ours. If it were efficacious at all, it would be efficacious against a doctrine, on which all Catholics are unanimous ; the doctrine, viz. that morality is necessary and unchangeable, and independent of God's free Appointment. (2.) Now I say, secondly and more directly, that the objection is not efficacious at all against this doctrine. Let it be observed then, that the necessity of Moral Truth, as of Mathematical, is a hypothetical necessity. It is in no respect necessary that God shall create a triangle ; it is only necessary that, if he create one, its three angles together equal two right angles. In like manner it is in no respect necessary, that He shall create beings possessed of freedom and intelligence ; it is only necessary, that, If He do create such beings, they are subject to this or that moral obligation. And this holds, not only as to obligation in general, but also as to the various particulars of which it consists. That there are creatures capable of impurity, flows from God's most free Appointment : all which is necessary is, that if there he such creatures, in them impurity is sinful. That there are beings capable of pain, is part of God's free Providence ; the necessary truth is, that, if such creatures endure pain, they act sinfully by murmuring against their Creator's Decrees. And so of TIIK RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 105 every possible combination of circumstances, under which this or that duty may be incumbent. It may be said then, without the slightest repug- nancy to the principles which we have established, that God is the free Author of every single moral obligation, to which any one of His creatures is subject. We shall see this readily in an analogous case. No Theist will deny, that the elliptical revolution of the planets is due wholly to God's free Appointment. ' How can this 'be?' an objector may nevertheless ask. ' Such ellip- tical revolution follows by necessary consequence from these two data : first, from that property of gravi- tation, which appertains to all matter ; secondly, from a certain original projection in space, which the planets received. It is true indeed that the property of gra- vitation,— it is true that the original projection, — are due to God's free Appointment : but these once supposed, the rest follows by necessary consequence.' True, we reply: but then, since (1), the elliptical revolution is a necessary consequence of physical laws, which God has freely established; — and since (2), in establishing them He distinctly saw and intended that consequence ; — what is our conclusion? We unhesitatingly ascribe to His free Appointment that consequence itself. And this answer is felt by all Theists to be abundantly sufficient. See then, how universally recognised is our prin- ciple. If there be a certain consequence, which neces- sarily results from this or that free Appointment of God; — and if God, in that Appointment, distinctly saw and intended that consequence ; — we at once ascribe that consequence itself to His free Appointment. But every moral obligation, which can possibly press upon any creature, is in this very category ; every such obliga- tion results necessarily, from this or that free Appoint- ment of God ; every such obligation was distinctly seen and intended by God in that Appointment. Hence He is the free Author of every possible moral obligation. -It is of very great importance, that this should be grasped as a practical truth, and not merely recognised 106 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. as a theoretical speculation. You will not therefore, I hope, think me tedious, if I labour, by one or two instances, to shew its intimately practical character. I am beset by some violent temptation, and ear- nestly pray to God for strength and support. It is to Him then that I look for Grace, that I may fulfil the obligation of resistance. Now it is quite equally to Him that I look, as being, by His free appointment, the Author of that obligation. How is it that the tempta- tion began ? how is it that it now continues ? Simply because God, in His free, tender, individual Providence, ordains and permits it. Let Him but speak one word, the temptation is brought to an end. It rests simply with Him, — and so I feel it to the bottom of my soul, — whether He continue my present obligation, or merci- fully remove it. How can He remove the obligation ? by making impurity, e.g. innocent? Is it this which holy souls mean, when they look to God as Author of their various obligations ? or is not this rather the foulest blasphemy ? No, God removes my obligation of resistance to the temptation in a most different way : He does so, by removing that temptation itself, which is the object-matter of the obligation. And so I say to Him, with St. Augustine, l da quod jubes et jube quod vis : do Thou but give me grace to fulfil Thy Commandment, and then command what Thou dost please. Command me to resist temptation, or remove that Command, as to Thee may seem best; for either alternative simply depends on Thy good Providence. And so with any other of these various obligations, which are my means of probation, and essential parts of His Providence in my regard. He commands me to bear adverse and trying circumstances with cheerful- ness and contentment: but by one Word proceeding from His Mouth that Command may be removed ; for my circumstances may cease to be adverse and trying. He commands me to love those who inflict on me the most stinging injuries; but He may withdraw that Command, by changing the hearts of my enemies and making all such provocation to cease. In fact, from the THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 107 beginning to the end of my life, it is His free Appoint- ment, and that alone, which determines what shall be these various obligations, which are to be the means of training me to Heaven. He adjusts those obligations, with most tender and loving regard to my power of bearing them; and harmonises them with the various dispensations of His Providence towards me. 46. Having concluded our answer to this most weighty objection, it will be well to pursue the same line of* thought a little further. I will put before you therefore in connection, the various modes, in which our theory holds up Almighty God as the One Object of our undivided reverence. (1.) There are various truths, which have an absolute and indefeasible claim on the submission of all creatures who are rational and free, so far as such creatures are brought within their scope. These truths are of the following kind : * Veracity is of obligation ; ' 4 Benevolence is a virtuous end of action ;' &c. &c. Now these truths, so far from being rivals in any sense to God, (God Himself forbid such blasphemy!) are abso- lutely identified with Him. In vindicating their inde- feasible authority, we are vindicating the indefeasible Authority of Almighty God. (2.) By recognising these truths, we can give a real meaning (whereas otherwise we could not do so) to the all-important proposition, ' God is Holy ; ' and it is per- fectly impossible, except by means of that proposition, to vindicate His claim on our allegiance and love. (See n. 37, arg. 3.) In truth He is not only perfectly Holy, but infinitely; and to this proposition also we are able to give a most real and intelligible sense, as we shall find in the Sixth Section. See n. 59, pp. 125, 6. (3.) We shall see, later in the present Section, that God is necessitated by His Sanctity to add the sanction of His Command, over and above the intrinsic obliga- B tion of those duties to which we are thus intrinsecally obliged. Wherever then we recognise an intrinsic obligation, we not only recognise the Nature of God with which that obligation is identical ; — we also re- 108 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. cognise an Act of His Will, expressly commanding our obedience. And as in every case of moral obligation we recognise God's Command, so also in every case of moral preferableness we recognise His Counsel. (4.) We have said that these moral truths possess an indefeasible claim on us, so far as we are within their sphere. But now it is to be further observed, that it depends simply on God's free Appointment, how far we are brought within their sphere. Every moral obligation which binds me, binds me by God's free Appointment. Whenever this act is morally preferable to that, God by His free Appointment has placed me in those circumstances, which are the foundation of that preferableness. Every instance then of moral obligation or preferableness, issues to me directly from God ; and is part of that tender, loving, watch- ful, individual Providence, whereby He trains me for Heaven.* * My readers will now be able to judge, how far I should agree with the following passage of Dr. Brownson' s, from which I have already, in a former note, cited an extract. It is most clearly and powerfully expressed ; specially as to the identity of God and Moral Truth : and it contains very far more with which I concur, than the reverse. Yet, in addition to the statement criticised in my former note, there are one or two others from which I must dissent. Thus, I cannot agree in denying that there are two distinct ideas, one of God, and another ' of good.' It seems clear to me that these ideas are distinct, and that our idea of God includes that of good. Again, Dr. Brownson says ' that to ask whether God be good is absurd.' This no doubt is true ; for by ' God' I mean the Infinitely Perfect Being. But to ask whether our Creator be good, is not merely (me judice) not absurd, but is to ask the most real and important question that can be asked. On the other hand I do not dissent from Dr. Brownson, when he states that ' if the Devil were necessary being, he cannot be evil, but must be f good.' For Dr. Brownson means, as the context shews, not that on such an hypothesis mendacity e. g. and cruelty would be good ; but that on such an hypothesis the Devil would be veracious and benevolent. The following is the passage in extenso ; and I am sure those of my readers who may not have hitherto seen it, will be much impressed with its vigour and clearness of expression. " ' But absolute and necessary ideas, if not God, if not real and necessary being, are mere abstractions, and therefore nothing ; for the necessary is not and cannot be creature, since creature is always contingent. If real and necessary, they must be being ; and therefore God Himself the only being. _ The Xoyaj, the Word, Verbum Dei, is a distinction in God, not/row, God, for the Word is God. Reason then, when distinguished from our faculty of intelligence which depends on it, is not something between necessary being and contingent existence ; but is real and necessary being, or God Himself THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 109 47. There are one or two minor objections to our doctrine, which have been brought to my knowledge. But it is unnecessary to speak of them, as you will be able most easily to refute them, if you have followed at all carefully the preceding argument. Indeed they would not by themselves (I think) have cost much diffi- culty to any one ; though they may reasonably be adduced as additional arguments, against a proposition otherwise questionable. I shall now, therefore, con- sider myself to have sufficiently established the main proposition for which I have been contending ; and I shall proceed to deduce from it one or two con- sequences. Before proceeding to our next step, it will be necessary to explain a distinction, always recognised in theological treatises cde Deo.' There are certain things, which God cannot do ' de Potentia Absolute! ; ' certain other things, which He can do indeed ' de as Fenelon maintains : and therefore the idea of good must be the Good itself.' " ' The ideal,' interposed Father John, ' is the intelligible, and the intel- lect of God Himself affirming Himself, and in the act of affirming Himself creating and illumining our intelligence ; and He is at once the Creator, the immediate Object, and the Light of our reason. The idea of good, which is the principle of our moral judgments, is God affirming Himself to us as the Good itself. God, then, is Himself the Principle, the Eule, Standard, or Measure of our moral judgment. When we judge that this or that particular thing is or is not good, He is the term of comparison. We may properly ask whether this or that conception of God Himself be true or false in the same way ; but to ask whether God be good or not is absurd : for we can, in order to answer the question, compare Him only with Himself.' " ' We have not,' added Diefenbach, ' two distinct ideas, one of God, and another of good, between which we can institute a comparison, or which we can judge the one by the other. The two ideas in the real order are one and the same. God, as Being, is identically God as Good ; for in God there is no distinction between Essence and Being, and none between Being and Attribute, or between one Attribute and another.' " ' Therefore,' said Wiuslow, * nothing is gained by the attempt to found the Sovereignty of God on his intrinsic Justice, Goodness, Love, dis- tinguished from his Omnipotence, or creative power. Goodness, Justice, Love, so distinguished, give the law according to which the sovereign power must be exercised, if you will, but they do not give dominion itself. If, per impossibile, some other power had created us, we might still love and revere God, for what he is in and of Himself; but He would have no right to command us as a sovereign, for in that case we should not be his creatures but another's.' " « If, then, the devil had created us, we should have been bound to obey the devil,' concluded De Bonneville. 110 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Potentia Absoluta,' but not 4 de Potentia Ordinata. And now to explain this distinction. God can do anything ' de Potentia Absoluta,7 which is not either intrinsecally impossible, or contradictory to His Attributes. God cannot ' de Potentia Absoluta ' create a triangle, whose angles shall be greater than two right angles ; or command His creature to cul- tivate pride and vindictiveness. But short of these extreme cases, short of cases which involve self-con- tradiction or contradiction to His Essential Attributes, 4 de Potentia Absoluta ' He can do everything. Yet there are many things which, though they do not involve this absolute contradiction, are manifestly " ' Give the devil his due, is a maxim one often hears repeated/ replied Father John. ' If the devil were an independent being, and were really our creator, we should be his, and bound to obey his commands. But the sup- position is absurd. The devil could create us, only on the supposition that he is not himself created ; that he is real and necessary being ; and if real and necessary being, he cannot be evil, but must be good, and hence not the devil but God. The devil is a creature, the creature of God ; and therefore, like any other creature, belongs to God in all he is, and in all he can do. Whatever the power he may have, he has received it from God, and owes it to him. God owns him, owns his power, and therefore all that by that power can be brought forth ; as he who owns the parents owns the offspring : as we believe is asserted by the laws of every civilised State.' " ( M. De Bonneville,' said Winslow, * is a French royalist, in exile for his loyalty : and he, I presume, holds that he is bound to obey his legitimate prince, precisely because it is his prince who commands. The same com- mand, however just and good, issued by another, would not be a command for him. How then is it that he fails to perceive, that the obligation to obey God does not depend on what is commanded, but on the fact that he who commands it is his sovereign ? It is not precisely because what is commanded is just and good that God's Commands are obligatory, but because they are the Commands of Him who has the right to command.' " l God's Commands bind our consciences because they are just and good,' said O'Connor. " ' Rather,' replied Winslow, ' they are just and good because they are His Commands. I love the law of God, I delight in it, because it is just and good ; I obey it because it is the Command of my Sovereign.' " ' The dispute arises,' said Diefenbach, ' from not distinguishing between the real sovereign and his deputy or representative ; between him who is sovereign in his own right, and him who is sovereign only by commission. God is Sovereign in his own right, and we owe him unconditional obedience ; we can make no inquiry into the intrinsic nature of his Commands before obeying ; we can only inquire what is commanded, and whether it is really He who commands. The real sovereign is not and never can be a tyrant ; for tyrant, by the very force of the word, means a usurper, one who com- mands without the right to command. Every tyrannical act is an usurpa- tion of power ; and an unjust command is tyrannical, because no one has legitimate authority to command injustice. " Human sovereigns, even the THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. Ill incongruous and unworthy of Him. For instance : He might have infused into the soul of Christ a less degree of Habitual Grace, than He infuses into you and me at Baptism . There is nothing here either self-contradictory, or contradictory to His Attributes: yet the supposed act would be so manifestly incongruous and unworthy of Him, that we might have been quite certain He would never so have acted. In all such cases, theo- logians say, that God cannot so act ' de Potentia Ordinata :' in other words, He cannot congruously so act. 48.* Let us now proceed with our general subject. We have seen that there are certain combinations of most legitimate, are only delegated sovereigns, and possess no sove- reignty in their own right. Into their orders we may inquire, for they have no authority beyond their commission, and that commission never authorises them to command what is intrinsecally unjust. But when we know the Command is from God, to inquire if it be just or not, is not only irreverent, but absurd ; for it is simply asking if the Command of God be the Command of God.' " ' But that, though it may give us rights in face of the delegate or human representative of power, gives us none before God,' said O'Connor. ' The law of justice is universal; and God Himself is no more exempt from it than the meanest of His creatures. He has no more right to do injustice than I have ; I have then before Him the right of Justice.' " ' The law of justice] said Diefenbach, * is universal, not because it is distinct from God, above Him, or anterior to Him, but because it is Ood Himself. He is bound by it, only in the sense that He is bound by His own Being, or the Perfection of His own Nature. He can apply the law to His creatures, or create existences that shall come under it ; but He cannot alter it, because He cannot alter or annihilate Himself, or His own real and neces- sary Being. God is, and is necessarily what He is. He only is ; and what- ever is distinguishable from Him, is not being, but existence, created by Him, and having its being in His being; * for in Him we live and move and have our being.' Abstractions are nullities, and an abstract law is simply no law at all. The law of justice must be real ; then being ; and if being, God. Hence St. Augustine identifies it with the Eternal Reason or Will of God. The nature of things, the contrary of which cannot be done, is not something distinct from Ood, and subjecting Him, but is precisely His own Etemwl and Immutable Nature. The nature of things is what it is, because He is what He is, and cannot make Himself other than He is. To say such or such a thing is impossible in the nature of things, is simply to say that it is repugnant to the Nature of God, and what He, from the Perfection of His Nature, cannot do. God cannot be subject to any law, but that of His own Being. He cannot be placed under obligation ; we then can have no rights before Him, and no rights at all except from Him, and under Him : for rights on the one side are obligations on the other.' " The italics are mine. * The asterisks are added to distinguish these numbers from nn. 48, 49, 60, 51, already printed in the fifth Section. 112 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. circumstances, under which certain acts are of inde- pendent obligation on human beings. Let us call the assemblage of these obligations, by a name not un- frequently given to it ; let us call it for the present the Natural Rule of human actions.* The Natural Rule of human actions, then, according to our present definition, is that portion of Moral Truth, which contains the duties iutrinsecally obligatory on us men, apart from God's Command ; obligatory on us men, as possessing that nature, and placed in those circumstances, which God by His free Appointment has ordained. In the fifth Section we shall give a some- what larger sense to this phrase, the 'Natural Rule;' but in the fullest sense which we shall give it, it will remain but a small portion of that whole fabric which we have called Moral Truth (see n. 31, p. 69). The Natural Rule concerns only us men; but Moral Truth concerns all possible creatures, who could be endowed by God with freedom and intelligence. See n. 31. Now in what relation does God, our All- holy Creator, stand to this Natural Rule ? Two things follow, from the principles already laid down. First, He was perfectly free to call into existence creatures, or not to do so ; to call into existence rational creatures, or not to do so ; to call into existence us human creatures, or not to do so. Secondly, since He does resolve to call human creatures into existence, He is not free to appoint, that they shall be exempt from the intrinsic obligatoriness of the Natural Rule. But now further I ask thirdly ; is He necessitated to add a further distinct Command of His own, in corroboration of that Natural Rule? Let us consider for a moment this somewhat important question. It is very plain, that 'de Potentia Ordinata' He could not have acted otherwise. Strange and incongruous indeed it would have been, that an All-holy Being should have created free persons, without commanding * 'Ante omne Dei Irnperium, — Voluntatem, — Judicium, est regula qucedam harum actionum, quoe sudpte naturd constat.' Vasquez, already quoted. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 105* them to practise virtue and flee from vice. And that He has in fact so acted, no Theist ever doubted. But Suarez goes further than this ; and I think that every Theist, on reflection, will follow him in his further step. He considers that 'de Potentia Absoluta' God could not have abstained from imposing this Command ; so that, from the very fact of knowing that He is a Holy Being, we know also that He commands us to fulfil those duties, which are of independent obligation. Suarez's reasoning is as follows. When I know by Reason that God is Holy, I know also that what is independently good pleases Him, and what is inde- pendently evil displeases ; for otherwise He would not be Holy. Now a Holy God, by the very fact of creating us, takes on Himself the office of governing us; and He who holily governs us, cannot but forbid us to do those things, which are independently bad, and therefore intrinsecally displeasing to Himself.* * " Quidquid contra rationem rectamfit, displicet Deo, et contrarium illi placet ; quia cum Voluntas Dei sit summti Justa, nonpotest Illi non displicere quod turpe est, nee non placere honestum, quia Voluntas Dei non potest esse irrationabilis, ut dixit Ans. lib. i. Cur Deus homo, c. 8. Ergo .Ratio Naturalis, quse indicat quid sit per se malum vel bonum homini, conse- quenter indicat, esse secundum Divinam Voluntatem, ut unum fiat et aliud vitetur. " Dices : ' ex voluntate complacentice aut displicentioe in Deo, non sequitur, { qu6d sit Voluntas obligans per modum Prcecepti: turn quia hac ratione non 'tenemur conformarionmiDivin9eVoluntati,qii8e est persimplicem affectum ; ' imo nee omni Voluntati Beneplaciti seu Efficaci ; sed illi tantum, qua vult 'nos obligare ; ut suppono ex. 1. 2. q. 19. Unde hac ratione, licet opera ' consiliorum placeant Deo, non inde infertur Voluntas prsecipiens ; turn etiani ' quia homini justo vel beato displicet quidquid a me contra rationem fit, et * tamen nihilominus ilia voluutas non est praeceptiva.' Respondeo primum, pon esse sermonem de quAcumque voluntate complacentice, sed de ilia, qua ita placet aliquid ut bonum, ut contrarium vel privative opposituni per dmissionem dispticeat tanquam malum: opera autem consiliorum non placent hoc niodo, sed ita placent, ut in oppositis omissionibus non dis- pliceat aliqua malitia : et ide6 ilia complacentia vocatur simplex voluntas ; prior autem, qua ita unum placet ut aliud simpliciter displiceat, censetur magis absoluta. Deinde dico, talem Voluutatem spectandam esse in Deo 'ut in Supremo Gubernatore, et non ut inveniri potest in persona privata justa, sive beata sive viatrice : Deus enim, habens illam absolutam displi- centiam aut complacentiam, vult absolute illud opus fieri vel non fieri, quantum ad munus Justi Gubernatoris spectat ; ergo est talis Voluntas, ut per illam velit subditos obligare, ut idfaciant vel non faciant. Non enim potest esse Voluntas Efficax, ut opus absolute fiat vel noii fiat ; alias nun- quam opus aliter fieret quarn Deus vellet : quod tamen non ita est, ut constat. Neque id pertinet ad munus Gubernatoris, ad quern spectat ita B* 106* PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. On a matter where all Catholics will be probably agreed, it is unnecessary to say more. Here then we arrive at the idea, implied in that well- known phrase ' the Natural Law.' It is simply this : the Command given us by God, and which a Holy Creator could not but give, to perform those acts which in them- selves are of independent obligation, and to abstain from those other acts which in themselves are in- dependently evil. Or more briefly — it is God's Command, necessarily imposed upon us, to observe the Natural Rule.* Now it is a most undoubted intuem, velle bona, ut permittat mala, et sinat causas secundas liberas sua libertate uti expedite et sine impedimento. Ergo oportet, ut sit Voluntas obligans : nam hoc modo providet subditis in hoc genere, quantum ad rectam et prudentem providentiam spectat. ' " Dico igitur ex Cajet. dicto a 8 Divinam Voluntatem, licet simpliciter libera sit ad extra, tamen ex suppositions unius acids liberi posse necessitari ad alium : ut si vult promittere absolute^, necessitatur ad implendum promissum ; et si vult loqui aut revelare, necessario debet revelare verum. Et cum eadeni proportione, si vult creare mundum et ilium conservare in. or dine ad talem finem, non potest non habere Providentiam illius ; et sup- posita providendi Voluntate, non potest non habere Providentiam perfectam, et consentaneam Suse Bonitati et Sapientise : ideoque suppositd Voluntate creandi naturam rationalem cum sufficienti cognitione ad operandum bonum et malum, et cum sufficienti concursu ex parte Dei ad utrumque, non potuisse Deum non velle prohibere tali creaturce actus intrinsece malos, vel nolle prcecipere honestos mcessarios. Quia sicut non potest Deus mentiri, ita non potest insipienter vel injuste gubernare ; esset autem providentia valde aliena a Divind Sapientia et Bonitate, non prohibere vel prcecipere suis subditis quce talia sunt. Sic ergo ad argumentum distinguitur minor : nam absolute^ posset Deus nihil prsecipere vel prohibere; tamen ex sup- positione, quod voluit habere subditos rationes utentes, non potuit non esse Legislator eorum, saltern in his quse ad honestatem naturalem morum necessaria sunt. Item ratio supra insinuata est satis probabilis : quia non potest Deus non odisse malum rectse rationi contrarium ; habet autem hoc odium, non tantum ut privata persona, sed etiam ut Supremus Gubernator : ergo ratione hujus odii, vult obligare subditos ne illud cominittant." — SUAREZ, De Legibus, lib. 2, cap. 6, n. 8, 9, and 23. * I have taken this definition almost literally from Suarez, though he does not give it as a definition. In explaining what is meant by the Natural Law, he says, 'Deus habet perfectam Providentiam hominum ; ergo ad Ilium, ut ad Supremum Gubernatorem naturae, spectat vetare mala et prsecipere bona : ergo quamvis ratio naturalis indicet quid sit bonum vel malum rationali naturce ; nihilominus Deus, ut Auctor et Gubernator talis natures, prcecipit idfacere vel vetare quod ratio dictat esse faciendum vel vetandum? — De Legibus, lib. 2, c. 6, n. 8. There is a definition of the Natural Law, often ascribed to St. Thomas, nearly equivalent to that which I have given. " Participatio legis seternse in rationali creatura, dictans et prsescribens illud esse agendum quod est intrinsece bonum, et illud fugiendum quod est intrinsece malum." See e.g. " Philosophia Lugdunensis." But I cannot find it in St. Thomas. THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 107* that disobedience to the commands of an Infinitely Holy Creator is most deeply sinful. Hence an important consequence follows, in regard at least to all those who have the means of knowing this Command imposed by God : this consequence is, that, in violating the Natural Law, these men incur, not merely that sinfulness which is independently intrinsic to the act, but another totally distinct ; viz. disobedience to the Infinite God.* How far it is possible that there may be men possessed of reason, who have no sufficient means of knowing God's sanction of the Natural Rule, is a question of some im- portance ; and it shall be considered in our theological course. A condemned proposition on Philosophical Sin, which we are to treat in the Supplementary Section, goes so appalling a length, as to maintain that we cannot gravely offend God, unless we are distinctly thinking of Him when we commit a sin. It is difficult to imagine, how any one can have seriously maintained so astounding a paradox. 49*. It need hardly be said, that the Commands of a Holy Creator claim unswerving obedience at our hands, whether the thing commanded be of independent obligation or not. Hence, when God commanded the Jews to circumcise their children, it was their bounden duty so to do ; when He commands us to obey the laws of the Church, we violate a most solemn duty in refusing obedience. Here we see the distinction, between the Divine Positive Law and the Natural Law. By the latter, God commands that, which is in itself of independent obliga- tion ; by the former, He commands that, which carries with it no obligation whatever except His Command. And here too we see the distinction, which con- tinually meets us in Theology, between * prohibita quia mala,' and, ' mala quia prohibita.' Pride, vindictive- ness, impurity, are 'prohibita quia mala;' prohibited by God, because they are independently evil. To remain separate from the Catholic Church, is c malum * We shall shew, in our theological course, that this sinfuluess is not only totally distinct, but also immeasurably greater. 108* PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. quia prohibitum ; ' it is evil, simply because, under the Gospel, our Holy Creator has forbidden such separation. Again, to eat flesh on Friday, to do servile work on Sunday, to omit confession at Easter, are ' mala quia prohibita ; ' evil because they are forbidden by the Church, to which God has given the power of enacting such laws. 50*. There are various truths, of fundamental im- portance, which have engaged our attention in this and the preceding Sections. We have been hitherto occu- pied in stating these truths, according to their logical order ; I mean according to that order in which we arrive at their knowledge. It will conduce, however, to further clearness, if I terminate this Section by endea- vouring to make you conceive the same truths in their ontological order ; i.e. according to that order, whether of nature or time, in which they actually exist. In this order, of course, we begin, not with the Principle of Certitude, but with Almighty God. I must first then lead you to conceive of Him, with sufficient fullness and explicitness for our present purpose. I must lead you to conceive of Him, — not indeed in all those various aspects wrherein we are able to conceive of Him, — but only in a small number of them ; only so far as we are led to contemplate Him by those particular truths, which we have been considering in the present Chapter. (1.) We must begin by conceiving of Him, as the One Self-existent Necessary Being. On this, however, our present purpose does not require us to enlarge. (2.) With Him, as the One Necessary Being, all necessary truths are identified. Such verities as the following then are simply identical with God. ' The three angles of any triangle together equal two right angles ; ' ' Knowledge and Power are Perfections ; ' ' Sanc- tity is a Perfection ;' c Sanctity includes Justice and Benevolence ;' &c. &c. (3.) The will of this Necessary Being is necessarily directed to that which is morally good ; or (in other words) He is necessarily Just, Veracious, Loving, and THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. 109* the rest. This is that Attribute which we call Sanctity. These three particulars lead us to conceive truly of God's Nature. Now in regard to what we conceive as His External Acts. (4.) He has thought fit, for the wise purposes of His Providence and in accordance with His Liberty, to create various beings, who are rational and free. (5.) Since He is necessarily Veracious, He has necessarily given to those beings, not an unsound, but a sound, reason. So far as His Power was concerned, He might most easily have created us, so that our rea- son should testify what is false. He might have so created us, that we should be invariably fancying ourselves to remember things which never happened; or that we should fancy certain laws of reasoning to be valid, which really lead from true premisses to false conclusions. But His Veracity renders it impossible for Him so to act. He has given us faculties, which are truthful and not mendacious ; He has given us a reason, which will certainly lead us to truth, if we do but exercise it according to those rules which itself prescribes. (6.) But it would be of no service to give us truth- ful faculties, unless He also gave us the means of knowing that they are truthful. This, therefore, He has also provided. He has implanted in our souls that | intuitional light ' (see n. 12, p. 33) whereby certain judgments carry with them their own evidence of truth. (7.) As He has given us full means of knowing other important truths, by means of these veracious faculties, so also of knowing these: (a) that there is a Perfection called Sanctity; (|3) that this Perfection essentially includes Justice, Veracity, Benevolence ; (y) that certain acts, done by certain beings under certain circumstances, would possess the opposite quality ; or, in other words, would be intrinsecally and necessarily (8.) He has further given us full means of knowing wrong. 110* PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. His Own Existence ; of knowing, that our Creator is the One Necessary Being, Who possesses the Perfection of Sanctity, as He possesses all other Perfections also, in an infinite degree. (9.) He has added the sanction of His Command to the intrinsic obligation of the Natural Rule ; He has forbidden those things which are intrinsecally wrong, and counselled those which are intrinsecally preferable. And these Commands and Counsels are made known to us pari passu with our knowledge of the Natural Rule itself, by the very Reason which He has given us. In other words, He has promulgated to us the Natural Law, by His gift of Reason. After all that has been said in this Chapter, nothing more need be added to make this whole statement fully intelligible : I will but call your attention to one parti- cular contained in it. You will remember, that in the first Section I protested most strongly against the notion, that our confidence in the trustworthiness of our faculties depends on our knowledge of God's Vera- city. Now I have just been stating, that the fact of their trustworthiness arises from the fact that God is Veracious; and I wish you clearly to bear in mind, that these two statements are most perfectly distinct. To say that the fact of their trustworthiness arises from the fact of God's Veracity, is true and indeed undeniable. But to say that our knowledge of the former fact arises from our knowledge of the latter, — or in other words, that we must know God to be Veracious before we can reasonably trust our faculties, — this is not only erro- neous, but absurd. It is of course impossible, without first trusting our faculties, to approach ever so distantly to the conviction that God is Veracious. 51*. Throughout this Section I have been con- sidering the vitally important subject before us, by the best light which my reason can give me. Var- ious Catholics however seem to be under the impres- sion, that it is not a question on which Reason is free to decide ; that there is at least some overwhelming amount of theological authority for the thesis, that all moral THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MORAL TRUTH. Ill* obligation springs from God's Command. So far is this from being true, that I believe the very great pre- ponderance of theological authority to be against any such thesis. But the mere fact that this impression exists, will (I am sure) be admitted as a sufficient reason, for at once proceeding to examine its grounds. Here therefore, as in one or two other parts of the present volume, I will make no scruple of transgressing strictly philosophical ground, for the sake of the prac- tical advantage obtainable by such transgression. In the fourth Section then of the present Chapter, I will bring together such a collection of theological authorities, as will be amply sufficient for my purpose. They will be amply sufficient to shew, how absolutely unfounded is the above impression ; and how completely at liberty is every Catholic to hold those doctrines which have been here advocated, if they appear to him supported by Reason. This fourth Section, for reasons of mere physical convenience, has been removed to the end of the volume (see Preface) ; but it may be studied at once, imme- diately after the present. Very possibly however, you may yourselves have had no such misgivings as those above mentioned; very possibly you may have never supposed that the doctrines which I have been engaged in advocating, whatever their philosophical merit, are theologically reprehensible. In that case, you may perhaps prefer to postpone the purely episodical study of theological authorities, and proceed at once to the further exploration of Moral Truth. 113 SECTION V. On the Idea of Moral Worthiness. 48. I pointed out in the second Section, that there is a considerable number of intuitions, readily elicited by all who have attained the use of reason, which include the idea of ' ought' or c moral obligation/ I will now direct your attention to another considerable class ; containing another idea closely allied to the former, which we may call ' moral worthiness.' Let us give one or two illustrations. A. and B. are two men of my acquaintance. A. de- votes the main current of his life — devotes his labour, his time, his wealth, — to instructing the ignorant, relieving the distressed, promoting the cause of virtue. B. on the other hand, without grossly neglecting any of his immediate duties, leads on the whole a life of great comfort and enjoyment. I am very far from intuing, as an obvious truth, that B.'s course of life is wrong ; but supposing I believe A.'s motives to be pure and simple, I intue it as most undeniable, that A.'s course of conduct is morally better, more worthy of praise, or (to use the phrase which we may consistently adopt) more morally worthy. Or let us proceed, from general courses of conduct, to individual acts ; let us revert to our old hypothesis of the deposited jewel. Suppose I am surrounded with enjoyments, while he to whom I owe them is in penury. By restoring that jewel which is his, and which will enable him to procure all necessaries, I satisfy the re- quisitions of moral obligation. But if, from the pure motive of gratitude, I give him plentifully from what is mine, I act in a manner more morally worthy. If from i 114 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. the same motive (and supposing no other claim to interfere) I share with him my whole substance, my act is more morally worthy still. 49. Now after what has been said at length in the second and third Sections, it will not be necessary to spend many words on a further step. When we say that act H, e. g. is more morally worthy than act K, this idea 'moral worthiness' is not capable of being decomposed or analysed into other more simple ideas. We do not mean, e. g. that act H is more beneficial to society than act K ; nor that it is more conducive to the agent's happiness. It is far more probable indeed, that the more virtuous act is more beneficial to society, and more conducive to the agent's (even temporal) happiness. But to make either of these two latter statements is one thing ; and to make the original statement, viz. that H is morally worthier than K, this is quite another thing. It does follow on the other hand, by the strictest necessity, that if H is more morally worthy than K, it is more deserving of praise, more deserving of reward, and the like. Further, and very importantly; when we say that act H is more morally worthy than K, we do not at all mean that H is more pleasing to our Creator than K. The very opposite is true ; H is more pleasing to our Creator than K, because it is intrinsecally better. Let us make a supposition, which is intrinsecally impossible, Eet is perfectly imaginable (see n. 20, arg. 3, pp. 48, 9). et us suppose we had been created by a being, who should be necessitated indeed to avoid what is intrin- secally wrong, and to forbid it in his creatures ; but who should be in no way necessitated to prefer that which is intrinscally more morally worthy. Let us suppose a being, who should be less pleased with the conduct of one who labours earnestly to avoid every deliberate imperfection, than with that of another who is totally indifferent on the subject. It is quite plain that such a being would not be holy, in that sense in which we ascribe that Attribute to our own dearest Creator — the Infinitely Holy — the one Fountain and Source of ON THE IDEA OF MORAL WORTHINESS. 115 holiness. When Reason declares to us that our Creator is the Cumulus of all Perfections, it inclusively declares that He possesses Sanctity. And when it declares that He possesses Sanctity, it declares, among other things, that, by the very necessity of His Nature, He prefers that which is intrinsecally more morally worthy to that which is intrinsecally less so.* 50. It is very plain, that there is some close con- nection between the idea of moral obligation and the more general idea of moral worthiness. Let us next therefore consider precisely what that connection is. We have already seen its essential nature ; for we have seen that the being morally obliged to do this or that act, means simply that the failing to do it would be morally evil or morally unworthy.^ We may suppose then a graduated scale, as of a thermometer, in- cluding all moral worthiness and unworthiness ; and moral obligation will be at the zero point of moral worthiness. Whatever may be the circumstances of the moment, if I simply comply with my obligation and do no more, I keep clear indeed of moral evil ; but that is all which can be said. I am at zero point; removed, and only just removed, above the region of moral evil. In proportion as I rise above that zero point, I perform acts more and more morally worthy. If I fall below that point, I fall from the region of moral worthiness altogether; and in proportion to the degree in which I sink below it, my acts become more and more sinful. Let us illustrate this, by reverting to our old case of the jewel. If I share my whole fortune with my friend, this is more morally worthy than if I merely give him even a large gift in addition to his jewel. Another act, still less worthy, will be illustrated, if I give him but a small gift in addition to his jewel ; and the lowest, consistent with avoiding evil, if I simply restore the jewel. It is plain I cannot fall below this * This statement will be further explained, and (in some sense) qualified, in the last Section of this Chapter, t See n. 19, p. 42. 116 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. act in moral worthiness, without actual sin : hence this act, the restoration of the jewel, is of strict obli- gation. 51. Here then are two different classes of moral judgments: (1) this or that act is good, is obligatory, is morally evil; (2) this act is more morally worthy than that. And take the two classes together, so far from its being at all a rare or exceptional thing to elicit such judgments, it will perhaps be found on con- sideration, that there are no kind of judgments what- ever, more frequent with the great mass of mankind. 4 How wrongly A. behaved on such an occasion P * How admirably B. encountered that trial!' 'How far pre- ferable is C.'s conduct to D.'s!' Such judgments as these, surely succeed each other quite rapidly in the mind throughout the day. We need not at all, and we cannot, maintain, that the moral judgments of men in general are commonly correct ; but we do say that they are very frequent. In other words, there is no one idea more constantly familiar to the mind of every man, than the idea of moral worthiness considered in itself. Men may make great mistakes, as to those acts or persons whom they praise or blame ; but praise and blame, for supposed merit or demerit, are among the very commonest thoughts in their mind. Much might be said, were this the appropriate place for saying it, on the religious inferences de- rivable from this fact. Our Creator, it seems, is quite in a special degree solicitous, to ensure our remem- brance of this moral Rule which has claim over all our actions. He has therefore so constituted our nature, that even those who are most engrossed with tem- poral objects, who live most undividedly for wealth, or honour, or comfort, bear constant witness against themselves, in this unceasing reference to the ideas of moral obligation and moral worthiness. But all such considerations rather belong to a later part of our work ; and here I need only say, that you will find it (I expect) a most edifying and almost surprising study, as you find one particular after another evolved, ON THE IDEA OF MORAL WORTHINESS. 117 of those which shew how singularly He has formed our nature for the practise of virtue. 52. It will be now advisable, to extend the sense in which we use that important phrase the 'Natural Rule/ We have hitherto used it as synonymous with the ' rule of independent obligation7 (see n. 24). Let us now use it more extensively, as synonymous with the ' rule of independent virtuousness.' Accord- ing to its former acceptation, it signified the sum of all those obligations, which bind us independently of God's commands.* According to its new acceptation, let it include also the sum of all those cases, in which one act is more morally worthy than another, inde- pendently of any special intervention exercised by God. 53. Here then we are led to a further very im- portant enquiry ; how far does this Natural Rule extend. And this general enquiry subdivides itself into three. First, we may ask how far in fact does this Natural Rule extend. Secondly, how far is reason in the ab- stract capable of discovering it. Thirdly, as to reason in the concrete, — exercised under those circumstances in which mankind are placed, — we may ask how great progress is reason in this sense able to make, towards discovering the Natural Rule. Our meaning may be illustrated by a parallel case. There is an indefinite number of properties impressed by God on matter, which, by their various combina- tions, account for all the physical phenomena of the universe. He who should know all these properties, and all their combinations, would be a master of all physical truth. Now (1) nothing is more probable, than that there may be many of these properties, which Reason is absolutely unable to approach ; it may either not possess the data, or the intrinsic power, which would enable it even to advance towards their dis- * So Vasquez, already quoted n. 30 : ' Regida Naturcdis, quae nulla voluntate sed suapte natura constat.' * Ante omne Imperium, ante omnem Voluntatem, immd ante omne Judicium [Dei, est] regvla qucedam harum actionum, quse suapte natur& constat.' 118 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. covery. And yet we might in other ways, as, e. g. by Revelation, be enabled to acquire a full knowledge of such properties. But (2) there will be a considerable number of other properties, whose discovery is quite within the domain of Reason : Reason, exercising its in- trinsic power on those data which are within its grasp, may be fully competent to attain them. And yet (3) there may be multitudes of these latter properties which are so circumstanced, that the reason of man here below never will in fact, nor indeed can, arrive at their knowledge. The process, required for that purpose, may need such constant and prolonged exer- cise of Reason, or so very wide a collection of data, that in fact, circumstanced as we are in this visible world, we are utterly unable to accomplish the task. Just so, as to the Natural Rule. One question is, how far it does in fact actually extend; another, how far Reason in the abstract is able to attain it; a third, how far our reason, in our existing circumstances, enables us to proceed. The following Section will be devoted to a consideration of these three most important questions. 119 SECTION VI. On the Extent of the Natural Rule. 54. Various intuitive judgments, which are most certainly legitimate, and which are common to all mankind, enable us to state with confidence one very important proposition. Justice, Veracity, and Benevo- lence, are intrinsecally good ends of action. The phrase 'good' or virtuous 'ends of action,' I use in somewhat of a technical sense ; which will be fully explained as we proceed. On the other hand, when we speak of three ends, we are not speaking with very strict accuracy ; for Veracity should by rights be included under Justice. I mention Veracity however separately, because of its special importance ; since (as already implied) it is only by proving the intrinsic virtuousness of Veracity, that our acceptance of a revelation becomes possible. However, even if the above statement in itself could be considered as ambiguous in any particular, the course of our remarks will amply explain and define it. I intue that it is wrong, not to give my friend back his jewel : why ? because it is contrary to Justice. I intue that it is wrong, if a governor punishes his subjects, for that which they have no real power to avoid : why? because it is contrary to Justice. I intue that it is wrong, if a traveller comes home, and tells me all kind of falsehoods about the countries which he has visited : why ? because it is contrary to Veracity. Suppose any one has the power most readily to do a great deal, in the way of lessening some terrible mass of evil which surrounds him ; to save numbers, e. g. from imminent danger of death ; and suppose nevertheless he does not move a finger in the matter : I intue that such conduct is morally culpable; why? because it is contrary to Benevolence. 120 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Here are cases, where Justice, Veracity, and Bene- volence, are intued as obligatory : now for others, where, putting aside the question of obligation, they are intued as virtuous ends of action. A governor is aggrieved by some great public evil ; but on preparing to punish the offenders, he finds that they have really not had the full power of acting otherwise. Though greatly provoked at the evil which has ensued, and though the punishing of these men would be very ex- pedient as a piece of state policy, he refuses to do so, because it would be unjust. I intue that this act, wherein his will is thus powerfully affected towards the virtuousness of Justice, is a very virtuous act. A traveller returns from abroad; and, though he might obtain great eclat and make himself a very interesting object by romancing on what he has seen, he confines himself to strict and sober truth. I intue that these acts, wherein his will is thus powerfully affected towards the virtuousness of veracity, are very virtuous acts. A landlord devotes his energy, his time, his money, to redress the misery which exists among his tenants or their labourers. I intue that, if he does all this because his will is so powerfully affected to the virtuousness of Benevolence, these various acts are extremely virtuous. Nor are these principles confined to external acts : they apply fully as much to acts purely internal ; to acts which are consummated in the will, nay, and to acts which do not in any way contemplate eveufuture action. If I earnestly wish that A. B., who has laboured in the service of the state, may receive his just reward — though I do not contemplate my own agency as tend- ing in any way (now or hereafter) to obtain it for him — yet such wish alone is virtuous, under the head of Justice. If I rejoice in the thought, that some invention has greatly mitigated human suffering, — that mere act of complacence is virtuous under the head of Benevolence. Still more keenly do I intue, that to rejoice in the sufferings of any of my fellow - creatures, simply as such, is among the most detestable sins I can commit ; one which, more than almost any other, has earned the title of diabolical. I intue that this is most fully the ON THE EXTENT OF THE NATURAL RULE. 121 case, even though I should not contemplate adding to those sufferings by my own acts in the slightest degree. It is implied in what we have said — but it needs to be explicitly stated — that there is nothing like this on the opposite side. No one ever thought another vir- tuous for this precise reason, viz. because his will was so powerfully affected towards injustice, mendacity, and cruelty. The meaning and force of this remark will be made clearer, by supposing an objection. 4 Surely,7 then it will be urged, ' there are number- 4 less cases, where unjust, mendacious, and cruel acts 4 are applauded. We invade an enemy's country ; and ' think it no kind of sin to deprive the poor inhabitants 4 of that harvest, on which they have been expending a 4 year's toil : yet what can be more unjust ? Again, 4 multitudes of men think a lie most allowable, if there 4 be no other means of defending a friend's life or 4 honour. Lastly, men often think it lawful to inflict 4 very considerable suffering — e.g. all the horrors of 4 war — simply for the sake of national honour or terri- 4 torial aggrandisement. Here then is a large number 4 of intuitions, wherein injustice, mendacity, and cruelty 4 are held as virtuous.' The answer to this is extremely simple. But before giving it, c ex abundanti cautela ' it may be as well to make one most obvious remark. The question through- out is not what men do, but what they approve; not what course they in fact follow, but what they believe to be the path of virtue. And now to the objection. Certainly men often think it lawful to inflict suffer- ing, for very inadequate reason. They think it lawful, under many circumstances, to say what is false. But why ? Not because of any supposed virtuousness in mendacity or cruelty as such ; on the contrary, they probably enough recognize the intrinsic claims of Veracity and Benevolence, at the very moment of acting in opposition to those virtues. Their judgment is of the following kind. 4 Undeniable as is the claim 4 of Veracity where there is no reason to the contrary, 4 my friend's claim on me, to save his life or honour, is 4 superior and should prevail.' And the very sf\me 122 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. account may be given of the other cases specified. It is not mendacity, that is recognized as having a counter claim to Veracity ; but a friend 's life or honour, which is thought to possess such a counter claim. A great multitude of acts are recognized as morally good, simply because they are motived by the virtuousness of truth- telling as such: — when was one ever regarded as good, simply because it was motived by the (supposed) virtuousness of lying as such ? This will appear even more clearly, if we contrast any of those instances, in which (I fully admit) men do elicit false intuitions, in regard to virtuous ends of action. Many, e. g. think it morally culpable, if they leave a stinging injury unrevenged. They will there- fore go through great labour and self-denial, for the purpose of vengeance ; for the sake of fulfilling the (supposed) obligation of vindictive retribution. And many, who witness this conduct, will admire them for so acting. Vindictive retribution then is regarded by many, I admit it, as a virtuous end of action. But who can say that injustice, mendacity, or cruelty, has ever been regarded as such? Who ever thought it his duty to do any one thing, for the sake of fulfilling any supposed obligation to practise injustice, mendacity, or cruelty, simply as such, and for its own sake? or who ever admired another because he so acted ? The various intuitions, which have been assumed as legitimate in the preceding argument, are proved to be so, on precisely the same grounds, which have been already (we suppose) admitted as satisfactory. Let any one look back at our reasons for maintaining that the intuition of moral obligation is itself legitimate (see n. 17, pp. 37, 8); he will see that they apply in their full force to the intuitions which we have here been considering. We infer therefore, that Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence, are legitimately intued as virtuous ends of action. 55. Before proceeding with our research for other virtuous ends, let us consider various important truths, which are implied in the very fact of certain ends being virtuous. Such truths, as soon as established, will hold ON THE EXTENT OF THE NATURAL RULE. 123 at once in regard to Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence ; and they will also of course hold in regard to any other ends, which we may afterwards prove to be virtuous. (1.) We have already seen, that in recognizing any virtuous end of action, it is implied that we never regard, as lawful, the contravening such an end purely for the sake of pleasure or caprice. We may often indeed consider that, in this or that particular case, some other virtuous end, which happens for the mo- ment to conflict, has a preponderating claim ; that Veracity, e. g. may be sacrificed to the claims of Justice or Benevolence. But where no conflicting claim can be put forward, we universally admit the authority of any one virtuous end to be paramount and indefeasible. We never think it lawful, e. g. to inflict cruelty, except to satisfy the claims of Justice or of some other virtuous end. 56. (2.) Suppose I confer various benefits on my fellow-men, yet not at all because of the virtuousness of Benevolence, but for some different end altogether : for instance, suppose I so act in order that I may keep a promise made to my dying father. Such an act may be virtuous under the head of Fidelity (i. e. observance of promises) ; or under the head of Filial piety : but in no sense under the head of Benevolence. Or suppose I so act, for the simple purpose of obtaining the affection of those whom I benefit, with the sole view of reaping some temporal advantage by their help. Such an act will have no virtue whatever ; since it is wholly motived by a desire of temporal gain. Both these statements are obvious as soon as made ; from them, and from an indefinite number of propositions precisely similar and intued with equal clearness, we derive a very important generalization. No act is virtuous, unless it be directed to the virtuousness of some end recognized as virtuous ( c nisi fiat propter honestatem boni cujusdam honesti'). Nor is it virtuous at all, except so far as regards that end, or those ends, to the virtuousness of which it has been directed. 124 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. There is no philosophical proposition, more con- stantly used in Theology than this ; I must beg you therefore most carefully to consider its meaning and its proof, and remember it for future use. 57. (3.) We are now able easily to understand the distinction, so frequently expressed by philosophers, between objective and subjective morality. To confer great benefits on a multitude of men, is objectively most virtuous ; but if I do so merely for the sake of tem- poral gain, my act is subjectively immoral. In ob- jective morality, we consider merely the thing done or resolved on ; but in subjective morality, we consider the frame of mind in which, the circumstances under which, above all the end for which, the agent does it or resolves on it. Nothing is more common, than for acts to be objectively virtuous, but subjectively sinful. On the other hand, it must always be subjectively sinful, to do that which I recognize as objectively wrong. It is a contradiction in terms to say, that any circum- stances can make me right, in doing that which I know to be under all circumstances wrong. But I may often be subjectively virtuous in doing what is objectively wrong, supposing that I do not know it so to be. What those circumstances are, — or in other words when and how far ignorance excuses from sin, — is a further consideration. You will find hereafter, when we arrive at the subject, that there is hardly a more difficult question in all Theology. The same distinction applies to relative degrees of moral worthiness. Let me assume, what every Ca- tholic holds, that the life of Obedience, Poverty, and Celibacy, objectively speaking, is intrinsecally more morally worthy than the life of an ordinary Christian. Yet if I have no vocation to that life, — in other words, if God's gifts to me, whether of nature or grace, are such that I promote my own sanctification better by the more ordinary course, — then subjectively, in my own case, that ordinary course is the more morally worthy of the two. Or again, if in any way God were to ON THE EXTENT OF THE NATURAL RULE. 125 express His preference that I should pursue the more ordinary course — wishing, e. g. so to employ me in some providential work — then also this course would be sub- jectively the better. But on this latter instance, God's expression of a preference, we will here say no more, as we shall treat of it expressly in the next Section. 58. (4.) A. restores his kind friend's deposit under circumstances of great trial : by doing so, he brings himself into the necessity of labouring for his daily bread. B. restores the deposit, without thereby in- curring any serious inconvenience. Objectively speak- ing, A.'s act is more virtuous than B.'s ; for the just and obligatory act is performed under circumstances of greater difficulty. But is A.'s act also subjectively better ? On the surface, we should reply c certainly yes ; ' but a little consideration will shew that something more has to be said. Why are we inclined to think A.'s act the better ? Because, by the very circumstance of resisting such great temptation to dishonesty, he displays a will firmly and efficaciously adhering to the virtuousness of justice. But it is abundantly possible, that B.'s will may in fact adhere quite as efficaciously to that vir- tuousness ; only that he has no opportunity for dis- playing that fact. If therefore we knew (e. g. by Revelation) that such was in truth the case, we should have no hesitation in considering that B.'s act was subjectively as virtuous as A.'s. Here by generalisa- tion we arrive at another proposition, which is of extreme importance both to Theology and Philosophy. My act, casteris paribus, becomes subjectively more virtuous, in proportion as my will adheres more firmly and efficaciously to the virtuousness of the virtuous end 'or ends. 59. (5.) We are now able to arrive at our general idea of a perfectly holy being. And first we will suppose that being to be finite. The intuitions, on which our argument has hitherto rested, apply not to men only, but to all rational creatures ; as will be evident to any one who re- 126 PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. considers them. A finite being then, who should be perfectly good or holy, will unite two characteristics. First, he will avoid all sin ; secondly, his will will adhere to the various virtuous ends of action, with a degree of firmness and efficacity proportioned to the degree of his sanctity. Even at the present stage of our argument then, we have proved so much as this. So soon as we establish by Reason the existence of an Infinitely Perfect Being, we establish the existence of a Being, Whose Will adheres with infinite firmness and efficacity to the virtuousness of Justice, Veracity, and Benevolence.